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The benefi.ta of education and of 
useful knowledge, generally diffused 
through a community, are eaaential 
to the preservation of a free govern­
ment. 
Sam Houston 
Cultivated mind is the guardian 
genius of democracy. • • • It is the 
only dictator that freemen acknowl­
edge and the only security that free­
men desire. 
Mirabeau B. Lamar 
FOREWORD 
In accordance with its usual practice, the Interscholastic League is 
issuing this bulletin for the help and convenience of students who 
wish to prepare themselves for entry into the debating contests of the 
League. 
In the interest of economy, the League has discontinued furnishing 
free copies, and is thus enabled to reduce the price to 15 cents per 
copy. The large free distribution in former years to many schools 
not participating in debate increased the cost to those schools pur­
chasing extra copies, and hence it seems wise to discontinue the free 
distribution, and reduce the cost to those schools actually using the 
publication. 
The Extension Loan Library, University Station, Austin, Texas, 
will furnish any school official in Texas who applies for the same a 
package library on the present question, which he may keep for a 
period of two weeks. These libraries are arranged in four sets, each 
set containing fifteen articles. It is suggested that the debating 
coach order each of the four sets during the season, so that his pupils 
may have access to all of the sixty articles, some of which are general, 
some negative, and some affirmative. 
The present bulletin was prepared by C. Edwin Davis in cooperation 
with the Government Department of the University of Texas. 
The League endorses and commends to debating coaches and judges 
the following statement of the aims of this contest: 
"The purpose of practice debating is to teach young men [and young 
women] to think, and to speak their thoughts effectively. Debaters 
who are so trained should be given precedence over those who recite 
vigorously memorized speeches. The college or high-school debater 
who declaims, in all probability has not written the speech himself. 
Too much help by the coaches [and commercial bureaus] is doing 
much to bring disrepute upon all debating. If judges have the cour­
age to distinguish between declamation and speaking from the floor, 
they can do much to raise the standard of school debating." 
Coaches are cautioned to study carefully the "Instruction to Judges" 
which appear in the "Rules for Debate" in the current issue of the 
Constitution and Rules, Bulletin No. 2822. 
ROY BEDICHEK, 
Chief, Interscholastic League Bureau, 
Extension Division, University of Texas 
"Good argument is a sharp process 
of investigation, leading by mutual 
criticism to some nearer ascertainment 
of truth." 
J. L. GARVIN. 
"The gods have given us speech­
the power which has civilized human 
life; and shall we not strive to make 
the best of it?" 
"It is easy to say that in every dis­
pute we should have no other aim than 
the advancement of truth; but before 
dispute no one knows where it is" .•• 
ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER. 
"Remark likewise two things : that 
such prize arguings were ever on su­
perficial debatable questions; and then 
that they were argued generally by the 
fair laws of battle and logic-fence, by 
one cunning in the same. If their 
purpose was excusable, their effect 
was harmless, perhaps beneficial: that 
of taming noisy mediocrity, and show­
ing it another side of a debatable mat­
ter; to see both sides of which was, for 
the first time, to see the truth of it." 
CARLYLE. 
EXPLANATION 
A large part of the preparation for a student who intends to debate 
this proposition is the acquiring of a thorough knowledge of the 
various agencies involved and the rules of procedure followed in the 
two legislative systems under discussion. He who has this knowledge 
at his finger tips can more effectively use the arguments advanced 
on both sides. 
Because this technical knowledge is so essential, a large part of 
the bulletin is devoted to a comprehensive description of the two 
legislative systems. Although such material, or a lot of it, is not 
within itself pro or con argument, proof on either side must rest on 
it as a groundwork. Because of its importance, it is advisable for 
the student to read straight through the "General" section in order 
that he may not miss essential points. 
Some of the articles listed on the affirmative side may have ma­
terial in them that can be used as negative proof and vice versa. 
It was impossible to get articles, all of which championed only one 
side. 
There is one point which the debaters should keep in mind: under 
the statement of the question the desirability or undesirability of a 
change from one system to the other is not to be debated. The point 
will be for the debaters to attempt to show that according to valid 
standards of efficient law-making the one system works better in its 
nation than the other does in its country. The debaters must also 
guard against letting their speeches take the nature of a general 
debate on the merits of the presidential system of government vs. 
the cabinet system. It is the systems of legislation that are involved 
and not the whole range of administration. 
The brief included in the bulletin is prepared to give the debaters 
the broad outlines of the points around which the debate will probably 
center. Each team, however, should work up its own outline, get a 
larger quantity of proof than this brief includes, and arrange it in 
the manner which seems to be most appropriate. 
C. EDWIN DAVIS. 
University of Texas, August 1, 1928. 

SUGGESTIVE BRIEFS 
Resolved, That the English Ca.binet Method of Legislation ls More 
effi,eient in England than the Committee System Is in the United 
States. 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
I. The question of which of the two systems of legislation is the 
more efficient is a very important and timely one, because 
A. Whether a country has good or bad government depends 
to a large extent on the efficiency of its legislative 
machinery. 
B. The question has been discussed by every authority in 
the field of comparative government since the time 
when Woodrow Wilson's "Congressional Government" 
came off the press. 
C. The last war tested the two systems to the utmost and 
opened anew the floodgates of discussion, for 
1. Certain new features appeared in the working of 
each system which ex'Cited attention. 
D. The increasing necessity for social legislation makes 
the two systems the targets for the criticism of re­
formers in America and in England. 
II. Definitions: 
A. The term "committee syatem," as used in the statement 
of the question, refers not only to the organization and 
functioning of the standing committees but also to the 
other agencies found in the two houses of Congress, 
such as the rules committee, the speaker, the caucus, 
etc., and to the rules of procedure under which these 
agencies function. 
B. The cabinet system in England is that system under 
which the principal public bills are drawn up, introduced 
into Parliament and defended in that body by the chief 
executive officers of the nation who are themselves 
members of Parliament and responsible to it. 
C. An efficient legislative system in democracies such as 
the United States and Great Britain are may be defined 
as one which is responsible to the will of the people, 
which provides for the planning of a well-conceived 
legislative program, which provides for the expeditious 
handling of the mass of measures which confronts a 
modern legislative body, and which guarantees the 
enactment of sound financial measures. 
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III. Admitted matter: 
A. Both sides will admit that neither system is perfect in 
every particular. 
IV. Issues: 
A. Is the English system more responsible to the will of 
the people than the American system? 
B. Does the English system provide for the enactment of 
legislation which is better planned than does the 
American system? 
C. Does the English system provide for greater expedition 
in handling the mass of proposed legislation that con­
fronts every legislative body? 
D. Is the handling of financial measures more in line 
with sound financial policy in England? 
INTRODUCTION TO AFFIRMATIVE CASE 
I. The cabinet system of legislation in its present form is the out­
come of the evolution of English political institutions, because 
A. The Cabinet has inherited much of the power once pos­
sessed by the king of England. 
DISCUSSION OF THE AFFIRMATIVE CASE 
I. The English system is more responsible to the will of the 
people, because 
A. In England there are definite leaders who can be held 
responsible for the measures enacted, whereas this is 
not true in America, for 
1. In England the Cabinet with the prime minister 
at its head is held solely responsible if the 
wishes of the people are not expressed in legis­
lation. 
2. In the United States there are several agencies 
which divide the leadership and the public cannot 
fix the responsibility, for 
a. The speaker, the rules committee, the floor 
leader, the steering committee, the chair­
men of committees, the conference commit­
tee, and the caucus all play an indetermi­
nate part. 
3. This divided sort of leadership operates in the 
dark, for 
a. The caucus acts secretly. 
b. The committees hold secret executive ses­
sions. 
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c. The speaker, floor leader, and steering 
committee act quietly and without publicity. 
d. The conference committee is hardly re­
sponsible to anyone. 
B. The House of Commons and the Cabinet maintain a 
closer contact with the people than is true in America, 
for 
1. In England the members of the House of Com­
mons find how their constituents stand on major 
issues before they cast their vote, for 
a. The possibility of a dissolution of Parlia­
ment is always imminent and the members 
want to stay in the good graces of the elec­
torate so that they will be reelected. 
2. The Cabinet frames its bills only after discover­
ing the popular will, for 
a. In case of defeat by Parliament it must 
depend on a favorable verdict from the 
people to keep it in power. 
3. In America Congress need not pay so much atten­
tion to the will of the people, for 
a. The members are elected for a fixed term. 
C. The English system makes for the creation of a decided 
public opinion on points of public policy, for 
1. 'Ihe debates in the House of Commons between 
the government and the opposition are watched 
with all interest by the people, for 
a. There is an element of the spectacular in 
them, for 
(1) The votes after these debates may 
oust ministries. 
2. In America debates over legislation rarely are 
read by the people, for 
a. There is nothing sensational attendant on 
the outcome. 
b. Most of the discussion takes place in secret 
meetings of the committees. 
II. The English system provides for the enactment of legislation 
which is better planned than does the American system, be­
cause 
A. The Cabinet is in a better position to plan a connected 
program than are the party leaders in the United 
States, for 
1. The Cabinet initiates all public bills of major 
importance and thus it has a check on what 
Parliament will consider. 
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2. The Cabinet sees to it that private member's bills 
which do not harmonize with the Cabinet's pro­
gram do not pass, for 
a. The Cabinet can defeat any private mem­
ber's bill by bringing its influence to bear 
against it. 
3. There is opportunity given for only a limited 
number of private member's bills each session. 
4. The Cabinet members know what laws are needed, 
for 
a. They are in charge of administrative de­
partments. 
B. In America there is no real leadership in the prepara­
tion of a program, for 
1. Every individual member may introduce as many 
measures as he chooses. 
2. The committees are like so many independent and 
uncoordinated legislatures, for 
a. The caucus exercises no comprehensive su­
pervision over their work, for 
(1) The records show that almost with­
out exception the caucus ratifies the 
work of the respective committees. 
3. The President and the Cabinet can exercise no 
real leadership, for 
a. All their work must be indirect, for 
(1) They cannot debate on the floor of 
the Senate and House of Repre­
sentatives. 
b. History shows that three-fourths of our 
Presidents have not been in any sense of 
the word leaders of Congress. 
c. Very often the President and the majority 
in Congress are members of different po­
litical parties. 
C. Expert aid is better provided in the framing of bills 
in England, for 
1. In England the legislative counsellors can be and 
are used more effectively than they are in Amer­
ica, for 
a. The English Cabinet members take all their 
measures to the office of the legislative 
counsel and the counsellors harmonize the 
proposed laws with past enactments. 
b. In America the committee members are not 
forced to consult the legislative counsellor. 
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c. The American congressmen regard the 
counsellor as exercising a powe:t which in­
fringes on their freedom so they are slow 
in visiting him. 
d. The counsellor can exercise no such co­
ordinating influence in America as he can 
in England because he has to deal with 
proposals coming from many different com­
mittees instead of the measures coming 
from one committee. 
I II. The English system provides for greater expedition in handling 
the mass of legislation that confronts a legislature, for 
A. There is no last minute rush which leads to congestion 
at the end of the session in England, for 
1. The Cabinet has its program planned in advance 
of the session and can put it through in regular 
order. 
2. The private members have a chance to introduce 
only a limited number of bills. 
3. The Cabinet allows adequate debate, but it can 
apply an effective closure in case of a time­
wasting filibuster. 
4. The debates are kept on the subject because they 
are directed by a Cabinet member. 
B. The American system makes for congestion, for 
1. A huge number of measures are introduced each 
year. 
2. Each committee trys to get action on its measures 
before the session ends and congestion results. 
3. Many bills are passed under a suspension of the 
rules without adequate discussion. 
C. The English system does away with the evils of a 
bicameral legislature, for 
1. The cabinet system has practically done away 
with the power of the Lords to check legislation, 
for 
a. The cabinet system can only work ef­
ficiently when it owes responsibility to only 
one house. 
b. The Cabinet acts as a sort of conference 
committee between the two houses and 
compromises their differences. 
2. The decrease in the power of the Lords is in line 
with advanced political thinking, for 
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a. Many authorities say that the only purpose 
an upper house serves is to slow up legis­
lation. 
3. In America the Senate kills many bills which 
have been painstakingly considered and passed in 
the House of Representatives, and the House does 
the same for bills coming from the Senate. 
4. The President vetoes bills which have passed both 
houses and which may be the results of years of 
hard labor in those bodies; e.g., President 
Coolidge's veto of the farm relief measures. 
D. The English system simplifies procedure by making it 
possible to cut out one type of bill which is very 
numerous in the United States, for 
1. The cabinet system allows the department heads 
to issue administrative orders which take the 
place of many bills, for 
a. The Parliament does not fear to delegate 
this power to the Cabinet, for 
(1) It maintains an effective check over 
the Cabinet officials. 
IV. The handling of financial measures is more in line with sound 
financial policy in England, because 
A. Responsibility for financial legislation is fixed in Eng• 
land, for 
1. The Cabinet compiles the budget and defends it 
against attacks on the floor. 
2. The Cabinet allows very few changes in the 
budget in Parliament. 
B. Responsibility is not fixed in America, for 
1. There are many agencies which handle the budget 
no one of which is responsible to the others, for 
a. The budget bureau, the standing commit­
tees in the two houses of Congress, and 
the committees of the whole house all play 
a part. 
b. The finance measures practically always 
have to be sent to a conference committee 
where there is extreme irresponsibility. 
C. The British system results in more economy, for 
1. In England the budget bills must pass in virtually 
the same form in which they are introduced or 
the ministry will resign. 
2. In the debates on the financial measures on the 
floor of the House of Commons the Cabinet mem­
bers have to explain thoroughly what they intend 
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to do with the money they are asking for if a 
question comes up about it. 
3. In America many useless appropriations are 
voted, for 
a. In the secrecy of the committee rooms in 
the House and in the Senate the "pork" 
is parcelled out. 
4. In the Senate there is no stern party control and 
the measures are sometimes amended beyond rec­
ognition. 
INTRODUCTION TO NEGATIVE CASE 
I. The committee system is a natural outgrowth of the American 
system of separation of powers, because 
A. Under the working of the theory of separation of 
powers the President and his Cabinet cannot take 
very much of the initiative in sifting the measures to 
be introduced into Congress, and 
B. In legislative bodies as large as our House of Repre­
sentatives there must be some way to divide the work 
and provide leadership, for 
1. It would be impossible for the whole House to 
examine critically even a small portion of all the 
measures which are introduced. 
DISCUSSION OF THE NEGATIVE CASE 
I. The American system is as responsible to the people as is the 
English system, for 
A. The party in power can be held responsible for good 
or bad legislation just as is done in England, for 
1. The organization of the House and Senate is on 
party lines, for 
a. The committees are organized on party 
lines. 
b. The accepted leaders are partisan, for 
(1) The speaker, floor leader, etc., are 
all party workers. 
B. The desires of the people in various parts of the coun­
try are better responded to under the American system, 
for 
1. The individual Congressman has more power to 
get his bills passed than is true in England, for 
a. He serves on at least one of the committees. 
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b. He can introduce as many bills as he 
cares to. 
c. He is a member of one of the caucuses 
which are the policy-determining bodies of 
the respective parties. 
2. In England the only power which has been re­
served to the private member is that of criticising 
the cabinet measures. 
C. The Cabinet in England is not really responsible to the 
representatives of the people except in theory, for 
1. It pays slight regard to the criticisms offered by 
private members, for 
a. It can always muster a majority in support 
of its bills, for 
(1) Party allegiance is strong in Eng­
land. 
(2) The Cabinet can threaten a disso­
lution which is expensive to the 
members of the House of Commons 
because they have to campaign for 
reelection. 
2. The Cabinet deliberates in secret and the public 
doesn't have a chance to find out why a certain 
bill is proposed, for 
a. The Cabinet members can easily evade the 
questions asked during the question-hour. 
3. The Cabinet is not selected after a consideration 
of the will of the people, for 
a. The prime minister sometimes disregards 
the wishes of the House of Commons in se­
lecting Cabinet officers. 
D. The American system provides safeguards to insure 
responsibility, for 
1. History shows that a system of checks and bal­
ances must be imposed on any one agency of 
government if it is to remain responsible to the 
people, and 
2. In the United States the two houses of Congress 
constitute an effective check on each other with 
the President as a check on both. 
4. The practically unlimited debate in the Senate 
airs policies. 
5. Under the English system practically the only 
check on the Cabinet is that imposed by the elec­
torate and this is an indirect check, for 
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a. The cabinet system has practically killed 
the value of the Lords as a checking body. 
II. The American system provides for the enactment of legislation 
which is as well planned as that in England, because 
A. The division of labor under the committee system helps 
in the planning of legislation, for 
1. Committeemen are assigned to the field they know 
most about and which they are interested in, and 
they can give all their time to arranging co­
herent legislation in that field. 
2. Many of the committeemen serve for long terms 
and they get better acquainted with their field 
than does an English Cabinet officer whose tenure 
is often short-lived. 
3. Measures are given a more critical examination 
than is true under the Cabinet-controlled English 
system, for 
a. Hearings are conducted for months at a 
time by some of the important committees. 
4. Cabinet officials in England have too much to do 
to prepare a good legislative program, for 
a. They both administer and legislate. 
B. There is effective leadership in America to coordinate 
the program, for 
1. The President and Cabinet members influence 
legislation, for 
a. The President is the recognized leader of 
his party with the duty of phrasing the 
program on the major policies to which the 
party is pledged. 
b. The President's message, appeals to the 
country, veto, conferences with Congress­
men all help him to put over his measures. 
c. Cabinet officials attend committee meetings 
and give information, and thus have a tre­
mendous influence. 
d. It has been estimated that a large propor­
tion of the public bills that find their way 
into Congress emanate from an executive 
department. 
2. Congress has an effective internal machinery to 
carry out an integrated program, for 
a. The caucus binds the members of the ma­
jority party to act in unison on bills in­
volving party policy. 
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b. The rules committee, the steering commit­
tee, the floor leader, and the speaker act 
together to see that the party program is 
enacted. 
C. There is more chance for a farsighted policy to be 
carried out in the United States, for 
1. The Cabinet in England is not sure of its tenure, 
for 
a. It may be overthrown just after it has 
inaugurated a program which it would take 
three or four years to carry out. 
2. In the United States an administration is sure of 
a fixed tenure and a comprehensive program can 
be planned several years in advance. 
D. Expert aid in drafting measures is as well provided in 
the United States as in England, for 
1. There is a legislative counsellor provided for each 
house of Congress. 
2. The Congressmen are showing an increasing tend­
ency to seek his aid. 
III. The American system provides for as much expedition in the 
handling of the mass of work that confronts the legislative 
body, because 
A. There is a scientific division of work in America, for 
1. The discussion of many bills is carried on simul­
taneously in the committee rooms. 
2. The Houses of Congress accept in most cases the 
report that a committee makes on a bill. 
B. In England the benefits of the committee system are 
recognized, for 
1. Just after the war the House of Commons set up 
a committee system which more nearly ap­
proached the system in the United States than 
the one they had used previously. 
2. The present English committee system does not 
carry the division of work far enough, and the 
committees do not have the independent powery 
that they have in America. 
3. Many Englishmen, including among their number 
such prominent political scientists as Lecky and 
Marriot advocate a more extensive use of com­
mittees in England. 
C. The leaders in the American Congress r.an control the 
business of the two houses just as eff~ctively as the 
British Cabinet controls the House of Commons, for 
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1. In the House of Representatives the majority 
floor leader prepares a schedule of work which is 
rigidly followed, for 
a. The rules conunittee can be used to bring 
in a rule which will secure consideration 
for the measure which the leaders wish to 
consider. 
2. The leadership in the Senate is less rigid, but the 
party in po~r manages to guide legislation, for 
a. The majority floor leader plans a program 
to be followed. 
3. At times the leaders of the two houses get to­
gether and work out a joint program. 
IV. The handling of financial measures is as much in line with 
sound financial policy as it is in England, for 
A. There is an efficient executive budget, for 
1. The estimates are prepared by the budget bureau 
whose head is responsible to the President alone. 
B. Congress gives due weight to this budget in preparing 
financial measures, for 
1. The practice of "pork-barrel" legislation has 
pra-ctically disappeared. 
2. There is very little amendment of the appropria­
tion measures after they reach the floor of the 
house in the House of Representatives. 
C. Ample opportunity is given for all members to debate 
the finance measures, for 
1. In both the Senate and the House of Repre­
sentatives they are considered in the Committee 
of the Whole House. 
2. The Senate debates the bills very thoroughly. 
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GENERAL MATERIAL ON THE CABINET 
SYSTEM 
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 
(Munro's "The Governments of Europe," pp. 168-169, 170-171, The Macmillan 
Company, New York, 1925.) 
. In legislative bodies throughout the world a large part of the 
preliminary work is assigned to committees. The House of Commons 
is no exception. All bills now go automatically to one of its regular 
committees unles.s the House votes otherwise in particular cases. 
These committees of the House of Commons are of various types. 
First there are the standing committees, as they are called-e<>mmit­
tees which are appointed at the opening of a session and remain un­
changed until Parliament is prorogued. To these standing commit­
tees, of which there are now six in all, certain classes of bills are re­
f erred; each committee receiving the measures which fall within its 
particular field of jurisdiction. Second, there are select committees, 
appointed to consider and report upon individual measures or ques­
tions which involve some new principle, or upon s<>me subject which 
has n<>t yet come before the House in the form of a bill. They differ 
from standing committees in that they rarely deal with public bills 
and very often are merely appointed to make a study of some timely 
subject. Some of these select committees continue through the session 
and hence are often called sessional select committees or, more briefly, 
sessional committees. 
Finally, there is the Committee of the Whole House. In other 
words, the entire House sits as a committee; the Speaker leaves the 
chair and his place is taken by a chairman who is appointed afresh 
in each new Parliament and is a stanch party man; the mace is placed 
under the table as a sign that the House, as a House, has adjourned. 
This method of doing business goes back to Stuart times. When the 
House resolves itself into Committee of the Whole the more rigid rules 
of procedure are relaxed; a member may speak several times on the 
same question if he desires, and any matter which is voted upon can 
easily be opened for reconsideration. Because procedure in the 
Committee of the Whole House is so simple and flexible the practice 
of considering the details of measures in this way has proved popular 
not only in the House of Commons at Westminster but in the House of 
Representatives at Washington. When the Committee of the Whole 
House has finished with its consideration of a measure, item by item, 
a motion is made that the committee "rise and report." The Speaker 
then resumes the chair and the chairman reports the committee's 
action, in other words the House reports to itself and then proceeds 
to adopt its own recommendations ...• 
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Committees in the House of Commons (with the ex>eeption of the 
Committee of the Whole House) are chosen by a committee of selec­
tion. This committee of selecti<m, which contains eleven members, 
is named by the House itself at the beginning of each parliamentary 
session. But while ostensibly named by the House itself, the mem­
bership of the com'mittee of selection is arranged in advance by a con­
ference between the prime minister and the leader of the opposition. 
In making up the various standing and select committees, this com­
mittee of selection does not pay strict attention to party lines, although 
members of the different parties are selected in something like the 
proportion that they have in the House as a whole. Each standing 
committee ordinarily contains from forty to sixty members, but the 
rules of the House provide that from ten to fifteen supernumerary 
members may be added to serve during the consideration of any 
designated measure; the design being to strengthen the committee 
when some matter requiring special knowledge is before it. Select 
commdttees are much smaller; they ordinarily have fifteen members, 
except in the case of select com'mittees on private bills, which have 
four members only. Each standing or select committee has a chair­
man but this official is neither named by the com!mittee of selection, 
at is the practice in Congress, nor chosen by the committee itself. 
Instead, the committee of selection names a panel of chairmen and this 
panel chooses from its own membership a chairman for each com­
mittee. 
The Cabinet is not officially ranked as a committee of the House 
of Com?nDns, yet it is in fact the greatest parliamentary committee 
of them all. It is the steering committee. It is the originator and 
the censor of all important business. Nothing of any general im­
portance has much chance of getting through the House of Commons 
unless the ministry favors it or at least refrains from opposing it; 
on the other hand a measure has every chance of passing if the 
Cabinet lends its support. There are exceptions to this general rule, 
of course, and these exceptions were naturally more frequent during 
the time when a Labor ministry was in power without firm control of 
a majority in the House. But when a ministry controls a majority, 
as it usually does, there is no gainsaying its mastery of the legislative 
program. 
Nevertheless the Cabinet's control of com:mittees is by no means 
so strong as its control of the House. Party discipline is not so striet 
in the one as in the other. Hence it frequently happens that a 
standing committee amends a bill in a way which the ministers dis­
like. The minister in charge of the bill must then decide (usually in 
consultation with his colleagues) whether he will accept the am.end­
ment or ask the House to strike it out when the committee reports 
the bill. This the House will do if the ministry insists, but coercive 
tactics are not popular in England and the ministers often find it 
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wise to concede or compromise. In any event the minister in charge 
of a government measure must familiarize himself with every detail 
of it, must follow its course day by day in committee, and must guide 
it through the House. It is for this reason that the ministers are the 
real leaders of the Commons and collectively form "the great standing 
committee of Parliament." ... 
THE PROCESS OF LAW MAKING IN PARLIAMENT 
(Munro's "The Governments of Europe," pp. 176-186, 192-193, The Macmillan 
Company, New York.) 
... To the casual visitor, sitting in the galleries, the method of 
legislative procedure at Westminster and at Washington seem to be 
wholly unlike. But the differences, save in one important respect, 
are superficial only. They do not affect the underlying principles, 
which (with one exception) are the same in all English-speaking 
legislative chambers. Measures are introduced on both sides of the 
Atlantic in much the same way; they are given three readings, re­
ferred to committees, reported out, debated, amended, and sent to the 
other chamber. The differences relate principally to the organization 
and work of the committees and the limitations on debate. Congress 
has modified the original rules for the purpose of expediting business, 
but the fundamentals remain unaltered. The colonial assemblies of 
America borrowed their procedure from Parliament; the state legis­
latures which were called together after the Declaration of Inde­
pendence continued these rules; and Congress, on its organization in 
1788, took its procedure from the state legislatures. 
There is, however, one important feature in which the process of 
legislation in Congress has diverged from that of Parliament. In 
Parliament a distinction has long been made, and is still made, 
between public and private bills; in Congress there is no such dis­
tinction. According to British parliamentary practice a public bill 
is one which affects the general interest and ostensibly concerns the 
whole people or, at any rate, a large portion of them. A measure for 
changing the tax laws is a public bill; so is a bill for altering suffrage, 
or raising the age of compulsory school attendance, or establishing a 
new administrative department. A private bill, on the other hand, is 
one which relates to the interest of some individual, or corporation, 
or municipality. A bill authorizing the construction of a new railway 
line, or the extension of an old one, or giving a municipality powers 
beyond those which it possesses by general law, is a private bill. 
There are some bills, of course, which come in the twilight zone be­
tween these two categories, but so many measures have been pre­
sented to Parliament and ruled upon during its long history that the 
precedents now cover almost every conceivable case, and the Speak.er 
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merely follows these precedents in deciding, when doubt arises, 
whether a bill belongs in the public or the private class. 
Public bills may be brought in by a member of a ministry, in which 
case they are known as government bills. All money bills must be 
SCI introduced. But public bills (other than those which relate to the 
raising and spending of money) may also be brought in by any pri­
vate member; that is, by a member of the House who is not a member 
of the ministry. Such public bills are known as private members' 
bills, and a word of caution should be added lest the reader drop into 
the pitfall of confusing these "private members' bills" with "private 
bills." Government bills, money bills, and private members' bills are 
all pubUc bills and in the process of legislation are so dealt with. Pri­
vate bills, on the other band, are based on petitions from the parties 
directly interested and go through a special procedure. Any bill, 
whether public or private, may be introduced either in the House of 
Commons or the House of Lords; the only exception being that money 
bills must originate in the Commons. As a matter of practice, how­
ever, the great majority of all measures originate in the Commons. 
Most of the important measures laid before Parliament are govern­
ment bills, which means that much preliminary consideration is given 
to them by the Cabinet. Important government bills are all cut and 
dried at Whitehall before being brought to Westminster. One of the 
ministers makes the first rough outline of a bill, stating only the main 
principles. This he lays before the Cabinet for discussion. If the 
principles are agreed to, he then turns his outline over to an expert 
draftsman for elaboration into a finished measure, with sections, sub­
sections, and paragraphs. Thereupon the Cabinet gives it a final look­
over and the bill is ready to be introduced. The introduction of every 
bill is pre~eded by a notice, printed in the Orders of the Day. When 
called upon by the Speaker, the minister or private member files his 
bill with the clerk of the House, who reads its title aloud. Thereupon, 
without hearing the contents of the bill and without debate, the 
House orders it to be printed and placed in line for a second 
reading. The measure must then wait its turn. On matters of 
great importance the opposition usually gets its first inkling of min­
isterial policy at the initial reading. C'abinet secrets are well kept in 
England. 
In due course the bill is again reached by the House; it appears 
among the Orders of the Day, and its sponsor moves that it be 
"read a second time." This second reading gives opportunity for a 
debate on the principles of the bill. Discussions of individual pro­
visions are tabooed, and amendments which merely aim to alter the 
phraseology of the bill are not in order at this stage. The question 
is whether the House desires legislation of the proposed type at all. 
If the opposition desires to test its strength with the ministry, here 
ii' the opportunity to do it. It may move that the bill be given its 
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second reading "this day six months," which would put it over to a 
date when the House is not in session, and hence is equivalent to an 
indefinite postponement. Or it may offer some resolution which is hos­
tile to the general tenor of the bill. Long debates often mark this 
stage .in the progress of important measures--debates which extend 
over several days. Such debates are usually followed by a vote (a 
"division" it is called in England) which determines whether the 
House approves or disapproves the principles of the bill. In the case 
of a government measure a defeat at this stage betokens a want of 
confidence in the ministry and under normal conditions would compel 
it to resign. Only on the rarest occasions, however, has a government 
measure been refused a second reading. 
Having passed its second reading the bill enters the committee stage. 
It is referred to a committee for the consideration of its detailed pro­
v1s10ns. Ordinarily every public bill (except a money bill) goes to one 
of the six standing committees; but in exceptional cases, the House 
sometimes orders it to a select committee. If the measure be a money 
bill, it goes to the committee of the whole house immediately after 
its second reading. Moreover, the House may at any time and for 
any reason order a non-financial measure referred to the committee 
of the whole house, but this is seldom done. 
The organization of these various committees has already been ex­
plained. Every measure sooner or later reaches the House from a 
standing committee, a select committee, or from the Committee of 
the Whole House. Then it enters the report stage, being laid before 
the House in amended and reprinted form_ Bills may come back ·from 
committees and be given their third reading forthwith, but important 
measures rarely have any such good fortune. If amendments have 
been made in committee, these may be debated during the report stage, 
and alternative amendments offered. All the old questions which were 
threshed out at the second reading may be debated over again-and 
in the case of a controversial measure they usually are. At the close 
of this debate the measure is ready for its third reading. In connec­
tion with the third reading of a bill no amendments are in order. 
If it is desired to change the substance or phraseology of a clause, 
even slightly, the bill must go back to committee. The House must 
now accept or reject the bill as it stands. Rejections at the third 
reading are not common. Here ends the action of the Commons and 
the bill goes to the House of Lords for concurrence. 
British parliamentary procedure is based upon the theory that the 
initiative, as respects all public measures, belongs to the Cabinet and 
that government measures ought to have the right of way. Hence, 
although public bills may be introduced by private members, they 
have relatively little chance of passage or even of prolonged discus­
si-0n. This is because most of the daily sittings of the House are 
reserved for government measures and only a few are available for 
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the consideration of private members' bills. Even these sittings. 
moreover, are taken over by the ministry for government bills when 
the pressure of business becomes heavy. Nevertheless, private mem­
bers sponsor a great many public bills, and as there is no chance of 
consideri.ng them all, the rules of the House provide that a selection 
from the entire grist shall be made by lot. At an appointed hour, 
therefore, those private members who desire to introduce public bills 
are required to put their cards in a box at the clerk's table, and the 
clerk draws them out one by one. The member whose name is first 
drawn gets the opportunity to introduce his bill on the first Friday of 
the session; the second member gets the second Friday, and so on till 
the Fridays of the session are exhausted-twelve or fifteen of them 
in all. 
Having had the good fortune to get his bill on the Orders in this 
way, the private member moves that it be read a first time and se­
cures it a second reading; it then goes to one of the standing com­
mittees, and follows the same procedure as other public bills. "If a 
member is lucky in this lottery and can introduce a bill which is 
generally popular, and which neither the ministers nor any of his 
fellow-members dislike, and if he possesses the art of appeasing 
opposition, he may manage adroitly to steer his bill through a par­
liamentary session." But few members can hope to run this gauntlet 
successfully and although scores of private members' bills are pre­
pared on the eve of each session it is unusual for more than a half 
dozen of them to gain places on the statute book before Parliament is 
prorogued or dissolved. 
So much for public bills, whether introduced by the ministry or 
by private members. All other bills are known as private bills. The 
most numerous class among these private bills are bills introduced by 
municipalities asking for special powers. English municipalities have 
a broad range of powers laid down by general law, but from time to 
time they desire special powers in addition. These powers they seek, 
in many instances, by means of private bills. Every year Parliament 
gives special powers to individual cities (boroughs) in this way. A 
highly advantageous arrangement this is deemed to be, for it gives 
flexibility to the system of local government and enables Parliament 
to give one municipality additional powers as an experiment without 
committing itself to the same policy for all. 
These private bills are presented to Parliament in a different way 
and do not follow the same procedure as public bills. They are pre­
sented in the form of petitions with the bills attached. They cannot 
be introduced by merely giving notice on the order paper but must 
first go before two parliamentary officials (one from each House) 
known as the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills. Every petition 
for a private bill must be preceded by certain published notices, the 
object of which is to inform those whose private interests may be 
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affected by the bill. Copies must also be sent in advance to the gov­
ernment departments concerned-to the Board of Trade in the case 
of a private bill incorporating a gas company, for example, or to the 
Ministry of Transport in the case of a bill authorizing the taking of 
land for a street railway. It is the duty of the Examiners to see 
that these requirements as to notice and copies have been complied 
with. If they find that there has been full compliance, they so certify, 
and the bill may then be presented in either House. If they find 
that the requirements have not been fully observed they so report to 
both Houses which then refer the bill to two committees--one ap­
pointed by the House of Lords and the other by the House of Commons 
at the beginning of each session. These are known as the Committees 
on Standing Orders, and they decide whether the non-compliance shall 
be overlooked and the bill introduced at the current session. Either 
House, on the recommendation of its committee, will then permit the 
bill to be brought in. Otherwise, it is sent back to the petitioners and 
cannot be considered until the next session. 
On introduction, all private bills are read a first time and ordered 
to be read a second time. After second reading, if there is no oppo­
sition, they are referred to a committee on unopposed bills, unless 
some new principle is embodied in one of the bills, in which case it 
may be sent to a select committee. If there is opposition a bill goes 
to one of the private bills committees. These are small committees 
of disinterested members, who are appointed by the committee of 
selection from lists prepared by the party whips. A private bills 
committee may be named to consider a single bill, but more often 
every such committee gets a group of measures. Before going on a 
private bills committee, however, each member must sign a declaration 
that he has no personal interest, and that his constituents have no 
local interest in the measures to be considered. 
The private bills committees, each in its own committee room, give 
hearings to all who have a definite interest in the bills, whether for or 
against. Every private bill begins with a preamble setting forth the 
object of the bill. The committee first hears evidence and arguments 
on the question whether it is expedient to grant parliamentary powers 
for the fulfilment of this object. Then it decides that the preamble 
is proved or not proved. If the latter, the bill drops; if the former, 
the committee then proceeds with hearings on the clauses of the bill. 
These hearings are of the nature of fair and thorough investigations; 
they are conducted by paid counsel on both sides, with testimony as 
in a court of law and arguments at the close. They differ from the 
legislative committee hearings with which Americans are familiar in 
that none but persons who have a locus standi, in other words a 
demonstrable interest in the bill, are permitted to give testimony 
before the committee. The committee, examining the bill and the 
evidence, has at its disposal a report from the ministry of health, the 
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board of trade, the ministry of transport, or some other central de­
partment. In this way it is possible to make sure that the bill does 
not conflict with the general policy of the government or create an 
undesirable precedent. But it cannot be too strongly emphasized that 
the work of a private bills committee, while legislative in form, is 
largely administrative in effect, and is carried out in accordance with 
a procedure which is quasi-judicial in character. 
When a private bill committee has reached its decision it reports 
each bill, favorably or unfavorably, and with or without amendments 
to the House which its members represent. The committee's report 
on the bill is almost invariably accepted, although there is no ques­
tion as to the right of either House to reject a report on a private 
bill if it chooses to do so. But the members know that the committee 
has been impartially constituted, that it has given both sides a fair 
hearing, and that it has consulted the experts. They realize that rec­
ommendations coming before the House in this way should not be 
rejected by men who have had no opportunity to become acquainted 
with the facts. Occasionally, however, a private bill raises some 
issues of general policy and then the House may divide on the com­
mittee's report. But ordinarily it accepts the recommendation without 
discussion and thereafter the private bill takes the same course as a 
public bill. 
The quest for private or special acts of Parliament has been con­
siderably slackened by the use of "orders." These orders are issued 
by a central department and they become effective either auto­
matically or when confirmed by Parliament. In the latter case they 
are known as "provisional orders." The reason for the issuance of 
these orders is that many general laws which have been passed by 
Parliament (such as the Public Health Acts and the various acts 
relating to railways, street railways, public lighting, poor relief, and 
education), authorze the various government departments, such as the 
ministry of health, the board of trade, or the home office, to grant 
certain powers to corporations and municipalities whenever proper 
cause for such action can be shown. When, therefore, a power not 
already conferred by law is desired by some municipality, corpora­
tion, or individual, an application is made to whichever department 
has jurisdiction in the matter. 
For example, an application for authority to finance a hospital 
by the issue of municipal bonds goes to the ministry of health. 
1'he ministry, through its administrative officers, thereupon enquires 
into the merits of the application, and if it decides that the permis­
sion ought to be granted, an order is issued conferring the power 
desired. This order, as has been said, may be a provisional order, 
in which case it requires for its validity the subsequent ratifica­
tion of parliament. The usual practice is to lump several pro­
visional orders into a confirmation bill, and in that form they are 
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presented for enactment into law. As a rule there is no opposition 
to these confirmation bills, in which case they are referred to the 
committee on unopposed private bills, and go through the usual 
procedure. But if opposition arises they are referred to a select 
committee. It is less expensive to obtain authority in this way 
than by petitioning for a special act of parliament and the prac­
tice of applying for "orders" has become increasingly popular in 
recent years. Even to a greater extent than the private bill pro­
cedure this plan has the merit of relieving the House from what 
would otherwise be a heavy burden upon its time and attention. 
It has sometimes been suggested that Congress, and the state 
legislatures as well, might unburden themselves in this way from 
the great pressure now placed upon them. They might authorize 
the various executive departments (such as the department of 
commerce in the National Government, or the department of edu­
cation, or of public utilities in the state governments) to issue 
provisional orders which would have the force of law when con­
firmed by legislative enactments. But the American scheme of 
government by checks and balances does not lend itself readily 
to any such procedure. In Great Britain an executive department, 
being assured that there is a legislative majority behind it, can 
usually count upon the confirmation of its acts. In the United 
States there would be no assurance of such confirmation. The 
majority in Congress, or in a state legislature, is often hostile to 
the executive; and even when the two branches of government 
represent the same political party they do not always work in 
cooperation. Certainty of confirmation (save in very exceptional 
instances) is the feature which makes the English plan workablP­
and no such certainty could be hoped for in America. To some 
extent in recent years, however, American legislatures have been 
giving to various administrative authorities and boards the right 
to issue orders having virtually the force of law-without the neces­
sity of confirmation. The order-issuing powers given to the Inter­
state Commerce Commission, to the Federal Trade Board, and to 
public utilities commissions in the various states, afford good 
examples. . . . . , 
In the House of Commons the rule relating to the previous ques­
tion was devised and adopted more than three hundred years ago. 
But in its original form this rule did not accomplish much, as was 
shown during the debates on Irish questions, so the obstructionist 
tactics of the opposition led ultimately to the adoption of the 
closure, as it is called. This is substantially the previous question 
rule as followed in the House of Representatives except that the 
speaker of the House of Commons may refuse to put the motion if 
he believes it unfair to the minority; a power which the speaker at 
Washington does not have. But even this did not put an end to 
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obstruction where the clauses of a long bill were being taken up one 
by one in committe of the whole house. The previous question 
had to be invoked on every clause. So the House of Commons 
devised another weapon for handling obstruction. This is the 
process known as closure by compartments-which is the applica­
tion of the previous question to a whole group of clauses in a bill. 
Somebody moves, for example, that clauses seventeen to twenty­
three "stand part of the bill." Then, if the speaker approves, and 
a majority agrees, the debate on these clauses is at an end. A 
variation of this is known as the "Kangaroo closure," an arrange­
ment which permits the speaker and the chairman of the committee 
of the whole house in ways and means to select amendments for 
discussion out of those which appear on the order paper and to pass 
over the rest. The chairman of a standing committee does not 
have this power. In the hands of an impartial speaker or chairman 
this is a valuable yet entirely fair arrangement for expediting 
business. 
By majority vote the House may also fix a time limit for the 
consideration of the various clauses of a bill. Then the guillotine 
falls at the expiration of the allotted period whether all the clauses 
have been discussed or not. But the guillotine is not frequently 
used; it has not been brought into play exce.pt on one occasion 
during the past ten years. The practice now is to make a time­
table when an important controversial measure comes up. The 
minister in charge of the bill asks the House to approve a resolu­
tion alloting so many days to the second reading, to the committee 
stage, to the report stage, and so on. The time-table may even 
assign specified hours to individual clauses. 
THE CABINET 
(Munro's "The Governm<nts of Europe," pp. 62, 63-66, 68--69 78- 82, The Macmillan 
Company, New York, 1925. ) 
. . . . For the past hundred years, therefore, the outlines of 
the British cabinet system have remained unchanged, but its various 
features have become clarified by a series of precedents. It has 
become an established rule, for example, that when a prime minister 
resigns the entire cabinet must go out of office with him, in other 
words that the cabinet's responsibility is collective. It has become 
sE:ttled, as will be explained a little later, that members of the 
cabinet are not only responsible to the king and to parliament, but 
also to one another. With the steady development of the party 
system, moreover, the functions of the Cabinet in the matter of 
framing the party program and materializing it into legislation 
have been given emphasis. The whole system has been shaking 
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itself down to a stable basis; it has done this slowly because it rests 
upon usage, and the evolution of usage is a slow process. Nor 
is there any reason to think that this evolution has yet come to 
an end. The English system of cabinet government is still evolving 
and through future generations will doubtless keep on doing so.•..• 
How is the Cabinet organized, and what are its functions at the 
present time? Before entering upon such a discussion it is well 
to define certain terms which Englishmen use in describing the 
executive branch of their government. These terms are privy 
council, ministry, cabinet, and "the government." The privy council 
is the body of royal advisers which still, in theory, controls the 
actions of the crown. Most acts of the crown are declared to be 
"by and with the consent of the privy council." But in point of fact 
the privy council is a body with no real advisory functions at all. 
When a new cabinet is being formed, its members are appointed to 
the privy council unless they are already privy councillors, and they 
remain privy councillors for life. No one is ever officially ap­
pointed a member of the cabinet because the laws do not recognize 
the existence of a cabinet. Thus the privy council, at any given 
moment, contains not only the. cabinet ministers who are in power, 
but all living members of former cabinets. Appointments to the 
privy council are made in the name of the crown, but always on the 
advice of the prime minister. Men are sometimes appointed to it, 
as an honor, with no intent that they shall become members of the 
cabinet. As a body the whole privy council is never called together 
except at the accession of a new monarch, and for other ceremonial 
purposes. It has become a mere piece of official machinery, inas­
much as the cabinet, not the privy council, now advises the crown 
and takes full responsibility for the advice which it gives. 
Another distinction is somewhat confusing to the outsider, 
namely, the distinction between the ministry and the cabinet, be­
tween ministers and cabinet ministers. All members of parliament 
who hold important administrative posts of a political character, 
and who go out of office when a cabinet resigns, are known as min­
isters. There are more than fifty of them in all. But there are 
only twenty-one cabinet ministers. The ministry does not meet 
as a body for the transaction of business, for it has no collective 
functions. It is only the cabinet ministers who meet. 
The functions of a minister (unless he is a cabinet minister) 
are individual functions only. The distinction may be illuminated, 
perhaps, by reference to the Government of the United States where 
the President, on coming into office, appoints a considerable number 
of higher administrative officials who ordinarily go out of office when 
his term expires. These include not only the ten members of the 
President's cabinet but an even larger number of assistant secre­
taries and other high officials who are not of cabinet rank. We 
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have no term which applies to this entire group of high officials. 
Englishmen would call it "the ministry." 
The cabinet, therefore, is the smallest of the three groups and 
the only one that has a collective responsibility. Briefly, it may 
be defined as a body of royal advisers chosen by the prime minis­
ter, in the name of the crown, with the approval of a majority in 
the House of Commons. It is composed of those ministers whom 
the prime ministers designates to membership, but the prime minist.er 
in making his designations is guided largely by precedent. Some 
high ministerial posts are always of cabinet rank; some less im­
portant ones invariably are not. There are a few which may or 
may not be of cabinet status as the prime minister decides. 
Finally there is "the government," a term which Englishmen 
use in a sense unfamiliar to outsiders. When they speak of a 
change in the government, or a change of government, for example, 
they do not mean a change in the form of government. When they 
say that "the government is likely to fall" they do not mean that 
the monarchial system is about to be supplanted by something else. 
By "the government" they mean the executive authorities who are 
in control for the time being-namely, the prime minister and his 
ministerial colleagues. It is they who are responsible for the 
passage of "government measures" by parliament. The term most 
nearly analogous in America is "the administration," which is 
somewhat loosely used to include the President and his advisers. 
Since the days of Sir Robert Walpole the chief adviser of the 
crown has been known as the prime ministers. The king, although 
he goes through the gesture of selecting this official, has very little 
discretion in making the choice. He summons, and by usage must 
appoint, the leader of that political party which controls a majority 
in the House of Commons. If no single party controls a majority 
he appoints some leader who can either form a coalition or other­
wise assure himself of a majority on important measures. Under 
the two-party system, which prevailed in England until recently, 
the king's task was very simple. When a prime minister resigned 
by reason of a defeat at the polls or on the floor of the House, he 
merely sent for the leader of the victors and invited him to assume 
office. But when three political parties are represented in the 
House, with no one of them controlling a majority the royal func­
tion is not so simple. He must then use his own judgmnt as to 
which leader he will summon. The main thing is that whoever 
takes office as prime minister shall be able to command a majority. 
If he can do this from within the ranks of his own party so much 
the better. If he cannot, then he must secure it by some coalition, 
compromise, or understanding with one of the other parties. When 
Mr. Ramsay MacDonald was invited to become prime minister in 
1923 the Labor party did not control a majority in the House. But 
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before taking office he satisfied himself that a sufficient number of 
Liberals would probably support him as against the Conservatives­
which they did for a time. 
In any event, the prime minister is always chosen from among 
the two party leaders, or the three party leaders, as the case may be. 
It is inconceivable that anyone other than a recognized leader would 
be called upon. In 1894 when Gladstone gave up the prime min­
ister's post, leaving his party for the moment without a leader, 
Queen Victoria did not call a successor until after she had assured 
herself that her personal choice, Lord Rosebery, would be acceptable 
to the Liberals. In 1922, when Mr. Lloyd George tendered his 
resignation, there was no recognized leadership in the ranks of the 
Conservatives. The king sent for Mr. Bonar Law who agreed to 
accept the post of prime minister in case the Conservative party 
should formally designate him as its leader, which it did. Each 
political party determines for itself the methods by which its own 
leader is chosen. Ordinarily, however, the selection is made by a 
caucus which is attended by the party's membership in the House 
of Commons together with various other prominent party 
workers..... 
The king chooses the prime minister, and the latter proceeds to 
select both the ministers and the cabinet ministers. Ostensibly he 
has a free hand in making his selections, but there are various con­
siderations of a practical nature which he must take into account. 
If a new prime minister were to regard nothing but his own personal 
preferences in constructing a ministry, he would make trouble in 
the ranks of his supporters. He must see that various interests are 
represented. For example, he cannot select all the members of his 
ministry from the House of Commons, taking none from the House 
of Lords. Both peers and commoners have figured in every British 
ministry for two hundred years. Even the Labor ministry which 
held office during the years 1923-1924 found place for four members 
of the House of Lords in its ranks. This, however, is a smaller 
proportions of peers than in any preceding ministry. 
Every minister of the crown must be a member of parliament, 
of one House or the other. But this does not mean that he must 
be a member of parliament at the time of his appointment. It is 
enough that he become a member after his appointment as a min­
ister. This can be arranged, of course, by making him a peer and 
thereby giving him a seat in the House of Lords, but the usual pro­
cedure is to "open a constituency" by inducing some member of 
the House of Commons to vacate his seat. This entails a special 
election (or bye-election) to fill the vacancy, and the newly-ap­
pointed minister becomes a candidate at this bye-election. He can 
do this the more easily because neither law nor custom in Great 
Britain requires that a candidate for the House of Commons shall 
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live in the constituency which he seeks to represent. When, there­
fore, a prime minister desires to include some outsider in his min­
istry he arranges that a vacancy shall be created in a safe constit­
uency. The member who gives up his seat is sometimes rewarded 
for his generosity by being made a peer, or given some administra­
tive position which does not necessitate his sitting in parliament. 
The newly-appointed minister goes to the scene of the bye-election, 
gets himself nominated, and is usually elected. The prime minister 
so arranges it with the party organization. But the plans occasion­
ally go avtry and the constituency does not turn out to be so "safe" 
as was assumed. . . . . 
No announcement of what has been done at meetings of the 
cabinet is ever published, and it is accounted a breach of etiquette 
for members to disclose, either in parliament or out of it, anything 
that is said at the cabinet table. If there is disagreement among the 
members, some rumors of it may leak out, but the public does not 
get the whole story. Most of the cabinet discussions pertain to 
matters of general policy or to questions which involve the estab­
lishment of some important precedent. Routine details which relate 
to a single department are not usually laid before it. Each min­
ister is supposed to deal with these on his own responsibility or 
after conference with the prime minister alone. A cabinet discus­
sion is not followed by a vote save in very exceptional instances. 
If the discussion discloses a marked difference of opinion among the 
members, the matter is left open until some compromise can be 
reached, for the action of the cabinet, whatever it is, must be out­
wardly unanimous. No divided counsel can be tendered to the king, 
nor can the cabinet go before parliament with a division in its rank. 
It must act as a unit. If any member, after a decision has been 
reached, feels that he cannot support this decision, it is his duty 
to resign and make way for someone who feels differently. This 
solidarity is essential to the effectiveness of the cabinets' leadership 
in parliament. 
The collective function of the cabinet is to formulate the policy 
of the nation on every great question that arises. It is the cabinet 
that determines how the authority vested in the crown shall be 
exercised in all matters of nation-wide importance. It also pre­
pares the legislative program for each session of parliament. The 
various items in this program are then introduced as government 
measures with the prestige of a unanimous cabinet behind them. 
Not only this but the measures are advocated, explained and de­
fended upon the floors of both chambers by members of the cabinet, 
and the votes of the party majority are summoned to put them 
through. Not all bills are brought before parliament by the cabinet, 
of course; but practically all measures of general importance must 
come up through this channel or they have slight chance of being 
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passed. The cabinet, therefore, is the steering committee of parlia­
ment; it provides a recognized and effective leadership. 
This is the most conspicuous difference between the English and 
the American process of lawmaking. In the United States the 
cabinet does not have any official responsibility for the preparation 
of government measures; its members do not sit in either House 
of Congress and hence cannot direct the debates as the English 
ministers do. Both plans have some advantages, and some defects 
also. The arguments are not wholly on one side, as many admirers 
of the English system have assumed. Ministerial leadership in 
the House of Commons is, if anything, more despotic than was that 
of the American speaker before his powers were curtailed. 
Much has been written about ministerial responsibility as it 
exists in British government. No principle is more firmly estab­
lished and none is of more far-reaching importance. It is not a 
simple principle, easy to understand, for it has a three-fold appli­
cation. 
First of all, the English ministers are responsible to the king. 
This is, for the most part, a merely technical responsibility. The 
king cannot dismiss a member of the cabinet in the way that the 
President of the United States sometimes does it. An English min­
ister, so long as he possesses the confidence of the premier and the 
House of Commons, could not be ousted by the king without bring­
ing the whole mechanism of the government to a standstill. The 
entire cabinet would resign in protest; a majority in the Com­
mons would support its action; a general election would have to be 
held; and the king would be giving a hostage to fortune. So min­
isterial responsibility to the king is not a very serious affair. 
Nevertheless the legal fiction of such responsibility remains. 
Second, the members of the cabinet are responsible to one 
another. This is necessarily so because solidarity is the essence of 
the cabinet system. 80 it is a matter of each for all and all for 
each. The fault of one minister may bring the wrath of the Com­
mons upon the ministry as a whole. For this reason every minister 
is constrained, not merely as a matter of prudence but of honor, 
to seek the opinion of his colleagues before taking any action that 
might evoke criticism. This principle of intra-cabinet responsibility 
was definitely established in 1851 when Lord Palmerston, without 
consulting his colleagues, expressed to the French ambassador his 
approval of a coup d'etat which had taken place in France. For 
doing this Palmerston was dismissed from the ministry. On the 
other hand, so long as a member of the cabinet acts only in accord­
ance with a policy which has been approved by the whole body, he 
has nothing to fear. His colleagues in the cabinet will stand solidly 
behind him. The whole strength of the majority in the House of 
Commons will be rallied to his support if any attack is made upon 
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him. To drive him from office would necessitate forcing the whole 
ministry out. That is a drastic measure for a House of Commons 
to take, and nothing but a very unusual situation would ever induce 
such summary action. 
Finally, and most important, the members of the ministry are 
responsible to the House of Commons. That is what the term min­
isterial responsibility really means. There is no statutory require­
ment that a ministry shall go out of office whenever it loses the 
support and confidence of a majority in the House, but by a custom 
which has now prevailed for nearly two hundred years it is bound 
to do so. The ministry must always be able to demonstrate, by vote 
of a majority in the Commons, that it possesses the confidence of 
the country. Loss of this confidence means loss of office. 
There are various ways in which the House of Commons may 
show its lack of confidence in the cabinet and may thereby force 
it to resign. When the financial estimates are under consideration 
the House may vote to reduce the salary of a minister. Cabinet 
solidarity then requires his colleagues to defend him against this 
attack, and the whole body of ministers must stand or fall by the 
outcome. Or the House may reject some government measure. 
An amendment to such a measure does not necessarily imply want 
of confidence unless the cabinet opposes the amendment and makes 
an issue of it. Amendments brought forward in the House are 
often accepted by the minister in charge of the bill. Again, the 
House may undertake to pass some private member's bill which 
the cabinet opposes, and the issue may be made one of confidence 
in the government. Finally, if the House is dissatisfied with the 
cabinet's general policy, without reference to any particular meas­
ure, it can at any time pass a resolution declaring its want of 
confidence. British cabinets, as a matter of fact, have rarely 
been forced to resign during the past hundred years by reason of 
an adverse vote in the House of Commons. They have gone out 
of office, for the most part, as the result of adverse action by th~ 
people at the polls. On the other hand the decision to dissolve the 
House and call a general election has sometimes been necessitated 
(as in 1924) by a setback in the House. 
It is always the privilege of the cabinet, when it finds itself 
faced by defeat in the House, to make an appeal to the people. 
In other words the prime minister can advise the king to dissolve 
parliament and order a general election. During the election cam­
paign the ministry continues in office, but if the result of the 
polling is unfavorable it does not usually wait for parliament to 
assemble. The practice is for the ministers to hand over their 
seals of office and make way just as soon as pending business can 
be cleaned up. This is a matter of a few days, or, at most, a few 
weeks. Thereupon the king sends for the leader of the victorious 
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party and asks him to go ahead with the forming of a new ministry. 
This summons, of course, is not unexpected, and the new prime 
minister may have the organization of a cabinet well lined up in his 
own mind before it comes. 
Ordinarily the cabinet is made up of members drawn from one 
political party, but in times of national emergency, when it is 
desired to have all the parties work together, a coalition cabinet 
may be formed. When the world war began in 1914 a Liberal 
ministry headed by Mr. Asquith was in power. A year later, when 
the immensity of the struggle became recognized, the prime min­
ister suggested that his parliamentary opponents should be repre­
sented in the cabinet and they accepted. A coalition ministry, 
made up of Liberals, Conservatives, and Labor members, was ac­
cordingly formed, Mr. Asquith continuing as leader until 1916 when 
he was replaced as prime minister by Lloyd George. This coalition 
continued for a time after the war was over, but went to pieces 
in 1922. Thereupon a general election was held and the Conserva­
tives were successful. But their tenure of power was brief, for 
they went to the country in 1923 on the issue of inaugurating a 
protective tariff and were defeated. . . . . 
THE HOUSE OF LORDS 
(Munro's "The Governments of Europe," pp. 118-119, The Macmillan Company, 
New York.) 
The essential functions which a second chamber ought to perform 
have already been stated. To what extent does the existing House 
of Lords perform them satisfactorily? On the whole it appears 
to be doing the work fairly well. It examines and revises non-financial 
measures. It insists, when the occasion arises, that ample time be 
given for a full public discussion of such bills before they become 
part of the law of the land. It compels sober second thought and 
gives opportunity for passions to subside. It says, now and then, 
to the House of Commons: "The opinion of the country seems to 
be about equally divided on this matter. Suppose you hold up the 
bill until the minds of the people have become clarified." On the 
other hand, the House of Lords has not shown itself disposed, during 
recent years, to go clearly beyond its province and obstruct the 
passage of measures which the country is obviously in a mood to 
accept. It has accepted the diminution of its powers with tolerably 
good grace and shows no resentment. Its members no longer feel 
impatient because great questions of public policy are being finally 
settled by the House of Commons alone. 
The procedure followed by the House of Lords in considering 
the various measures which come before it is different from that 
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of the Commons. In the Lords there are no standing committees 
for public bills. All bills, after two formal readings, are debated 
in committee of the whole house before reading a third time. De­
bates in the House of Lords, when they take place, cannot be shut 
off by using the closure. If amendments are adopted in the upper 
HoWle, the measure goes back to the Commons for concurrence. 
Then the Commons either agrees to the amendment, or insists on 
its own way, or some compromise is reached by an informal confer­
ence. Failing this, the bill is deemed to have been rejected and 
the Commons must then decide whether the measure is of sufficient 
importance to warrant its repassage in accordance with the pro­
cedure laid down by the Parliament Act. 
GENERAL MATERIAL ON THE AMERICAN 
SYSTEM 
CONGRESS AT WORK 
(Beard's "American Government and Politics," pp. 256-283, The Century Company, 
New York, 1928.) 
To the average observer, Congress is a vast and complicated legis­
lative organ, with rules, committees, and methods, beyond the ken 
of ordinary mortals; but a somewhat careful examination of the 
procedure of that body from day to day reveals certain principles 
and practices which, when properly grasped, make the working 
scheme of the organization fairly clear-at least clear enough for 
the citizen who does not intend to become a legislator but merely 
wishes to watch the operations of the national lawmakers with a 
reasonable degree of understanding. 
THE MASS OF BUSINESS BEFORE CONGRESS 
I. The first important fact to grasp is that the business before 
Congress is intricate in character and enormous in amount. It in­
volves every problem in political economy and international relations. 
Taxation in all its branches, the administration of the postoffice, 
natural resources, and other property, technical questions of defense 
(guns, battleships, and airplanes), the regulation of railways, the 
government of the City of Washington-these and a hundred other 
matters equally complex and involved are constantly pressed upon 
the attention of the members. The demand for new legislation from 
every quarter is steady and insistent. Large problems in policy and 
problems minutely special in nature call for judgment of the highest 
order and knowledge deep and wide-reaching. 
In sheer bulk the business is immense. Each Congress in the 
course of its two years' life is confronted by about thirty thousand 
bills, joint resolutions, concurrent resolutions, simple resolutions, and 
reports. Any member may introduce as many bills as he likes by 
handing them to the clerk if they are of a private nature (such as a 
bill conferring a pension on some person) or to the presiding officer 
if they are public in character. He does not have to secure the 
permission of anyone in advance or assume any responsibility for 
them even if they carry a charge upon the treasury. Many of them 
are introduced "by rqeuest" just to please this or that group of 
voters and without any thought of enactment into law. 
It is not enough to say that thousands of bills are laid before 
each Congress; the character of these measures must be analyzed, 
for it has a close relation to leadership in both houses. Some of the 
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measures are general in nature; these are called "public bills." 
Others pertain to particular persons, localities, or objects; these 
are "special bills." For every important public bill there will be 
hundreds of special propositions laid before Congress. 
The public bills usually affect vital economic interests throughout 
the country such as railways, manufacturing, shipping, and farming; 
they concern the whole nation as well as special groups. It is over 
them that the more serious party divisions occur; it is to carry their 
public bills through Congress that the leaders of the majority party 
must bring pressure to bear on the rank and file. It is in this con­
nection that cleavages between the right and left wing of each party 
appear and threaten the disruption of the regular organization. Illus­
trations abound in the debates and votes on railway bills and ship 
subsidies. 
Great as may be the interest of the ordinary member in the fate 
of the public bills, his own political fortunes are likely to be bound 
up with obscure special bills making appropriations for postoffice 
buildings, river and harbor improvements, and pensions in his dis­
trict. The local party machine and active citizens among his con­
stituents expect him to get all he can out of the Federal treasury 
for his section. The member of Congress on seeking reelection must 
be in a position to "point with pride" to the amount and importance 
of the favors he has secured for "his people." If he fails to obtain 
advantages for his constituents, they will turn against him and 
support some more energetic and pushing person. Legislation of 
this character is called "pork-barrel legislation," a term reminiscent 
of plantation days. It was the old custom on southern estates to 
allot periodically a certain amount of pork to the slaves; at the 
appointed time the pork-barrel was rolled into view, the head knocked 
in, and the contents distributed among eager beneficiaries. The 
applicability of the figure of speech to the legislative process above 
described needs no elucidation. 
If the member does not "get his pork" from the treasury, he is 
generally regarded as a failure by his constituents. In order to 
get it he must do two things. In the first place, he must secure the 
consent of his party leaders who control legislation, and to obtain 
that consent he must usually vote as he is told on public bills. Thus 
he may have to sell his birthright for a "mess of pork." In the 
second place he must cooperate with other members bent on the same 
enterprise. Such cooperation is called "log-rolling." In olden times 
pioneers on the frontier helped one another to cut trees and roll up 
logs for their cabins. This process was known as "log-rolling"; like 
the term "pork-barrel," the phrase affords a homely but accurate 
characterization of the legislative procedure to which it is applied. 
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So when the member of Congress with his eager eye on the pork­
barrel is not busy placating his party leaders, he is likely to be en­
gaged in log-rolling with his friends. 
If thirty thousand bills, resolutions, and reports were taken up in 
order by one of the houses and ten minutes were devoted to each of 
the measures, five thousand hours would be spent in the process, 
that is, about eight hours every week day during the life of Congress. 
Obviously, therefore, every measure cannot be brought before Con­
gress. There must be a selection from the enormous mass of business. 
It follows that some person or group of persons must be made re­
sponsible for choosing the measures to be debated and passed upon. 
Since the time is limited, methods must be devised for putting an 
end to debates. The power to select measures and to control proceed­
ings is, of course, a fundamental power; it is in effect the power to 
decide what laws shall be passed and how they shall be passed. 
Since the laws go deep into the pocketbooks of the citizens or other­
wise affect their property and liberty, control over the procedure of 
Congress touches the most vital interests in the country. 
PARTY ORGANIZATIONS AND LEADERSHIP IN CONGRESS 
II. The second fact to be grasped is that the working methods 
of Congress are largely determined by the existence of two political 
parties-one, a majority in control of one or both houses and regard­
ing itself as responsible for the principal legislative policies; the 
other a minority, in opposition, bound under ordinary circumstances 
to criticize and often vote against the measures introduced and ad­
vanced by the majority. In England, party organization is carried 
frankly into the House of Commons, where the majority and minority 
sit facing each other, and where the government is avowedly that of 
the predominant party-a government of men, not even theoretically 
of constitutional law. In the United States, the party rules none 
the less, but its organization and operations are, as we have seen, 
unknown to the formal law of the Federal Constitution. It is true 
that the votes on measures in Congress are by no means always cast 
according to party divisions, but it is likewise true that the principal 
legislative work of a session is the work of the majority party, for­
mulated by its leaders, and carried through under their direction. 
This is not all. Each party in the Senate and the House has a 
separate caucus for each chamber, in which is frequently determined 
the line of party action with regard to important legislative questions. 
It is in a party caucus held before the opening of each Congress, that 
the majority in the House chooses the Speaker and the minority 
decides upon its leader whom it formally presents as a candidate for 
Speaker, knowing full well that he cannot by any chance be elected. 
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At the same meeting provision is made for selecting the committees. 
It is in the caucus that the majority decides whether it will adopt 
the rules of the preceding Congress or modify them; and it is seldom 
that the decision is overthrown. It is in the caucus that bills and 
resolutions of high importance are discussed and decided upon before 
they are formally presented for final vote in the House or Senate. 
The exact weight of the caucus in determining party policies and 
the extent to which the rank and file influence its decisions are diffi­
cult to ascertain. Its powers and methods vary from decade to decade. 
There are periods of concentration when the leadership of the houses 
is centralized in the hands of a few forceful men and the proceedings 
of the caucus become formal. Such was the state of affairs during 
the opening years of the twentieth century. The operation of the 
system in those days is tersely described by Robert M. La Follette, 
in a speech delivered in the Senate in 1908: "I attended a caucus 
at the beginning of this Congress. I happened to look at my watch 
when we went into that caucus. We were in session three minutes 
and a half. Do you know what happened? Well, I will tell you. 
A motion was made that somebody preside. Then a motion was made 
that whoever presided should appoint a committee on committees; 
and a motion was then made that we adjourn. Nobody said any­
thing but the Senator who made the motion. Then and there the 
fate of all the legislation of this session was decided.... Mr. Pres­
ident, if you will scan the committees of this Senate, you will find 
that a little handful of men are in domination and control of the great 
legislative committees of this body, and that they are a very limited 
number." 
Then there are periods of laxity and dispersion when the caucus re­
asserts itself and the members, high and low, are heard at length and 
have weight in party councils. Such a period opened in 1910 when 
discontented Republicans of progressive leanings united with the 
opposition Democrats in a war on concentrated leadership. The 
Democrats on coming to power shortly afterward sought to give 
vitality to the caucus. Hence-forward, they said, speakers and com­
mittees will be chosen in a full and free council of party members in 
each house. The Speaker of the House sank into the background; 
power and responsibility were diffused among the rank and file; de­
cisions were difficult to secure; and legislative leadership was trans­
ferred to President Wilson. 
When Wilson passed from the political scene and Harding came 
to the presidency, stern and dominant executive control over legisla­
tion was relaxed. As a matter of principle the new President restored 
liberty of action to both houses of Congress. Thus concentrated 
leadership, executive and congressional, was lost; the theory of dif­
fusion was applied. The caucus became more important and the voice 
of the rank and file, uncertain and discordant, was heard again in 
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party councils. So the pendulum swings forward and back, and it is 
difficult to say just where it is at any particular moment. Even in a 
period of decentralization, the caucus acts quickly and without serious 
dissension on matters referred to it by party leaders. Bills and 
amendments to bills laid before it by party committeemen are usually 
approved. But party members of the left wing often insist on assert­
ing their independence. 
Whatever the methods followed by the caucus, it is always accused 
of being tyrannical. The party member is usually bound to obey the 
decision of the caucus and vote in the legislative chamber for any 
measure it approves ; to refuse would be an act of party treason, sub­
ject to the penalties imposed for such heresy. The meetings of the 
caucus are secret; attempts of insurgents to throw them open to the 
public have been without avail. Important decisions are sometimes 
made by only a fraction of the party members, and this means that 
laws are sometimes enacted by a minority. Again and again it hap­
pens that the minority in a party caucus, united with the opposition 
party, could defeat a measure, but refrains from action through party 
loyalty. 
An interesting attempt to cut across caucus and party lines was 
made in 1921 when the so-called "Farm Bloc" was formed. This was 
the outgrowth of conferences attended by representatives and sen­
ators of both parties who were united by common interests and prin­
ciples. Especially did they speak for the farmers. After discussing 
the issues before Congress, they agreed to act together on all meas­
ures of common concern to the agricultural interests of the country. 
As a matter of fact, cooperation between kindred groups in the two 
parties-secret or open-has been fairly continuous from early times. 
LEADERSHIP IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
III. The caucus works only a partial concentration of power in the 
houses of Congress in the matter of selecting the propositions to be 
considered and passed. It is too large and miscellaneous in member­
ship to act on all measures or even to discuss critically very many of 
them. Most of the technical decisions and recommendations pre­
sented to it by experienced committee chairmen it must accept on 
faith; it cannot pretend to expertness. Moreover if the caucus did 
in fact frequently reverse the decisions of committee chairmen, it 
would force their resignation and break down the working party 
organization. 
In practice, therefore, a still smaller number of members than is 
embraced in the party caucus must perforce assume the responsibility 
for selecting the measures to be considered, directing congressional 
procedure, and deciding what bills shall be enacted into laws. In 
England this power is vested by law and custom in the hands of the 
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Cabinet, composed of twenty or more persons (most of them members 
of Parliament) who are in fact chosen by a conference of the domi­
nant party. Among the Cabinet officers, the acknowledged leader 
is the prime minister. Indeed he is chosen first and accepts as col­
leagues only those who can work in a fair degree of harmony with 
him. He is responsible before the whole nation for carrying into 
effect the principles of his party, and if he is defeated it is his duty 
to resign or to bring about a new election. 
In the United States neither law nor custom vests the open and 
avowed leadership in the House of Representatives or the Senate in 
any small body of men known to the public and held accountable for 
the measures debated and the laws passed. In fact, however, there 
is and must be leadership and a certain degree of concentration in 
power. As the authority of the rank and file of the members in the 
party caucus expands and contracts, so the leadership varies in extent. 
With political changes, too, the leadership shifts from one center to 
another. Now it is the Speaker and the rules committee in the House 
that direct policies; now the chairman of the ways and means com­
mittee occupies the dominant position. Wherever the leadership is, 
it is certain to be attacked by those members who feel their interests 
neglected or their sense of importance offended. Attacks long con­
tinued are sure to work a dispersion of prerogative and a new 
localization of it. 
At the opening of the twentieth century, the directing power in 
the House was unquestionably concentrating in the Speaker, the 
majority members of the rules committee (of whom the Speaker was 
one), and the chairman of the important committees. The positive 
leadership of these men and their responsibility were definitely recog­
nized throughout the country. They were working toward something 
like an inner council of government; they formulated policies and 
brought the other party members into line under a regime of severe 
discipline. In fact, the Speaker was the outstanding figure in this 
little group of dominant leaders. As a writer at the time observed: 
"The Speaker's control over legislation is now, under the rules and 
practices of the House, almost absolute. The people know this now. 
The time has passed when the Speaker could exercise his vast power 
unsuspected. Nor can he shirk his responsibility. No bill can pass 
the House without his passive approval, and that in effect is the same 
thing as active advocacy." He appointed all the members of all the 
committees and named the chairman of each; he and two of his party 
colleagues formed a majority in the committee on rules which could 
in fact (with the approval of the House, that was always given) 
decide what measures should be debated, when and how long they 
should be debated, and when the vote on them should be taken. 
Against this system, the Democrats protested as a matter of course, 
for it destroyed their influence in the House; but their objections 
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would have availed naught if there had not arisen discontent among 
the newer Republican members, particularly among the more radical 
representatives from the West. They disliked many measures which 
their own party leaders forced through Congress and they failed to 
get a hearing for their own plans. Moreover, the Speaker, Joseph G. 
Cannon, was harsh in his rulings and unconciliatory in conducting 
proceedings. At length, in 1910, the Democrats, aided by disgruntled 
Republicans, overthrew the Speaker; they carried a resolution enlarg­
ing the rules committee, provided that it should be elected, and ousted 
the Speaker from membership. When the Democrats, victorious in 
the election of that year, took possession of the House, they provided 
that all committees should be elected by the House. Thus the Speaker 
was shorn of all his power over the appointment of committees and 
their selection was transferred in fact to the party caucus-which 
indeed had always enjoyed more or less authority in the matter. 
Amid cheers for "the fall of the Czar" and the end of "despotism," 
a dissipation of leadership was effected. 
The "revolution" did not, however, make the rank and file of the 
members equal or destroy leadership. Through all such changes a 
certain concentration of power has remained. As the shots at a 
target, wild though some of them may be, tend to group around the 
center, so attempts to build up directing leadership in the House are 
found grouped around five sources of influence: the Speaker, the 
rules committee, the chairmen of the important committees, the floor 
leader, and the "steering committee." This has long been true and 
is true today. 
The Speaker of the House of Representatives, a party man chosen 
by a party caucus, cannot be simply a presiding officer, like the 
Speaker of the House of Commons in England. There the prime 
minister assumes responsibility for his party measures, but at Wash­
ington the position of the Speaker is entirely different. In the 
beginning of our history, he was regarded as a mere moderator, but 
as the House grew in size and the business to be transacted increased 
to enormous proportions, it became impossible for him to sit passively 
and see the measures advocated by his party delayed indefinitely or 
defeated by dilatory tactics on the part of the minority. Though he 
can no longer appoint party committees, his powers over procedure 
are great. He may refuse to put motions which he thinks designed 
merely to delay business; he may recognize or refuse to recognize 
anyone who wishes to debate a question or call up a measure for 
consideration; he may rule members out of order and decide questions 
of parliamentary law-subject, of course, to appeals from the decision 
of the chair. In spite of recent changes these powers yet remain. 
The Speaker, therefore, inevitably holds a sector in the line of in­
fluence. He is not as imperial in his sway as were Cannon and Reed 
in the old days, but he is no mere figurehead. 
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Closely associated with the Speaker, no more dominant than he, is 
the rules committee composed of twelve members of whom eight speak 
for the party that has a majority in the House. It has a right to be 
heard at almost any moment in the House. It may bring in resolu­
tions stating what measures shall be considered, how long they shall 
be debated, and when the vote shall be taken. Members of the party 
for which the rules committee speaks may revolt and refuse to vote 
for such resolutions, but if they do they incur all the risks inherent 
in party "treason." 
The third element in leadership in the House of Representatives 
is composed of the chairman of the important committees in charge 
of the weightiest measures brought up for debate and action. The 
premier among them is the chairman of the ways and means com­
mittee which prepares tariff and tax bills. Indeed when the Speaker 
was stripped of his regal authority, his influence and prestige tem­
porarily went to the head of this powerful committee. Next in order 
of precedence may be placed the chairman of the appropriations com­
mittee, which, under the budget law of 1921 and the rules associated 
with it, exercises great weight in decisions as to how much money 
shall be spent and what purposes it shall be devoted to. Then follow 
in uncertain order the heads of other great committees, ten or fifteen 
i:r. all, with the minor men swinging off loosely on the edges of power. 
Finally in considering leadership in the House we must take ac­
count of the floor leader chosen by the party caucus. Each party has 
such an agent. It is his duty to keep in close touch with the rank and 
file of his party colleagues, to learn their opinions, to understand 
their prejudices and ambitions, and whenever necessary to "line them 
all up" in support of some measure on which the party leaders have 
reached a decision. The floor leader is influential in determining 
who shall speak on bills, because by conferences with party members 
he helps to make up the list of members whom the Speaker will rec­
ognize. On important matters the majority leader will take counsel 
with the minority leader and reach an agreement as to when the vote 
shall be taken on measures and who is to speak for the minority. 
In short, the floor leader has succeeded to many of the prerogatives 
formerly exercised by the Speaker; in terms of power he ranks next 
to the Speaker; and if he is clever in management he may hope to 
rise to the honor of presiding over the House. But he must be cir­
cumspect. His power is uncertain. He is subject more or less to the 
direction of a "steering committee" chosen by the caucus, i.e., by 
"natural selection" for the purpose of exercising general supervisory 
powers-an informal group of seven or eight members who operate 
quietly behind the scenes. He muet deal gently with independent 
members-, especially if their votes are needed to carry party measures. 
In the Senate, the problems of leadership are not so difficult to 
work out. The number of members is small. The majority in control 
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seldom consists of more than fifty or sixty members. Among them 
are always several men of experience derived from long service and 
thus marked for leadership. The presiding officer, under constitu­
tional provision, is the Vice-President of the United States, who 
though himself a partisan is more of a moderator than a director. 
Often indeed he represents the minority, not the majority in the 
Senate. In such circumstances leadership falls to a few committee 
chairmen, among whom the chairman of the finance committee takes 
first rank. There is a party caucus, of course; and its power, like 
that of the House caucus, expands and contracts with passing events. 
Floor leaders and steering committees are to be found also in the 
Senate; their function, however, is not dictation; their business is to 
secure party harmony by informal methods. The individual Senator 
enjoys more weight in party councils and more independence of action 
on the floor than the member of the House. 
There are in addition many practices and customs which work for 
a concentration of power and direction in Congress. The President, 
as we have seen, may through his prestige, his party leadership, and 
his control over appointments to office, exercise an immense influence 
on the work of Congress. In times of party crises, there may be 
informal conferences of the leaders in both houses and party officers 
and workers on the outside. But here we pass from the known 
to the unknown, out into the realm of complex social forces which 
press in upon Congress from every part of the country. 
Leadership, once secured, thrives upon the meat with which it is 
fed. Every member of Congress, as we have seen, has schemes of 
his own relating to his district and demanded by the constituents who 
elected him. He must get a hearing and favorable action. Otherwise 
he becomes a nonentity and fails to satisfy the clamor of his con­
stituents. His political career depends upon "getting what he is sent 
there for." In the press of things he cannot get it without the con­
sent of one or more powerful committee chairmen. What can he give 
in return? His vote on the measures recommended by party leaders, 
his loyal support to the program formulated by the party leaders. So 
the net is drawn tightly and power concentrates-until accumulated 
discontent dissipates it again. Thus centripetal and centrifugal 
forces alternate, but, whenever business is to be transacted, leader­
ship must come into play. A Senator recently put the matter at the 
opening of Congress in a crude parody on Kipling's "Recessional": 
The tumult and the shouting dies, 
The captains and the kings depart. 
And the steam roller is about to start. 
What after all is the cause of the continual uproar over the or­
ganization of Congress? Why are there always insurgents raging 
against established leadership and demanding a redistribution of 
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power? What is it that they want? The answers are difficult to 
formulate, but an attempt may be made. Whenever any party has a 
long tenure of office such as the Republicans enjoyed between 1897 
and 1911, two things happen. The older men of longer service gather 
in all the power they can, for men thirst after it for its own sake and 
for the loaves and fishes connected with it. In the meantime new men 
appear and there is discontent on the left wing of the triumphant 
party. That is natural and inevitable also. 
Now the new men will receive little or no recognition unless they 
obey orders; that means they will get no power and no spoils; 
their measures will be smothered in committee and never see the floor 
of the house. They want, therefore, two reforms: (1) the dispersion 
of the committee assignments and the party authority among all the 
members of the majority, and (2) some kind of rule which will permit 
a certain number, let us say one hundred members, to call up any bill 
from the recesses of any committee and force a vote on it. Some even 
g<> beyond this, and demand that every bill introduced in the house 
shall be automatically brought out from committee and put to a 
vote. In this way they hope to get a consideration of their measures 
and to put all the members on record for or against their propositions. 
Indeed there are a few reformers who would like to destroy the party 
machine in Congress, give all bills and measures introduced a fair 
and automatic hearing, and allow all members an equal share of 
authority in controlling procedure. It is not likely that such a 
utopian reform will take place soon; it is more probable that we 
shall witness the continuance of the old struggle with changes only in 
emphasis. 
THE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS 
IV. A very important and fundamental element in congressional 
leadership is found in the standing committees. As the bills brought 
into Congress become more and more technical with the advance 
of the industrial age, so the power of those who have special knowl­
edge and experience in various fields must increase. This is in­
evitable. It is highly desirable. Therefore, the legislative work of 
each house is done mainly by committees composed of men more or 
less expert in the several branches of legislation. Each committee 
is dominated by a majority of members representing the party which 
is supreme for the time being. The chairman of the committee is 
nearly always a prominent leader in the majority party. The number 
of committees varies from time to time, but at the present there are 
about thirty in the Senate and sixty in the House. 
Each committee has a well furnished office and many perquisites 
which are not despised by members of Congress; that is, it has an 
allowance for clerk hire, stationery, and other purposes. Often 
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members employ their wives or relatives as clerks and assistants. 
A great deal of money is wasted in useless activities, but criticisms 
of the system fall on deaf ears. Not long ago when a member from 
Massachusetts, shocked by the careless expenditures for committees 
that never met, resigned his post by way of protest, his action met 
merely with indifference or laughter. 
The committees vary greatly in importance. In the lower house, 
the leading committees are on ways and means, appropriations, 
rules, banking and currency, interstate and foreign commerce, rivers 
and harbors, military affairs, naval affairs, postoffice and post-roads, 
public lands, labor, and pensions. In the Senate, the committees on 
appropriations, finance, foreign relations, judiciary, military affairs, 
naval affairs, interstate commerce, and pensions take high rank. 
Formerly all standing committees of the House of Representatives 
were appointed by the Speaker, but this system was changed in 
1910-1911 in favor of election by the House itself. The difference in 
practice made by this change in the rules is more apparent than real. 
Since the beginning of the party system in the United States, the 
selection of the members of committees in each house has really 
been in the hands of the party caucus, under the leadership, and 
perhaps dominance, of a few men experienced in the arts of manage­
ment. To borrow a term from economics, we may say that the 
committee assignments are determined by a "higgling in the mar­
ket" and that the various posts fall to members roughly according 
to seniority, their abilities, their power as leaders, their skill in 
management. This "higgling" begins long before a new Congress 
meets; most of the important assignments are determined probably 
before the party caucus assembles, and the caucus only ratifies the 
Work of the pre-caucuses as the houses ratify the work of the cau­
cuses. The minority party chooses representatives on each com­
mittee, somewhat in the same manner, but they seldom count for 
much in the determination of policies. 
After the "revolution of 1910," the Democrats adopted a new 
plan; they named the Democratic members of the ways and means 
committe.e at a caucus and authorized that group to act as a "com­
mittee on committees" and to nominate for approval at another cau­
cus the members of the other committees. When the Republicans 
came back to power in 1919, there was an attempt to make the 
dispersion of authority mechanical; the party caucus created a com­
n:ittee on committees, composed of one member from each state 
having one or more Republicans in the House--each member to have 
a~. many votes in choosing the other committeemen as there were 
Republicans in the delegation from his state. In short, an effort was 
made to mirror the entire Republican majority in the agency formed 
tc• select the Republican members of committees. The recommenda­
tions of "committees on committees," no matter how composed, are 
49 Cabinet vs. Committee System of Legislation 
always submitted to the party caucuses for approval, and then laid 
before the House for formal ratification. 
It is usually the custom of party leaders in both houses to assign 
all the important committee positions to members who have seen 
long service, in accord with the "seniority rule." It is only natural 
that the direction of affairs should fall to the most experienced. 
However, on the occasion of the Democratic victory in 1910, after a 
long session out of power, the new incoming members made a great 
outcry against allowing the older congressmen to monopolize all 
the choice committee assignments on the principle of seniority. The 
progressives in both parties, looking upon old age as a sign of in­
herent and irremedial conservatism, protested against the time­
honored practice, but the principle, in the main, is still applied-with 
exceptions. Another line of attack on concentrated leadership and 
experience takes the form of preventing any member from serving 
on many committees. Ordinarily a Senator or Representative does 
not serve on more than two powerful com1II1ittees. 
It is in the committee room usually behind closed doors and secure 
from public s·crutiny that the real legislative work is done. Every 
bill, imJ;>ortant or unimportant, is sent to the committee having juris­
diction over the subject matter to which it relates. The recommen­
dations contained in the President's message are distributed in the 
same manner. But a committee is not limited to suggestions from 
the outside; it may and does itself originate bills relating to the 
matters placed under its authority. 
Thousands of bills which go to committees are not considered at 
all. Only measures to be reported to the house for action receive 
a more or less severe scrutiny. In such cases papers and documents 
may be secured from the President or high officials; department 
heads may be requested to appear personally and answer questions 
:propounded by committee members. Friends and opponents of 
propositions in the hands of a committee are frequently admitted to 
state their views; witnesses may be summoned to appear and give 
testimony; the committee may travel about the country, hold hear­
ings, and gather evidence. 
In almost every case the measures in charge of a particular com­
mittee are considered or formulated by a sub-committee (in which 
the minority receives scant recognition), and the whole committee 
generally accepts its report. When it cornies to a strkt party ques­
tion, such as the tariff, the majority members of the committee draft 
the bill; and after the measure is completed, they may invite the 
minority members in to vote on it as a matter of form; they may 
even overlook that courtesy. With regard to action on any measure 
in hand, a committee may recommend its adoption, amend it, report 
adversely, delay the report indefinitely, or ignore it altogether. In 
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the House it rarely happens that a member is able to secure the con­
sideration of a bill which the committee in charge opposes; but in 
the Senate a greater freedom is enjoyed in this respect. 
Owing to the pressure of business in the House, it is impossible 
to consider each bill on its merits and arrive at a vote after search­
ing debate and mature deliberation; it often happens, therefore, that 
very important measures are forced through as they come from the 
committee without any serious discussion or a single amendment. 
This, of course, places an enormous power in the hands of commit­
tees and changes the House at times from a deliberative into a ratify­
ing assembly. 
Naturally there has been a great deal of criticism directed against 
the committee system. As early as 1880, the Independent National, 
or Greenback, party demanded "absolutely democratic rules" for the 
government of Congress and advocated taking away from the com­
mittees "a veto power greater than that of the President." Com­
plaints are constantly made in the House itself, especially by mem­
bers of the minority. "You send important questions to a commit­
tee," once lamented a member, "you put into the hands of a few 
men the power to bring in bills, and then they are brought in with an 
ironclad rule, and rammed down the throats of members; and then 
those measures are sent out as being the deliberate judgment of the 
Congress of the United States when no deliberate judgment has been 
expressed by any man." 
The division of each house of Congress into a large number of 
separate co:rmnittees, no doubt, does lead to many deplorable results. 
These committees work with little or no reference to one another, 
each preparing its own bills with slight regard to the measures in 
other committees. As a result there is a great deal of ill-adjusted 
and conflicting legislation, even on matters of fundamental im­
portance. But it is easier to criticize than to find better methods 
for conducting business. 
Only two outstanding remedies are offered for the evils of the 
committee system. One is the creation of the kind of unofficial 
leadership and direction which was built up by the Republicans in 
the early part of this century. The other is the adoption of the 
English cabinet system which openly vests control in the hands 
of a responsible group, the Cabinet. The first has been tried and 
rejected as a form of "invisible government." The second, striking 
as it does at the very root of the congressional system, receives 
little consideration outside academic circles. Indeed there are signs 
that the House of Commons is looking with favor on the adoption 
of the standing committee system. 
After this survey of the methods by which the majority in the 
House of Representatives may control reports of committees and the 
discussion and passage of measures, it might be assumed that the 
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minority party is without power to influence in any effective man­
ner the course of legislative procedure. This view, however, is not 
strictly correct. By exercising certain constitutional privileges, the 
minority may block proceedings and go a long way toward forcing 
the majority to adopt policies which it would not initiate on its own 
motion. The Constitution provides that on the request of one-fifth 
of the members present, the roll of the House must be called on any 
question and the yeas and nays of the members entered upon the 
journal. The Constitution furthermore provides that no business 
shall be done unless a quorum is present. The minority, in the 
House or Senate, may therefore raise at will the question of the 
presence of a quorum and force one roll-call after another, thus 
consurn;ing time and making endless delays. Finally a great deal of 
the legislative business is done under the rule of unanimous con­
sent which, of course, may be steadily refused by the minority mem­
bers. 
More than once the leader of the minority party has thrown 
down the gage to the majority leaders and frankly informed them 
that unless certain policies were adopted the minority would exer­
cise all its privileges under the rules for the purpose of obstructing 
business. In this way the minority may defeat bills by threats or 
by delays continuing until the end of the session. It sometimes even 
forces action on its own measures by threatening to refuse unani­
mous consent on all propositions and to call for the yeas and nays 
on every bill and resolution until the majority leaders capitulate and 
bring in the propositions which the minority demands. 
RULES OF THE HOUSES OF CONGRESS 
V. Whatever may be the nature of the leadership in Congress, 
there must be rules governing the daily procedure of the respective 
houses, which make it possible for leadership to direct, limit, and 
in a measure dictate action. The rules are a part of the system 
of control and their changes reflect the periods of concentration 
and expansions of power noted above. At all times, however, certain 
principles remain fairly fixed. 
1. In the first place, the Speaker of the House may refuse to put 
motions which he regards as dilatory-that is, designed merely to 
delay business. 
The immediate cause of the adoption of this principle was the 
practice of filibustering by the minority or by small groups. In 
the Fiftieth Congress, on one occasion, the "House remained in con­
tinuous session eight days and nights, during which time there were 
over one hundred roll-calls on the iterated and reiterated motions 
to adjourn and to take a recess, and their amendments. On this oc­
casion the reading clerks became so exhausted that they could no 
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longer act, and certain members, possessed of large voices and 
strenuous lungs, took their places. If this was not child's play, it 
would be difficult to define it. Then, again, when a measure to which 
the minority objected was likely to pass, the yeas and nays would be 
ordered." 
In the succeeding Congress, in which Thomas B. Reed was the 
Speaker, the Republicans had only a narrow majority, and it soon 
became clear that the opposing party, by making dilatory motions 
and refusing to answer to the roll-call on a quorum, could prevent 
the majority from doing any business at all. It was under these 
circumstances that Speaker Reed, in January, 1890, refused to put 
motions which he regarded as purely dilatory, and was sustained by 
the House. Mr. Reed defended his ruling as follows: 
The object of a parliamentary body is action, and not stoppage 
of action. Hence if any member or set of members undertakes 
to oppose the orderly progress of business even by the use of 
the ordinarily recognized parliamentary motions, it is the right 
of the majority to refuse to have those motions entertained and 
to cause the public business to proceed. Primarily, the organ of 
the House is the man elected to the speakership; it is his duty 
in a clear case, recognizing the situation, to endeavor to carry 
out the wishes and desires of the majority of the body which he 
represents. Whenever it becomes apparent that the ordinary 
and proper parliamentary motions are being used solely for the 
purposes of delay and obstruction; . . . when a gentleman steps 
down to the front amid the applause of his associates on the 
floor and announces that it is his intention to make opposition in 
every direction, it then becomes apparent to the House and the 
community what the purpose is. It is then the duty of the 
occupant of the Speaker's chair to take, under parliamentary 
law, the proper course with regard to such matters. 
This principle was shortly afterwards (1890) embodied in the 
rules, and the Speaker now has regular sanction for refusing to 
entertain purely dilatory motions. However, the constitutional right 
of a member to demand the yeas and nays cannot be denied even 
if the purpose is dilatory. 
2. In the second place the Speaker may count as present those 
members who are physically present but refuse to answer to their 
names on a roll-call for the purpose of compelling an adjournment 
in the absence of a quorum. This principle was established by 
Speaker Reed about the same time as the ruling on dilatory motions, 
and also embodied in the revision of the rules. 
3. In the third place, the rules of the House provide for auto­
matically shortening debate; they prescribe that the time occupied 
by any member in discussing a legislative proposition shall not ex­
ceed one hour. This limit was imposed in 1841, and at the time 
Senator Benton declared that it was "the largest limitation upon the 
freedom of debate which any deliberate assembly ever imposed upon 
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itself, and presents an eminent instance of permanent injury done 
to free institutiolliS in order to get rid of a temporary annoyance." 
lt is difficult to see, however, in what way the House could meet the 
enormous pressure upon it, if any member from among the 435 could 
talk as long as he pleased on any measure. 
A member may, if he chooses, yield a portion of his time to 
some other member or members wishing to speak on a measure, but 
he may occupy no more than one hour, except by obtaining unani­
mous consent. Neither may he speak twice upon the same measure 
unless he introduced it, or is the member reporting it from com­
mittee. When going into the committee of the whole, the House 
fixes the time of debate, which cannot be extended by the committee; 
and in many other ways freedom of debate is arbitrarily limited. 
Moreover it is in order to move "the previous question" and shut off 
debate automatically. 
4. In the fourth place, to enable party leaders to force the con­
sideration of certain measures whenever they see fit, several im­
portant com:mittees may report on specified subjects practically at 
any time in the course of the procedure of the House, no matter 
what may be under discussion. 
The Senate also has its code of rules, but it has not adopted any 
of the drastic restraints obtaining in the House. When the Senate 
rules were revised in 1806, the right to move the previous question, 
and thus close debate summarily, was omitted, and all attempts to 
-restore control failed until 1917. At the session convened in March 
of that year, the Senate found all business blocked by an apparently 
endless debate. By a certain irony of fate the Democrats, who 
had always been the most ardent champions of free debate, were 
forced to insist upon some method of cutting it off. Acting on the 
recommendation of a committee composed of an equal number of 
members from both parties, the Senate adopted a new rule provid­
ing that: (1) on petition of sixteen Senators a motion to cut off 
discussion on any bill can be served on the Senate and (2) if ap­
proved two days later by two-thirds vote debate will come to an end, 
after each mem:ber has enjoyed the right to speak for not more than 
one hour on the pending measure. After such a closure is adopted 
amendments to the bill under consideration can be made only by 
unanimous consent. 
In practice it has been found impossible to bring the rule into 
frequent use, and long filibusters have often blocked the businesa of 
the Senate. Exasperated by this "inefficiency," Vice-President Dawes 
tried to launch a national campaign to force the adoption of an 
easier method of closure. The Senate has been obdurate and not 
without reason. As Lindsay Rogers cogently argues in h1s book, 
The American Senate, liberty of debate acts as a salutary check on 
the administration, gives the minority the right to be heard, and 
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assures at least one open forum in the country for the free dis­
cussion of issues which might otherwise be smothered. 
THE ORDINARY COURSE OF PROCEDURE IN CONGRESS 
VI. .. . Bills, are introduced in the House in several ways. Any 
member may introduce any measure he likes by depositing it on the 
clerk's table or handing it to the Speaker if it is a public bill; or he 
may introduce a petition for a bill which will be referred to an ap­
propriate committee for drafting. All really important bills, how­
ever, such as tariff bills, currency measures, and the like are drafted 
by the majority members of the committees in charge of the subject 
matter. Sometimes, the committee of the House cooperates with 
the committee of the Senate having charge of similar business, in 
preparing a bill. If the question is very significant, the President 
of the United States may join some of the committee members in 
drawing up the bill; prominent party leaders not in office may be 
consulted. A caucus of party members may be held on the bill even 
before it is brought up for consideration. 
On its introduction, each public bill is referred by the Speaker 
to the appropriate committee, which may hold hearings and give 
the matter any amount of attention it sees fit. The committee may 
report the bill to the House favorably unamended, or it may amend 
it and report it in such form, or it may report unfavorably, or it 
may neglect it altogether. 
Debates in Congress are often perfunctory, seldom animated, and 
very rarely have any effect upon the decisions taken. As to impor­
tant bills reported from committees, decisions have already been 
made by party leaders; accordingly there is little to be said on such 
measures by members of the dominant party. The opposition is 
allotted a certain amount of time as a matter of form, but no one 
expects arguments from that quarter to produce any results of sig­
nificance. In the Senate, where, as we have noted, debate is more 
free than in the House, speeches may really change opinions and 
votes. 
A great many speeches that appear in the pages of the Con­
gressional Record are delivered to empty benches during sessions of 
the committee of the whole, or not delivered at all. Frequently they 
are not directed to members of C'ongress, but to the constituents of 
the orator. The "leave to print" is rather freely granted so that 
members have complete liberty to address the voters of their districts 
through printed speeches supposed to have been delivered in Con­
gress. Even such entries as "Cheers," "Laughter," and "Prolonged 
Applause" may be inserted by the member in preparing his copy for 
the printer of the Record. 
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When a bill has passed either house, it is transmitted to the other 
body for consideration. For example, when the Senate has passed 
a bill, it thereupon dispatches the measure to the House. If the 
House passes the bill thus brought in, the Senate is notified; the 
measure is then signed by the President of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the House, and is sent to the President of the United 
States for his signature. If he approves the bill, he notifies the 
house in which it originated of his action, and sends it to the 
Secretary of State for official publication. If he vetoes the measure, 
he returns the bill to the house in which it originated, with a state­
ment of the reasons for his action, unless that body has adjourned. 
If a bill originates in the House, it is sent to the Senate and goes 
through a similar process. 
Whenever a bill originating in one house is amended in the other, 
it must be returned to the first for reconsideration, and for adoption 
or rejection as amended. If, at last, the houses are unable to agree 
upon a measure--a regular occurrence in the case of important 
bills-it is the practice for the presiding officer of each body to 
appoint representatives to a conference committee, as it is called, 
authorized to discuss the differences, to come to some agreement 
upon the disputed points, and report baek to the respective houses 
their agreement, or their inability to come to terms. As a general 
principle the conference committee, in coming to an agreement, 
should introduce no new matter into the measure which it has under 
consideration-that it, no provision that has not been already 
adopted by either the Senate or the House. It is, of course, not easy 
to determine whether new matter has been introduced into a long 
and com,plicated measure. Certainly the conferees are not limited 
in their action to the adoption of the pr()visions as actually passed 
by one house or the other. They may, and often do, draft a com­
promise proposition, perhaps midway between the extremes de­
manded by the two houses, and in drafting it they may, in fad, 
change the language of the bill. When a conference committee 
report is submitted, each house adopts it, or rejects it as a whole; 
it does not amend. 
SECURING INFORMATION FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
In the exercise of its legislative functions, Congress frequently 
makes use of a special committee of investigation. For example, 
it instituted by an act of June 18, 1898, an industrial commission 
consisting of five members of the House of Representatices, five 
Senators, and nine persons appointed by the President--the last to 
be paid salaries. This conunission was instructed to investigate 
questions appertaining to immigration, labor, agriculture, and busi­
ness, to report to Congress, and to suggest desirable legislation on 
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these subjects. The commission made a long and e.xhaustive inves­
tigation and reported to Congress a voluminous mass of testimony 
and many proposals for legislative action. A few years. later, 
namely, in February, 1907, Congress created a joint commission on 
immigration, consisting of three Senators, three members of the 
House of Representatives, and three persons appointed by the Presi­
dent-charged with the duty of making a full investigation into 
the subject of immigration. In 1913 Congress established an in­
dustrial relations commission which conducted an elaborate inquiry 
il!to labor and agricultural problems and startled the whole country 
by the radical character of its findings.... 
The chief sources of information for legislative purposes are, of 
course, the hearings and investigations conducted by the various 
standing committees of Congress. Each of the important standing 
corn mittees has commodious and well-equipped quarters in one of 
the magnificent office buildings constructed for the Senate and the 
House. Every leading committee has a library of materials bearing 
on the subjects referred to it and also has at its command the extensive 
resources of the Congressional Library. Committees may also call 
upon the Legislative Drafting Service, of which there are two 
branches, one for the Senate and another for the House. The 
Library of Congress maintains a division of Legislative Reference 
charged with the duty of furnishing information on questions pend­
ing before the houses. 
The student may naturally inquire whether debates in Congress 
do not afford information on legislative questions. In the Senate, 
it frequently happens that speeches, particularly on constitutional 
law, really illuminate problems before that body; but it cannot be 
said that the House derives much information from the desultory 
and partisan speeches delivered there. Mr. Br~e attributes this 
absence of informing debates to the committee system itself. 
In fact, the average member of the House is absorbed in his own 
affairs and the work of the committees to which he is assigned. He 
is, therefore, not strongly inclined, as a rule, to question the wisdom 
of the results reported by the committees. He asswnes that the 
members of the other committees know more about their business 
than he does, and furthermore he does not like to stir up trouble 
for himself by criticisms of their work. 
THE LOBBY 
When we pass outside the realm of official inquiry and debate 
into spheres of influence associated with congressional action we 
have to deal with more or less elusive forces. Yet certain facts lie 
on the surface of things. Washington is the headquarters of many 
powerful organizations which concentrate their energies on advancing 
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or blocking legislation. Without attempting to take them in the 
order of importance, there is first the National Chamber of Com­
merce, a federation of the local chambers throughout the United 
States, with an elaborate organization and machinery for taking 
the opinion of American business men on issues arising in Congress. 
Not far away stands the large building which houses the American 
Federation of Labor, always indefatigable in its support of friendly 
legislation and its warfare on measures deemed inimical to labor 
interests. Equally active are the three nation-wide farmers' asso­
ciations. Ever on watch and ever busy disseminating its views on 
legislation is the American Association of Railway Executives which 
speaks for the combined railway interests of America. Then de­
scending to details we find each one of the leading manufacturing 
.and mercantile interests organized and prepared to bring powerful 
influences to bear on Senators and Representatives in season and out. 
It is estimated that there are in all about one hundred and fifty 
economic organizations (to say nothing of moral reformers) rep­
resented in the lobbies of Congress. Among them are the Standard 
Oil Company, the Farm Bureau (the conservative farmers' organi­
zation), and the spokesmen of the coal, leather, beef, railway, silk, 
glove, fertilizer, cotton, banking, wire, steel, express, drug, adver­
tising, lime, beet sugar, and other interests. The capitalistic and 
the conservative farming group are organized into a loose cooperative 
society known as "the Monday Lunch Club." All these interests 
have skillful and astute agents, paid large salaries, and granted 
generous expense accounts for entertainment and other purposes; 
one of the agents is said to be paid as much as the President of the 
United States. Sometimes former members of Congress are found 
among them; often "lame ducks" or members defeated for reelection 
are offered retainers' fees from concerns whose interests are involved 
in legislation. All the legislative agents are expert in the ways of 
Congress and keep an eagle eye on every bill that affects their re­
spective spheres. They know every Congressman, his past record, 
his mistakes, his weakness, his debts, the skeletons in his family 
closet. They work as quietly as mice sometimes and thunder through 
the newspapers at other times. They have their thousand cords of 
influence stretching away from Washington to every home, shop, 
farm, and office; they can set in motion potent forces which no 
Senator or Representative can ignore. They can drench or deluge 
Congressmen with letters, telegrams, and phone calls. 
Here is a vast and tangled network of agencies, having large 
sums at their disposal to spend in agitation and publicity, maintain­
ing research bureaus to accumulate facts favorable to their special 
interests, and equipped with all the mechanisms of modern society 
for bringing "pressure" to bear on members of both houses. Under 
the burning spotlight of their scrutiny, constantly bombarded by 
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their pleas, threats and promises, "gassed" by their publicity, the 
legislator who tries to see things as they are and as a whole 
and to do his full duty in the midst of clamor and perplexity must have 
poise, discrimination, and courage. As we have noted above, there 
are students of government who boldly advocate giving up the fiction 
of political equality and frankly incorporating manufacturing, labor, 
agricultural, and professional interests into the government itself. 
Whether these interests are inside or outside the government they are 
potent influences in shaping the opinions of Congressmen. 
PREAMBLE AND RULES ADOPTED BY A 
DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS 
(From "Materials Illustrative of American Government," by Rodney L. Mott. ) 
It frequently happens that the party caucus occupies quite as im­
portant a place in legislation as does the House of Representatives 
itself. The burden of work which often falls on the caucus, together 
with the size of the body, demands that its proceedings be guided by 
rules which are almost as formal as those of the House. In some 
respects the Democratic caucus is less rigidly organized than is the 
Republican; yet when occasion demands, its rules may be applied with 
equal force. As will be seen from the following statement, the caucus 
of the minority party is recognized as having a very definite place in 
legislative procedure; and it is not without significance that the 
rules of both majority and minority caucuses are printed by the 
Government Printing Office at public expense. 
PREAMBLES 
In adopting the following rules for the Democratic Caucus, we affirm 
and declare that the following cardinal principles should control 
Democratic action: 
a. In essentials of Democratic principles and doctrine, unity. 
b. In non-essentials, and in all things not involving fidelity to 
party principles, entire individual independence. 
c. Party alignment only upon matters of party faith or party 
policy. 
d. Friendly conference and, whenever reasonably possible, party 
cooperation. 
DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS RULES 
1. All Democratic Members of the House of Representatives shall 
be prima facie members of the Democratic Caucus of the House of 
Representatives; failing to abide by the rules governing the same 
shall thereby automatically cease to be a member of the Caucus. 
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2. Meetings of the Democratic Caucus may be called by the 
chairman upon his own motion and shall be called by him whenever 
requested in writing by twenty-five members of the Caucus or at 
the request of the party leader. 
3. A quorum of the Caucus shall consist of a majority of the 
Democratic members of the House. 
4. General parliamentary law, with such special rules as may be 
adopted, shall govern the meetings of the Caucus. 
5. In the election of officers and in the nomination of candidates 
for office in the House, a majority of those present and voting shall 
bind the membership of the Caucus. 
6. In the election of officers and in the nomination of candidates 
for office in the House a majority of those present and voting at a 
Caucus meeting shall bind all members of the Caucus; provided, the 
said two-thirds vote is a majority of the full Democratic membership 
of the House: And provided further, that no member shall be bound 
upon questions involving a construction of the Constitution of the 
United States or upon which he made contrary pledges to his con­
stituents prior to his election or received contrary instructions by 
resolutions or platform from his nominating authority. 
7. Whenever any member of the Caucus shall determine, by rea­
son of either of the exceptions provided for in the above paragraph, 
it shall be his duty, if present, so to advise the Caucus before the 
adjournment of the meeting, or if not present at the meeting, to 
promptly notify the Democratic leader in writing, so that the party 
may be advised before the matter comes to issue upon the floor of 
the House. 
8. That the five-minute rule that governs the House of Repre­
sentatives shall govern debate in the Democratic Caucus, unless sus­
pended by a vote of the Caucus. 
9. No persons, except Democratic members of the House of Rep­
resentatives, a Caucus journal clerk, and other necessary employees, 
shall be admitted to the meetings of the Caucus. 
10. The Caucus shall keep a journal of its proceedings, which shall 
be published after each meeting, and the yeas and nays on any ques­
tion shall, at the desire of one-fifth of those present, be entered on 
the journal. 
THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 
(Ogg and Ray: "Introduction to American Government, pp. 263-265, The Century 
Company, New York, 1926. ) 
Convening Congress in special session, transmitting messages, 
and wielding the veto power do not exhaust the President's means of 
influencing legislation; there are a half-dozen well-recognized modes 
of less direct, but often equally effective, control. The first is the 
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threat of veto. By letting it be known that he will veto a given bill 
unless certain features are added to it or other change.s are made in it, 
the President may be able practically to determine the form which the 
measure will finally take. President Roosevelt went so far as to warn 
Congress publicly that he would veto certain measures which it had 
under consideration. Protest was raised against such virtual use of 
the veto power in advance, but no one could find anything in the 
Constitution or laws to prevent a president from thus making his 
views and intentions known. A second source of presidential influence 
on legislation is the patronage. Long custom has made it the rule 
that senators and representatives shall be consulted, and shall be 
permitted to bring forward candidates, when important offices are 
to be filled in their state or district; and their political power and 
general prestige among their constituents are determined largely by 
their success in securing the appointment of such candidates. The 
President, therefore, holds the whip hand: if congressmen do not 
accept his ideas on legislation he can cut them off from a share in 
the patronage. There is no reason to believe that bald threats and 
bargains of this sort are made. Yet members of Congress can hardly 
be expected to be oblivious to the practical advantages of being num­
bered among the President's dependable supporters. 
A third source of presidential influence is the personal interview. 
The President cannot appear on the floor of either branch of Con­
gress to take part in debate, or for any other purpose, save to deliver 
a formal message. But this does not prevent him from discussing 
measures with members, individually and in small groups, in his 
office at the White House, or even in the room set apart for him at the 
Capitol. Chairmen of committees and other influential members are 
frequently called into conference, especially when important legisla­
tion, e.g., a great tariff bill, is pending; and on such occasions the 
President may urge or demand that a given measure be postponed, 
that it be advanced on the calendar, or that a bill be amended in 
specified ways. He may make a bold personal appeal, or even issue 
an ultimatum. In any case, his views, promptly carried back to the 
two houses by the conferees, are not likely to be without influence. 
"Stand by the President" is, as a rule, a potent catch phrase in con­
gressional halls. Executive control over legislation through this chan­
nel was notably broadened by Presidents Cleveland, Roosevelt, and 
Wilson. There arises, indeed, at this point a real presidential initia­
tive in legislation. For, while neither the President himself nor any 
other member of the executive branch can actually introduce a bill 
in Congress, the President may, and occasionally does, bring about 
the drafting of a measure, which formally introduced by a supporter 
and spokesman in the appropriate house. President Roosevelt was 
the real author of much of the legislation enacted during his seven 
years in the White House, and President Wilson had hardly less to 
61 Cabinet vs. Committee System of Legislation 
do with the formulation of the Federal Reserve Act, the Clayton Anti­
Trust Act, and other great measures of his first term than with the 
legislation of the ensuing war period. 
If all else fails, the President may carry his cease by appealing 
directly to the people, capturing the confidence of the country, and 
demanding of Congress compliance with the popular will. Jackson 
did this, and so did Roosevelt and Wilson. It is a risky procedure, 
and the President who undertakes it "shakes the iron hand of fate." 
The cause must be a good one and the President himself of real 
stature and even brilliance. Smaller men generally fail, sometimes 
in humiliating fashion; Andrew Johnson's famous "swing around the 
circle" in 1866 was absurd and little short of pitiable. 
From what has been said, it is apparent that the President derives 
much of his actual power over legislation from his position as a party 
leader: he usually consults only his fellow-partisans in Congress 
on proposed appointments; he commonly seeks interviews with, and 
initiates legislation through, them alone; he must work in a reason­
able degree of harmony with them if much is to be accomplished. 
Originally, the President was not a party leader; Washington thought 
of himself as responsible to no party and leader of no faction. But 
when parties took definite form and presidents began to be elected 
as party men, party leadership became as truly a function of the 
President as it is of the English prime minister; and it is nowadays 
hardly a less important source of power than is the authority ex­
pressly conferred in the Constitution. Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, 
McKinley, Roosevelt, and Wilson may be mentioned as presidents 
who in a preeminent degree dominated their respective parties. Tyler, 
Hayes, Garfield, and some other chief executives had less influence in 
this way, and Cleveland was, during his second administration, dis­
avowed by his party following. But in most of these latter instances 
the ciTcumstances were exceptional, and all pointed to the practical 
desirability of full and recognized presidential leadership.... 
GENERAL MATERIAL ON BOTH SYSTEMS 
THE DRAFTING OF BILLS 
(By Dr. C. P. Patterson, 1928) 
John Stuart Mill's theory that legislative bodies should not make 
laws but should restrict themselves to the approving or rejecting 
of measures framed by experts is becoming more and more a 
matter of practice. The proper wording of law has always been 
a difficult matter. In fact, inefficient lawmaking was considered 
one of the evils of the Confederation and a cause for the remod­
eling of the governments in 1787..... 
The matter of expert aid to legislators in drafting laws is not 
a new device in legislation. It was adopted in Great Britain in 
1837 where it proved sufficiently helpful to warrant the establish­
ment of the Parliamentary Counsel to the Treasury in 1869. The 
counsel and the assistant counsel are well paid and adequate legal 
assistance may be used by the employment of barristers who are 
paid fees based on the amount of work done. The Parliamentary 
Counsel prepares all government bills and gives instructions con­
cerning the private bills which receive the support of the govern­
ment and are, therefore, subject to its amendment. It has been 
estimated that four-fifths of the legislation of Parliament comes 
under the direction of the Parliamentary Counsel. 
American legislatures by virtue of their extensive use of the 
committee system have possibly had less need for such assistance, 
although an analysis of their laws indicates that they could profit 
considerably from its use; at least they have made much less use 
of this device than European parliaments. State legislatures have 
made much larger use of expert aid in the drafting and revision 
of legislation than Congress. A large part of our litigation and 
its costs to both governments could be eliminated if our laws were 
made unequivocally clear by the substitution of brevity and lucidity 
for prolixity and obscurity. 
Congress, however, has made a beginning. In 1919 the office 
of legislative counsel under the direction of two legislative coun­
sellors, one for the House and one for the Senate, was created. 
One is appointed by the President of the Senate and the other by the 
Speaker of the House without reference to political affiliation and 
solely on the basis of special fitness for the duties to be performed. 
Each House now has a legislative counsel, an assistant counsel, law 
assistant, clerk, and an assistant clerk. 
The duties of the Legislative Counsel are to aid in the drafting 
of bills, resolutions, and their amendments at the request of the 
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committees of either House of Congress under the supervision of 
the Library Committee of each House, which may for their respec­
tive Houses determine the order in which the requests of the com­
mittee shall be considered. Mastery of language, lucidity of style, 
familiarity with technical terms, knowledge of both statutory and 
constitutional law, insight into the structure of society, foresight 
as to the probable effects of legislation are some of their qualifica­
tions. They should be not merely legal priests but diagnosticians 
of society as well. There are indications that the committees, 
executive departments, and commissions are making increasing use 
of this assistance. The growing volume of legislation and heavy 
draft on the time of members of Congress for various purposes will 
undoubtedly in due course assign a much larger sphere of useful­
ness to the office of the Legislative Counsel. 
ORIGIN OF THE TWO SYSTEMS 
(From Hasbrouck, "Party Government in the House of Representatives," pp. 
58-5~, The Macmjllan Company, New York, 1928.) 
The American committee system, as well as the modern English 
cabinet, is a natural development of earlier parliamentary practice. 
When the fathers of colonial legislatures left England, in fact, 
Parliament had shown some tendency toward a system of standing 
committees with specialized function, such as that which has become 
the distinctive feature of Congress. Similar committees arose in 
many colonial assemblies, notably in Virginia, Maryland, and 
Pennsylvania. 
The cabinet system, on the other hand, was a later growth, result­
ing from conditions which were only faintly reflected across the 
Atlantic. While the Restoration placed the Stuarts again on the 
throne, Parliament continued to assert its supremacy. Under 
Charles II, it used frequent impeachments as a means of holding 
the royal ministers in some measure responsible to itself. But 
after the Revolution of 1688, cabinet government began to take 
its modern form. The system of control by a committee of the 
majority in the House of Commons became firmly rooted in England 
during the following century, under a succession of foreign kings 
(the Hanoverians). 
The cabinet, in brief, was a "posture of defense" against an irre­
sponsible executive. No necessity called forth a similar develop­
ment in the United States. 
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PARLIAMENTARY FINANCE 
(Munro's "The Governments of Europe," pp. 220-223, The Macmillan Company, 
New York.) 
. . . . It will be noted from the foreoging outline that the 
British national budget is framed, presented, debated, and passed 
in two divisions, one dealing with expenditures and the other with 
revenue. But both divisions emanate from the same source, 
namely, the cabinet, and they are considered by the same body, 
that is, by the House of Commons sitting in each case as a com­
mittee of the whole House under two different names. The essential 
unity of the British financial system arises from the fact that the 
cabinet is responsible for preparing the entire budget, responsible 
for what it contains, and responsible for getting it adopted by 
parliament. The concentration of financial responsibility is com­
plete, which is not yet true of budget procedure in Conrgress despite 
the marked progress which has been made during recent years. 
In the United States the estimates of expenditure are compiled 
by the director of the budget from figures submitted to him hy 
the various departments. The director of the budget transmits 
these estimates to the President, who, in turn, forwards them to 
Congress with his recommendations. Thus far the British and 
American procedures are substantially alike, inasmuch as the execu­
tive in both countries takes the initial step and submits to the 
legislative body a general plan of national expenditures. But there 
our parallel ends. In the House of Representatives the estimates 
go to a committee on appropriations which may recommend changes 
in them at will, either up or down, and from this committee they 
go before the whole House which has an unrestricted right, both 
by law and by usa.ge to increase, decrease, insert, or eliminate. 
There is no rule, as in the House l)f Commons, that additions may 
only be made on recommendation of the executive. And after the 
House of Representatives is through with the estimates the Senate 
of the the United States (unlike the House of Lords) takes them 
in hand, making such further changes as it may desire. In a word, 
there is no such executive control over financial measures in Con­
gress as is exerted by the British ministers in parliament, and hence 
there is no such complete fixation of responsibility. 
There is a further difference. In Congress proposals for raising 
the necessary revenues sometimes come from the President, but they 
may also be brought forward by any member of the House on his 
own initiative. And in either case they are considered by a differ­
ent committee from that which handles the appropriations. Expen­
ditures are handled by one set of men, and revenues by another, 
each working separately. The chairmen of the two committees 
confer frequently, and a certain amount of team play is securer!; 
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but there is a good deal of room for work at cross purposes. 
Finally, it will be noted that in parliament, when appropriations or 
revenue measures are under discussion, the heads of the executive 
departments are present to explain, defend, and answer questions. 
In Congress this is not the case. The head of a department may be 
asked to submit explanations in writing or to come in person before 
a congressional committee; but he does not appear before the whole 
House and is not responsible to it. 
All this does not mean, however, that the British budgetary sys­
tem, taking it as a whole, is necessarily superior to the American. 
On the contrary there are some respects in which it is inferior. 
Concentration of responsibility is an excellent thing in its way; it 
makes for economy in public expenditures, but it inevitably involves 
a concentration of power. In Great Britain the cabinet, not the 
House of Commons, is the body which really controls the finances 
of the realm. To this it will be replied, of course, that the cabinet 
is merely the agent of the House and is responsible to it; but the fact 
remains that the House cannot insert or increase any item. It can 
only reduce, and even this it cannot well do unless the ministers ac­
quiesce. To reduce an estimate against the will of the ministers 
would be to drive them from office. On the other hand, it is only fair 
to state that the ministers do not usually press the issue to this point. 
They are, in fact, quite sensitive to the general opinions of the 
House and do not usually submit proposals which are sure to arouse 
antagonism among their own supporters. Even on the floor, after 
the proposals have been presented, they sometimes give way. With 
due allowance for ministerial sensitiveness and courtesy, however, 
the English cabinet is the real controller of the national purse. 
And as James Madison once said, they who hold the purse control 
the government. If the British budget were put directly into effect 
as soon as it has been approved by the cabinet, without going to the 
House at all, its final figures would not be appreciably different.. 
But in that case the opposition would be deprived of what is now 
its best opportunity for launching its criticisms against the min­
isters. 
It should be noted, of course, that the rule against inserting new 
items in the estimates, or increasing items already there, is one 
which the House of Commons can repeal at any time. It is merely 
a self-denying ordinance which the House in its wisdom imposed 
upon itself more than two centuries ago and which it can abolish 
if it ever makes up its mind to do so. But there is no probability 
that it will ever do anything of the sort, for the rule is one which 
most Englishmen (and many American students of government, 
also) look upon as highly beneficent in its operations. 
But in any event the fact that private members cannot insert or 
increase any item causes many of them to lose interest in the budget. 
66 University of Texas Bulletin 
Why should they display any concern over figures that have no 
relation to their own constituencies? So, night after night, when 
the House is "in supply," the chamber remains half empty. As an 
Irish member once complained, it is "overrun with absentees." It 
is hard to imagine anything more dreary than these "debates"­
dreary for everybody except the minister who is putting his items 
through and the few opposition critics who are nibbling at him. 
The ministers can well sit snug, for they know that time is on their 
side. When the twenty days are up the estimates must be voted on, 
and they have the votes to put them through. Hence, although 
the discussions in supply appear to an onlooker to be conducted in a 
most leisurely manner, the estimates are really put through the 
House under much greater pressure than is the case in Congress. 
Sometimes half the entire estimates go through at Westminster in 
a single day-the last day. This means that millions are voted 
without any parliamentary discussion at all. It is a fair criticism 
of the British House of Commons, and one often voiced by its own 
members, that inadequate discussion is devoted to the financhl 
problems of the realm and that much time is wasted in providing 
safeguards against dangers which may have existed centuries ago 
but are wholly non-existent now. . . . . 
PRESIDENTIAL VS. CABINET GOVERNMENT 
(Ogg and Ray: "Introduction to American Government," The Century Company, 
New York, 1926.) 
The relations existing between the executive and the other 
branches of government involve numerous questions that cannot 
be taken up here. Fundamentally, they hinge on the distinction 
between "presidential government" and "cabinet government." In 
a presidential system the chief executive derives his powers directly 
from, and is immediately responsible to, the electorate. He is not 
chosen by the legislature; he holds his office for a fixed term, re­
gardless of whether his relations with the legislature are or are not 
harmonious; he stands on a common footing with the legislature, 
and in most of his acts cannot be controlled by it. Such is the 
system which we have in the United States. On the other hand, in 
a cabinet government the titular executive counts for little and the 
actual, working executive, i.e., the cabinet, while not elected by the 
legislature, is composed of persons who are members of that body, 
who are indeed its leaders, who retain office only so long as they can 
collectively command the legislature's support (at all events, the 
support of the majority of the Lower House), who accordingly form 
a sort of executive committee of that body and are responsible 
directly to it, rather than to the electorate, for all of their acts. 
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This is the type of executive found, with some variations, in Eng­
land, France, and most other European countries. 
It is obvious that the presidential system is based on the principle 
of separation of powers, both organically and personally; although, 
as is true in the United States, the excutive and legislative branches 
may retain authority to check one another at important points. 
AFFIRMATIVE MATERIAL 
CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION 
(Bryce's "The American Commonwealth," pp. 165-173, The Macmillan Company, 
New York, 1893-1895.) 
Legislation is more specifically and exclusively the business of 
Congress than it is the business of governing parliaments such as 
those of England, France, and Italy. We must, therefore, in order 
to judge of the excellence of Congress as a working machine, exam­
ine the quality of the legislation which it turns out. 
Acts of Congress are of two kinds, public and private. Passing 
by private acts for the present, though they occupy a large part 
of congressional time, let us consider public acts. These are of 
two kinds, those which deal with the law or its administration, and 
those which deal with finance, that is to say, provide for the raising 
and application of revenue. I devote this chapter to the former 
class, and the next to the latter. 
There are many points of view from which one may regard the 
work of legislation. I suggest a few only, in respect of which the 
excellence of the work may be tested; and propose to ask: What 
security do the legislative methods and habits of Congress offer 
for the attainment of the following desirable objects? Namely: 
1. The excellence of the substance of a bill, i.e., its tendency to 
improve the law and promote the public welfare. 
2. The excellence of the form of a bill, i.e., its arrangement and 
the scientific precision of its language. 
3. The harmony and consistency of an act with the other acts 
of the same session. 
4. The due examination and sifting in debate of a bill. 
5. The publicity of a bill, i.e., the bringing it to the knowledge 
of the country at large, so that public opinion may be fully expressed 
regarding it. 
6. The honesty and courage of the legislative assembly in reject­
ing a bill, however likely to be popular, which their judgment dis­
approves. 
7. The responsibility of some person or body of persons for the 
enactmentment of a measure, i.e., the fixing on the right shoulders 
of the praise for passing a good, the blame for passing a bad, act. 
The criticisms that may be passed on American practice under 
the preceding heads will be made clearer by a comparison of English 
practice. Let us therefore first see how English bills and acts stand 
the tests we are to apply to the work of Congress. 
In England public bills fall into two classes,-those brought in 
by the ministry of the day as responsible advisers of the sovereign, 
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and those brought in by private members. In point of law and in 
point of form there is no difference between these classes. Practi­
cally there is all the difference in the world, because a government 
bill has behind it the responsibility of the ministry, and presumably 
the weight of the majority which keeps the ministry in office. The 
ministry dispose of a half or more of the working time of the House, 
and have therefore much greater facilities for pushing forward their 
bills. Nearly all the most important bills, which involve large 
political issues, are government bills, so that the hostile critic of a 
private member's bill will sometimes argue that the House ought not 
to permit the member to proceed with it, because it is too large for 
any unofficial hands. This premised, we may proceed to the seven 
points above mentioned. 
1. In England, as the more important bills are government bills, 
their policy is sure to have been carefully weighed. The ministry 
have every motive for care, because the fortunes of a first-class 
bill are their own fortunes. If it is rejected, they fall. A specially 
difficult bill is usually framed by a committee of the cabinet and 
then debated by the cabinet as a whole before it appears in Parlia­
ment. Minor bills are settled in the departments by the parlia­
mentary head with his staff of permanent officials. 
2. In England, government bills are prepared by the official 
government draftsmen, two eminent lawyers with several assistants, 
who constitute an office for this purpose. Private members who 
are lawyers often draft their own bills; those who are not generally 
employ a barrister. The drafting of government bills has improved 
of late years, and the faults of form still observable in British Acts 
are chiefly due to amendments made hurriedly in committee of the 
whole House. 
3. Harmony of one government bill with others of the same 
session is secured by the care of the official draftsmen, as well as by 
the fact that all emanate from one and the same ministry. No 
such safeguards exist in the case of private members' bills, but it is 
of course the duty of the ministry to watch these legislative essays, 
and get Parliament to strike out of any one of them whatever is 
inconsistent with another measure passed or intended to be passed 
in the same session. 
4. Difficult and complicated bills which raise no political con­
troversy are sometimes referred to a select committee, which goes 
through them and reports them as amended to the House. They 
are afterwards considered, first in committee of the whole, and then 
by the House on the stage of report from committee of the whole 
to the House. Such bills are now often referred to what are called 
grand committees, i.e., committees of at least fifty appointed in 
each session for the consideration of particular kinds of business, 
discussion in which replaces the discussion in committee of the 
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whole. Many bills, however, never go before select or grand com­
mittees. While measures which excite political feeling or touch any 
powerful interest (such as that of landowners or railroads or 
liquor-dealers) are exhaustively debated, others may slip through 
unobserved. The enormous pressure of work and the prolixity with 
which some kinds of business are discussed, involve the hurrying 
of other business through with scant consideration. 
5. Except in the case of discussions at unseasonable hours, the 
proceedings of Parliament are so far reported in the leading news­
papers and commented on by them that bills, even those of private 
members, generally become known to those whom they may concern. 
There is usually a debate on the second reading, and this debate 
attracts notice. 
6. A government bill is, by the law of its being, exposed to the 
hostile criticism of the opposition, who have an interest in discredit­
ing the ministry by disparaging their work. As respects private 
members' bills, it is the undoubted duty of some ministers to watch 
them, and to procure their amendment or rejection if he finds 
them faulty. This duty is discharged less faithfully than might be 
wished, but perhaps as well as can be expected from weak human 
nature, often tempted to conciliate a supporter or an "interest" by 
allowing a measure to go through which ought to have been stopped. 
7. Responsibility for everything done in the House rests upon 
the ministry of the day, because they are the leaders of the majority. 
If they allow a private member to pass a bad bill, if they stop him 
when trying to pass a good bill, they are in theory no less culpable 
than if they pass a bad bill of their own. Accordingly, when the 
second reading of a measure of consequence is moved, it is the duty 
of some member of the ministry to rise, with as little delay as possi­
ble, and state whether the ministry support it, or oppose it, or stand 
neutral. Standing neutral is, so far as responsibility to the country 
goes, practically the same thing as supporting. The opposition, 
as an organized body, are not expected to express their opinion on 
any bills except those of high political import. Needless to say, 
private members are also held strictly responsible for the votes they 
give, these votes being all recorded and published next morning. 
Of course both parties claim praise or receive blame from the 
country in respect of their attitude towards bills of moment, and 
when a session has produced few or feeble acts the opposition charges 
the ministry with sloth or incompetence. 
The rules and usages I have described constitute valuable aids to 
legislation, and the quality of English and Scottish legislation, take 
it all and all, is good; that is to say, the statutes are such as public 
opinion (whether rightly or wrongly) demands, and are well drawn 
for the purposes they aim at. 
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Let us now apply the same test to the legislation of Congress. 
What follows refers primarily to the House, but is largely true 
of the Senate, because in the Senate also the committees play an 
important part. 
In neither House of Congress are there any government bills. 
All measures are brought in by private members because all members 
are private. The nearest approach to the government bill of Eng­
land is one brought in by a leading member of the majority in 
pursuance of a resolution taken in the congressional caucus of that 
majority. This seldom happens. One must therefore compare the 
ordinary congressional bill with the English private members' bill 
rather than with a government measure, and expect to find it marked 
by the faults that mark the former class. The second difference 
is that whereas in England the criticism and amendment of a bill 
takes place in committee of the whole, in the House of Representa­
tives it takes place in a small committee of sixteen members or less, 
usually of eleven. In the Senate also the committees do most of 
the work, but the committee of the whole occasionally debates a 
bill pretty fully. 
Premising these dissimilarities, I go to the seven points before 
mentioned. 
1. The excellence of the substances of a bill introduced in Con­
gress depends entirely on the wisdom and care of its introducer. 
He may, if self-distrustful, take counsel with his political allies re­
specting it. But there is no security for its representing any opinion 
or knowledge but his own. It may affect the management of an 
executive department, but the introducing member does not com­
mand departmental information, and will, if the bill passes, have 
nothing to do with the carrying out of its provisions. On the 
other hand, the officials of the government cannot submit bills; and 
if they find a Congressman willing to do so for them, must leave the 
advocacy and conduct of the measure entirely in his hands. 
2. The drafting of a measure depends on the pains taken and 
skill exerted by its author. Senate bills are usually well drafted 
because many Senators are experienced lawyers: House bills are often 
crude and obscure. There does not exist either among the executive 
departments or in connection with Congress, any legal office charged 
with the duty of preparing bills, or of seeing that the form fo 
which they pass is technically satisfactory.* 
3. The only security for the consistency of the various measures 
of the same session is to be found in the fact that those which affect 
the same matter ought to be referred to the same committee. How­
ever, it often happens that there are two or more committees whose 
spheres of jurisdiction overlap, so that of two bills handling cognate 
matters, one may go to Committee A and the other to Committee H. 
•There was established in 1919 the office of Legislative Counsel. 
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Should different views of policy prevail in these two bodies, they 
may report to the House bills containing mutually repugnant pro­
v1s1ons. There is nothing except unusual vigilance on the part of 
some member interested, to prevent both bills from passing. 
That mischief from this cause is not serious arises from the fact that 
out of the multitude of bills introduced, few are reported and still 
fewer become law. 
4. The function of a committee of either House of Congress 
extends not merely to the sifting and amending of the bills referred 
to it, but to practically re-drawing them, if the committee desires 
any legislation, or rejecting them by omitting to report them till 
near the end of the session if it thinks no legislation needed. 
Every committee is in fact a small bureau of legislation for the 
matters lying within its jurisdiction. It has for this purpose the 
advantage of time, of the right to take evidence, and of the fact 
that some of its members have been selected from their knowledge 
of or in the topics it has to deal with. On the other hand, it suffers 
from the non-publication of its debates, and from the tendency of 
all small and secret bodies to intrigues and compromises, compro­
mises in which general principles of policy are sacrificed to personal 
feeling or selfish interests. Bills which go in black or white come 
out gray. They may lose all their distinctive color; or they may be 
turned into a medley of scarcely consistent provisions. The member 
who has introduced a bill may not have a seat on the committee, and 
may therefore be unable to protect his offspring. Other members 
of the House, masters of the subject but not members of the com­
mittee, can only be heard as witnesses. Although therefore there 
are full opportunities for the discussion of the bill by the commit­
tee, it often emerges in an unsatisfactory form, or is quietly sup­
pressed, because there is no impetus of the general opinion of the 
House or the public to push it through. When the bill comes back 
to the House the chairman or other reporting member of the com­
mittee generally moves the previous question, after which no amend­
ment can be offered. Debate ceases and the bill is promptly passed 
or lost. In the Senate there is a better chance of discussion, for the 
Senate, having more time and fewer speakers, can review to some 
real purpose the findings of its committees. 
5. As there is no debate on the introduction or on the second 
reading of a bill, the public is not necessarily apprised of the meas­
ures which are before Congress. An important measure is of 
course watched by the newspapers and so becomes known: minor 
measures go unnoticed. 
6. The general good-nature of Americans, and the tendency of 
members of their legislatures to oblige one another by doing recipro­
cal good turns, dispose people to let any bill go through which does 
not injure the interest of a party or of a person. Such good-nature 
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counts for less in a committee, because a committee has its own 
views and gives effect to them. But in the House there are few 
views, though much impatience. The House has no time to weigh 
the merits of a bill reported back to it. Members have never heard 
it debated. They know no more of what passed in the committee 
than the report tells them. If the measure is palpably opposed to 
their party tenets, the majority will reject it: if no party question 
arises they usually adopt the view of the committee. 
7. What has been said already will have shown that except as 
regards bills of great importance, or directly involving party issues, 
there can be little effective responsibility for legislation. The mem­
ber who brings in a bill is not responsible, because the committee 
generally alters his bill. The committee is little observed and the 
details of what passed within the four walls of its room are not 
published. The great parties in the House are but faintly respon­
sible, because their leaders are not bound to express an opinion, 
and a vote taken on a non-partisan bill is seldom a strict party vote. 
Individual members are no doubt responsible, and a member who 
votes against a popular measure, one for instance, favored by the 
working men, will suffer for it. But the responsibility of individ­
uals, most of them insignificant, half of them destined to vanish, 
like snowflakes in a river, at the next election, gives little security to 
the people. 
The best defense that can be advanced for this system is that 
it has been naturally evolved as a means of avoiding worse mis­
chiefs. It is really a plan for legislating by a number of commi;;;­
sions. Each commission, receiving suggestions in the shape of bills, 
taking evidence upon them, and sifting them in debate, frames its 
measures and lays them before the House in a shape which seems 
designed to make amendment in details needless, while leaving the 
general policy to be accepted or rejected by a simple vote of the 
whole body. In this last respect the plan may be compared with 
that of the Romans during the Republic, whose general assembly of 
the people approved or disapproved of a bill as a whole, without 
power of amendment, a plan which had the advantage of making 
laws clear and simple. At Rome, however, bills could be proposed 
only by a magiiltrate upon his official responsibility; they were there­
fore comparatively few and sure to be carefully drawn. The mem­
bers of American legislative commissions have no special training, 
no official experience, little praise or blame to look for, and no 
means of securing that the overburdened House will ever come 
to a vote on their proposals. There is no more agreement between 
the views of one commission and another than what may result from 
the fact that the majority in both belongs to the same party. 
Add to the conditions above described the fact that the House 
:in its few months of life has not time to deal with one-twentieth of 
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the many thousand bills which are thrown upon it, that it therefore 
drops the enormous majority unconsidered, though some of the best 
may be in this majority, and passes most of those which it does 
pass by a suspension of the rules which leaves everything to a 
single vote, and the marvel comes to be, not that legislation is faulty, 
but that an intensely practical people tolerates such defective ma­
chinery. Some reasons may be suggested tending to explain this 
phenomenon. 
Legislation is a difficult business in all free countries, and perhaps 
more difficult the more free the country is, because the discordant 
voices are more numerous and less under control. America has 
sometimes sacrificed practical convenience to her dislike to authority. 
The Americans surpass all other nations in their power of making 
the best of bad conditions, getting the largest results out of scanty 
materials or rough methods. Many things in that country work 
better than they ought to work, so to speak, or could work in any 
other country, because the people are shrewdly alert in minimizing 
such mischiefs as arise from their own haste or heedlessness, and 
because they have a great capacity for self-help. 
Aware that they possess this gift, the Americans are content to 
leave their political machinery unreformed. Persons who propose 
comprehensive reforms are suspected as theorists and crochet-mon­
gers. The national inventiveness, active in the spheres of mechanics 
and money-making, spends little of its force on the details of govern­
mental methods. 
The want of legislation on topics where legislation is needed 
breeds fewer evils than would follow in countries like England or 
France where Parliament is the only law-making body. The powers 
of Congress are limited to comparatively few subjects: its failures 
do not touch the general well-being of the people, nor the healthy 
administration of the ordinary law. 
The faults of bills passed by the House are often cured by 
the Senate, where discussion is more leisurely and thorough. The 
committee system produces in that body also some of the same 
flabbiness and colorlessness in bills passed. But the blunders, 
whether in substance or of reform, of the one chamber are fre­
quently corrected by the other, and many bad bills fail owing to a 
division of opinion between the Houses. 
The President's veto kills off some vicious measures. He does 
not trouble himself about defects of form; but where a bill seems 
to him opposed to sound policy, it is his constitutional duty to dis­
approve it, and to throw on Congress the responsibility of passing 
it "over his veto" by a two-thirds vote. A good President accepts 
this responsibility. 
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THE HOUSE OF COMMONS OF TODAY 
(By Gerald B. Hurst in the Ninteenth Century, January, 1921.) 
In spite of all its adherence to old phrases and old customs, the 
Mother of Parliaments is still the most efficient. Its wonderful 
adaptability is evidenced by its never-failing success in fitting 
ancient forms to meet modern needs. Notwithstanding a cumbrous 
method of procedure, its output of laws is prodigious, if not too 
prodigious. The cabinet system reconciles the sovereignty of Par­
liament with the maintenance of the executive powers, once enjoyed 
by the Crown, but now delegated to ministers, more effectually 
than any other known constitutional expedient. No statute is 
legally more fundamental than any other; so that a change in 
public opinion, however sudden and however revolutionary, can be 
mirrored in the statute book with unequalled speed. No other 
state possesses so elastic a Constitution. Men and newspapers may 
criticize the Government and the House of Commons with all their 
customary vigor, but not one in a thousand would wish to substi­
tute "direct action" for so complete a democracy. Whenever 
parliamentary rule has been challenged in recent times by anarchical 
bodies like the Council of Action or the Sinn Fein organization, 
or by any other plotters against social order, the bulk of the nation 
has stood whole-heartedly by the Constitution. 
The best test of a political machine is its actual working. The 
glory of the House of Commons is to have responded to this test 
throughout its history. In every age it has stood first in the world 
for its genius in harmonizing time-honored customs with the de­
mands of successive ages and advancing civilization. Its fame is 
founded on its practice, not on its logic; and it is thus typically 
English..... 
There is a common belief, much encouraged by the press, that 
the House of Commons fails to exercise proper control over the 
executive. It is quite true that the private member has little scope 
for his own initiative, owing to the absorption of the time of the 
House by Government business. If the coalition leaders will only 
promise the people at the next general election to pass fewer laws 
in the future he may again come into his own. For the moment he 
pressure of Government bills is overpowering. The private mem­
ber's right to ballot for months on private bills in the early part 
of a session is a minute and elusive privilege. Questions to minis­
ters, although no doubt they serve a purpose, are usually sterile. 
On many large questions of diplomacy and finance parliamentary 
supervision is reduced to the vanishing point. The argument, how­
ever, may well be carried too far. The majority of the House still 
retain the ultimate power of refusing to vote supply or to pass the 
Army (Annual) Bill, and a coalition ministry would be the last io 
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flout its opm1ons. The Commons in fact have a real influence on 
every issue, for a minister will rarely combat what is called the sense 
of the House; no man has ever gauged it better than Mr. Bonar Law. 
In committee, moreover, the process of obstruction is still a frequent 
expedient. In the hands of a tiny group of reactionaries it killed 
the Plumage Bill. In the hands of another group it emasculated 
the Ministry of Health (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill. If Mr. 
Lloyd George seems all-powerful, it is merely because he is still 
regarded as first in peace as in war, and on essential issues he 
has a united country at his back. 
THE PROCESS OF LAW MAKING 
(Munro's "The Governments of Europe,"" pp. 190-191, The Macmillan Company, 
New York.) 
.... Much has been written about the concentration of party 
responsibility in England and the fidelity with which party pledges 
are redeemed. A British political party, when it makes a promise 
to the people, is enabled by the organization and procedure of 
parliament to fulfil this promise. If it triumphs at the polls, it. 
controls both the executive and legislative branches of government. 
The cabinet then proceeds to crystallize the party's promise into 
government measures with the assurance that these measures will 
be enacted into law. But in America the organization and pro­
c~dure of the government does not so readily lend itself to the 
redemption of party pledges. Candidates for the presidency make 
all sorts of promises, express and implied, during the election cam­
paign. But without the cooperation of Congress there is no way 
in which most of these promises can be carried out. Senators 
and representatives also make pledges, but unless the administratio11 
is ready to help in fulfilling them they go mostly unredeemed. 
The same is true, mutatis mutandis, in state government. Party 
programs are, therefore, a much less accurate forecast of future 
legislation in America than in England. Party pledges are more set 
at naught here than there. English parliamentary procedure is 
based upon the principle that the dominant political party, through 
its majority in the House of Commons and under the leadership of 
the ministry, is unequivocally responsible for the fulfilment of its 
pro~am. No checks and balances stand in its way. 
THE POWER OF THE SEN ATE 
(By Dr. C. P. Patterson) 
The Senate largely controls the House and the President, but 
does not like to be controlled itself by even the majority of its own 
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members. "Indeed," said Woodrow Wilson, "the Senate is, par 
excellence, the chamber of debate and of individual privilege." 
This is one of its chief elements of strength, but it enables a few 
Senators to paralyze the operations of the whole Government. In 
the Sixty-fourth Congress, this feature of the procedure of the 
Senate prevented the passage of such a large amount of much 
needed legislation that President Wilson, on March 4, 1917, when 
the measure for the defense of the American merchant ships was 
under consideration made the following appeal to the nation: "In 
the immediate presence of a crisis fraught with more subtle anti 
far-reaching possibilities of national danger than any other the 
Government has known within the whole history of its international 
relations, the Congress has been unable to act either to safeguard 
the country or to vindicate the elementary rights of its citizens. 
More than 500 of the 531 members of the two Houses were ready 
and anxious to act; the House of Representatives had acted by an 
overwhelming majority; but the Senate was unable to act because 
a little group of eleven Senators had determined that it should not. 
THE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS 
(Bryce's "The American Commonwealth," pp. 169-164, The Macmillan Com11any, 
New York. ) 
.... What are the results of this system? 
It destroys the unity of the House as a legislative body. Since 
the practical work of shaping legislation is done in the committees, 
the interest of members centers there, and they care less about 
the proceedings of the wohle body. It is as a committee-man that a 
member does his real work. In fact the House has become not so much 
a legislative assembly as a huge panel from which committees are 
selected. 
It prevents the capacity of the best members from being brought 
to bear upon any one piece of legislation, however important. The 
men of most ability and experience are chosen to be chairmen 
of the committees, or to sit on the two or three greatest. For 
other committees there remains only the rank and file of the House, 
a rank and file half of which is new at the beginning of each Con­
gress. Hence every committee (except the aforesaid two or three) 
is composed of ordinary persons, and it is impossible, save by cre­
ating a special select committee, to get together what would be 
called in England "a strong committee," i.e., one where half or 
more of the members are exceptionally capable. The defect is not 
supplied by discussion in the House, for there is no time for such 
discussion. 
It cramps debate. Every foreign observer has remarked how 
little real debate, in the European sense, takes place in the House 
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of Representatives. The very habit of debate, the expectation of 
debate, the idea that debate is needed, have vanished, except ns 
regards questions of revenue and expenditure, because the center of 
gravity has shifted from the House to the committee. 
It lessens the cohesion and harmony of legislation. Each com­
mittee goes on its own way with its own bills just as though it were 
legislating for one planet and the other committees for others 
Hence a want of policy and method in congressional action. The 
advance is haphazard; the parts have little relation to one another 
or to the whole. 
It gives facilities for the exercise of underhand and even corrupt 
influence. In a small committee the voice of each member is well 
worth securing, and may be secured with little danger of a public 
scandal. The press c.annot, even when the doors of committee 
rooms stand open, report the proceedings of fifty bodies; the eye 
of the nation cannot follow and mark what goes on within them; 
while the subsequent proceedings in the House are too hurried to 
permit a ripping up there of suspicious bargains struck in the 
purlieus of the Capitol, and fulfilled by votes given in a committee. 
I do not think that corruption, in its grosser forms, is rife at Wash· 
ington. It appears chiefly in the milder form of reciprocal jobbing 
or (as it is called) "log-rolling." But the arrangements of the 
committee system have produced and sustain the class of pro­
fessional "lobbyists," men, and women too, who make it their busi­
ness to "see" members and procure, by persuasion, importunity, or 
the use of inducements, the passing of bills, public as well as private, 
which involve gain to their promoters. 
It reduces responsibility. In England, if a bad act is passed or a 
good bill rejected, the blame falls primarily upon the ministry in 
power whose command of the majority would have enabled them to 
defeat it, next upon the party which supported the ministry, then 
upon the individual members who are officially recorded to have 
"backed" it and voted for it in the House. The fact that a select 
committee recommended it--and comparatively few bills pass 
through a select committee-would not be held to excuse the default 
of the ministry and the majority. But in the United States the 
ministry cannot be blamed, for the cabinet officers do not sit in 
Congress; the House cannot be blamed because it has only followed 
the decision of its committee; the committee may be an obscure 
body, whose members are too insignificant to be worth blaming. 
The chairman is possibly a man of note, but the people have no 
leisure to watch fifty chairmen: they know Congress and Congress 
only; they cannot follow the acts of those to whom Congress chooses 
to delegate its functions. No discredit attaches to the dominant 
party, because they could not control the acts of the eleven men 
in the committee room. Thus public displeasures rarely finds a 
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victim, and everybody concerned is relieved from the wholesome 
dread of damaging himself and his party by negligence, perversity, 
or dishonesty. Only when a scandal has arisen so serious as to 
demand investigation is the responsibility of the member to his 
constituents and the country brought duly home. 
It lowers the interest of the nation in the proceedings of Con­
gress. Except in exciting times, when large questions have to be 
settled, the bulk of real business is done not in the great hall of 
the House but in this labyrinth of committee rooms and the lobbies 
that surround them. What takes place in view of the audience is 
little more than a sanction, formal indeed but hurried and often 
heedless, of deeisions procured behind the scenes, whose mode and 
motives remain undisclosed. Hence people cease to watch Congress 
with that sharp eye which every principal ought to keep fixed on 
his agent. Acts pass unnoticed, whose results are in a few months 
discovered to be so grave that the newspapers ask how it happened 
that they were allowed to pass. 
The country of course suffers from the want of the light and 
leading on public affairs which debates in Congress ought to 
supply. But this is more fairly chargeable to defects of the House 
which the committees are designed to mitigate than to the commit­
tees themselves. The time which the committee work leaves for 
the sittings of the House is long enough to permit due discussion 
did better arrangements exist for conducting it. 
It throws into the hands of the chairmen of committees, espe­
cially, of course, of those which deal with finance and with great 
material interests. They become practically a second set of min­
isters, before whom the departments tremble, and who, though they 
can neither appoint nor dismiss a postmaster or a tide-waiter, can 
by legislation determine the policy of the branch of administration 
which they oversee. This power is not necessarily accompanied by 
responsibility, because it is largely exercised in secret. 
MODERN POLITICS-AN INTERPRETATION 
(Haines' "Your Congress," pp, 38, 40-41, 1915.) 
Big politics, more than big business, is the immediate and common 
problem which we have to face. 
Politics is the gateway to everything government has to offer or to 
withhold from the people. At present no real advancement in 
industrial oonditions, no vital change in government, can come 
excepting through political action. No economic theory, no moral 
idea, can become a reality excepting through the instrumentality 
of politics. And that is the only legitimate function that politics 
has-to serve as the agency for the application of economic and 
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moral principles to the life of the people. Politics should be only 
the means to that end; but modern political organization has become 
an end in itself. This end is office and the ever-increasing perquisites 
of office. 
In the last short session of the Sixty-third Congress there were 
passed 244 bills and resolutions. Of this number 229 related to 
one or both of the basic elements in the political system-patronage 
and pork. Less than thirty were measures in which the general 
public had an interest. Adding such perennial incidents as the 
mileage garb and misappropriated clerk hire, and special events like 
the sham attempt to make members earn their salaries and the 
Mulhall-McDermott matter, one gets a startling, but not an unfair, 
picture of the American Congress in action. 
Congress is the source and center of practically all that is per­
versive in modern politics. 
Whatever is national in scope must come out of Congress. Con­
gress as at present constituted and controlled is 99 per cent politics 
-perverted politics. Politics is always the first and last and inter­
mediate consideration. Economics, national morality, the common 
welfare, are only incidental. The first concern of every legitimate 
economic and moral interest should be to reverse this relationship. 
Then only can there come a fair, out-in-the-open consideration and 
choice among economic principles. 
The great economic problem today is the labor question, but until 
the hold of the political system upon Congress is broken there can 
come no adequate and lastingly equitable changes in that field. 
Those who embrace socialism as the best economic doctrine are 
confronted with the same political problem: No part of the national 
ownership program will be possible excepting through congressional 
action. 
Advocates of the single tax face the same necessity for acting 
through perverted political agencies. 
You may regard equal suffrage, or social legislation such as old 
age pensions, or prohibition, or conservation, or national highways, 
as of chief importance; whatever your interests, if national in scope, 
they can be realized only through congressional, which means politi­
cal, action. 
Many hold that governmental institutions must be changed, that 
the machinery of government should be made more democratic: in 
the field of "popular government" the same common problem 
appears, only more perplexing because attended by more duplicity 
and double dealing. A national initiative and referendum can come 
only out of a Congress in which politics and political objects occupy 
the center of the stage. It is the same with a gateway amendment 
to the Constitution, and proportional representation, and a one­
branch legislature. Even the changes that would help to change 
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Congress must come out of Congress-where politics and politicians 
dominate in their own interests, which are not public interests. 
Politics, the servant, the incidental thing, has grown so great as to 
overshadow and subordinate all else in government. The problem, 
then, the first task of all groups, regardless of conflicting economic 
convictions, is to unite to break up the vicious, bi-partisan political 
plunder system, and reduce politics back to its only legitimate func­
tion, that of serving as the instrumentality for the application of 
economic and moral principles to the common welfare of the 
people..... 
METHODS OF LEGISLATION 
(Sir Courtenay Ilbert'e "Methods of LeiPslation," pp. 27, 47-49, University of 
London Press. l!H2.) 
All I can say is that absence of responsibility for the preparation 
of legislative measures, and absence of security for their conformity 
to general principles and their consistency with each other, are 
among the chief defects noted by competent critics in American 
legislative procedure. 
. . . . . I believe that most Americans would agree that the 
amount of sifting which bills undergo in Congress, and the amount 
of attention and criticism which is brought to bear upon them both 
inside and outside the legislature are far less than in the case of 
bills introduced into the Parliament at Westminster. 
Another difference lies in the greater or less use made of the 
power of the executive government to supplement parliamentary 
legislation by means of rules or orders having the effect of law. 
All free countries recognize the importance of maintaining the 
principle that a distinction ought to be drawn between the legisla­
tive, judicial and executive functions of government, and that these 
functions ought to be exercised by separate bodies. But they differ 
very much in the application of this principle. The principle of 
separation of powers, as it is sometimes called, was a leading tenet 
in the political philosophy of the eighteenth century, and is nowhere 
more emphatically affirmed than in the Constitution of the United 
States, with results which are not always conducive to good govern­
ment. There is always and everywhere a tendency on the part of 
those responsible for the three great branches of government respec­
tively, to regard the others as rivals, to fret at limitations of their 
own powers, and to poach on the provinces of their neighbors. And 
this tendency is increased and acc:entuated if too hard and fast a line 
is drawn between organs and functions which ought to work in 
harmony with each other, and the relations of which to each other 
require the most delicate adjustment for their proper working. 
One result of denying to the legislature at Washington the control 
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which the legislature at Westminster exercises over the executive, 
is that Congress is always trying to regulate by bill matters of detail 
which in this country would be left, and in the opinion of most of us 
would properly be left, to be regulated by administrative action and 
administrative regulations. 
CLOSURE: THE HOUSE 
(Rogers' "The American Senate," pp. 142-144, 145-147, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 
1926.) 
The increasing activity of the Rules Committee in report­
ing special orders for the consideration of legislation has not been 
given the attention it deserves. The practice, as I have said, began 
with the Speakership of Mr. Crisp in the Fifty-second Congress. 
It was in part an attempt to prevent filibustering which had been 
freely resorted to in the previous Congresses. The special orders, 
which could be reported by the Rules Committee at any time, limited 
both amendments and debate and made it certain that the House 
would take action at a time and in a way determined upon by the 
leaders. 
Increasing use has been made of special orders. At the first 
session (special) of the Sixty-third Congress (April 7 to December 
1, 1913) only six special orders were reported and four of these 
applied to appropriation bills. This, it will be recalled was the 
session when the new Democratic administration (making full use 
of the caucus) was passing its currency, trust, and tariff legislation. 
These six special orders were hardly in excess of the number at the 
first session of the Sixty-first Congress (March 15 to August 5, 1909). 
Then the Census Bill, the Tariff Bill, the conference report on the 
Tariff Bill, and an amendment to the urgent deficiency bill were the 
only matters on which the Committee on Rules proposed to suspend 
the general procedure of the House. By the Sixty-seventh Con­
gress, however, important business was largely regulated by special 
orders imposing a rigorous form of closure. Frequently the special 
orders were presented without any notice, and there was thus raised 
in an acute form the difficult question which, as I have said, con­
fronts every legislative assembly: how to square the necessity for 
certainty and a time-table in legislative business with due notice to 
members and freedom of discussion. The matter is, of course, 
more acute in the American Congress because there is no centralized 
authority over legislative business such as is found in a cabinet 
form of government. When the House of Representatives revised 
its rules at the beginning of the Sixty-eighth Congress, it was pro­
vided that a special order shall lie over one day unless immediate 
consideration was authorized by a two-thirds vote. 
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Neither the number of the special orders nor their applicability 
to important legislation, however, has of itself a decisive influence 
on the deliberative functions of the House of Representatives. 
It matters little that at the second (short) session of the Sixty-eighth 
Congress eight special orders were reported, or that in the fh'st 
session there were nineteen and at the second session of the Sixty­
seventh Congress twenty-nine. Nor is it important of itself that 
these rules covered the whole ambit of congressional business-ap­
propriations, buildings, interstate commerce, agriculture, taxation, 
and constitutional amendments. From the standpoint of the House 
as a deliberative assembly or a rubber stamp, the vital thing is what 
the orders provided in opportunities for debate and amendment. 
Their ungenerous character is not difficult of demonstration. . . . . 
One of the most extreme cases of this sort occurred in May, 1920, 
when the House acted on the first bonus bill. This provided for 
insurance, education, land settlement, and "adjusted compensation," 
and levied taxes to raise the billion dollars that would be required. 
It was an extremely complicated measure, approved as a whole by 
probably only a tiny section of the House, but the leaders had de­
termined that it should be passed as part of the Republican campaign 
strategy. It was certain that it would not be considered in the 
Senate. The Republiean Steering Committee considered various 
forms of closure, and at first determined upon a rule limiting debate 
to five hours, preventing any amendment, and allowing a single 
motion to recommit to the committee that had reported the bill. 
There was a great deal of opposition to this proposal and it was 
abandoned, but in the end the measure was forced through with 
the House even more effectively, although not so openly, gagged. 
On May 29, 1920, with Congress slated to adjourn on June 5 to 
permit the members to attend the presidential nominating conven­
tions, the Rules Committee proposed a rule, "That it shall be in 
order for six legislative days, beginning May 29, 1920, for the 
Speaker to entertain motions of members of committees to suspend 
the rules under the provisions provided by the general rules of the 
House." This proposal but poorly concealed its real purpose; sus­
pensions for the final six days of a Congress had been resorted to, 
almost without exception, only during the short sessions, when Con­
gress must adjourn on March 4, and when there is the greatest 
congestion of business. There were no special reasons to make such 
a procedure necessary at this time. Nevertheless, the rule was 
adopted, and Representative Fordney immediately moved "that the 
rules be suspended and that the House pass H . R. 14157, known as 
the soldiers' bonus bill." Twenty minutes a side were allowed for 
debate, the rules were suspended, and the bill was passed. As 
Representative Mann, one of the ablest parliamentarians in the 
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House, said, no bill as important and complicated had ever been 
forced through with no opportunity for amendment. . . . . 
LEGISLATING WITH A DARK LANTERN 
(Haines' "Your Congress," pp. 76-78, 80, 1916.) 
THE PART THE CAUCUS PLAYS 
Leadership, to be effective, must be based upon something more 
than personal power. The party "leader," in order to have a follow­
ing, must have at his disposal spoils with which to reward his fol­
lowers. In the House these rewards take the form of favored com­
mittee places, patronage, perquisites, prestige, etc. It is instructive 
to note how Mann and Underwood came to occupy the positions 
they undeniably held as respective leaders of the Republican and 
Democratic regulars in the last House. The method is simple. It 
should be understood, however, because it illustrates the comparative 
importance of caucuses and committees, their dependence each upon 
the other, their respective contributions to the building of the or­
ganization. 
Take the case of Mr. Mann. Before the last Congress was organ­
ized, the leaders of his party apparently affected a tentative combi­
nation of reelected Republicans. (The new members are always 
excluded from real participation in the organization.) With this 
assumed power they went into the Republican caucus. The caucus 
ratified their tentative action, making Mr. Mann their candidate for 
Speaker, their floor leader, and giving him authority over the Re­
publican membership of committees. Thus was the assumed power 
made real. Mr. Mann then had actual control of the regulars of his 
party because their congressional fortunes were largely in his hands. 
It was much the same on the Democratic side, only the procedure in 
that camp was more complex and mystifying. 
Neither party caucus could have become a dominating force in the 
beginning without a tentative "organization" to bring it into being. 
Neither caucus could long remain intact without a real organization 
back of it. In fact, a caucus is only the manifestation of an organi­
zation. One man, or a few men, can control a caucus only when they 
have gained control of the membership of the caucus through domi­
nation of the machine--which means the regular committees. 
The power of the caucus lies in the popular belief that it is an 
institution of real power. It is not. It has no power except that 
born of the fear of it. When its bluff and bluster fail, the caucus is 
a weak, timorous thing that shies at his own shadow. So false is 
its foundation, so indefensible is its place in the machinery of legis­
lation that, by bolting and advertising their insurgency throughout 
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the country, no more than ten determined members can bring about 
its disruption at any time. 
This misunderstanding of the people is based largely on the belief 
that the caucus can bind reluctant members to unanimity. That is 
false. The action of a caucus binds only those members who were 
bound by the "organization" before the caucus acted. No one ever 
heard of a caucus where the leaders were not in harmony as to the 
course to be taken. Why did not the Remocrats caucus and unite in 
the fight to repeal free tolls? 
The greatest fallacy of all is the contention that the caucus some­
times is used to probate good legislation. The caucus in its influence 
is always obstructive, and never constructive. Not once in the last 
Congress did the caucus contribute the deciding factor of strength 
to secure the passage of a measure. On the other hand, it was em­
ployed repeatedly to shield and mantle with vague, shifting irre­
sponsibility the cbstructive tactics of so-called leaders. 
The caucus assumes and exercises responsibility for the organiza­
tion and activities of the House. But who in the caucus is respon­
sible? Theres' the rub. How is it possible to reduce the responsi­
bility down to individuals? If the caucus has any power, regardlei;.s 
of what form of power it may be-negative, obstructive, or even a 
kind of positive power based on the tolerant ignorance of partici­
pants and people-it is an irresponsible power. When you try to 
fix responsibility for anything the caucus does or does not do, the 
outlines of individuals, dimly seen even at first, gradually dissolve 
into a misty mass. 
Yet the majority party caucus, an unofficial institution, essentially 
secret, its meetings held behind barred and bolted doors, with no 
record of the debate, not even a sound escaping; with no assured 
integrity of the meager records it does keep; with absolutely no 
power to prevent dodging or the manipulation of quorums; with its 
portals ever open to pork-barrel bargainers, and all the under­
ground influences of politics; with rarely more than a fourth of the 
whole membership of the House doing the deciding, has often usurped 
the official functions of the House itself. 
A small minority may prevail over the whole House through the 
-caucus. The caucus is the instrument of a minority; it means minor­
ity rule, the most undemocratic thing in the catalogue of political 
perversities. 
It is indefensible enough when a minority in the caucus presumes 
to act for the House, but that is not the worst of it. The caucus 
has become the last refuge of the dodgers. Those actually respon­
sible for not bringing politically dangerous questions before the House 
for an open vote seek shelter in the failure of the caucus to command 
them to do so. 
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"Log jams" are the modern politicians' chief delight. When thti 
calendars become so congested and obstructed with appropriation 
measures and special orders that dangerous issues cannot be reached, 
then ordinary Congressmen are in bliss. In the first session of the 
last Congress, the caucus passed a resolution forbidding standing 
committees to report bills to the House without express permission 
from the caucus. 
During all that period this meant a double check upon committees. 
The "reformed rules" gave the House no practical power to compel 
reluctant committees to report business; that was one side of it. 
On the other hand, if standing committees desired to act on bills and 
advance the work of Congress, there was this caucus mandate to 
obstruct them. In that way the caucus contributed to a "log jam" 
which was so complete as to make the Rules Committee almost the 
absolute dictator of what the House did or did not do. 
Then, with Calendar Wednesday filibustered and disregarded out 
of countenance, the only possible way to get anything not privileged 
before the House was through a special rule from the Rules Com­
mittee, and the Rules Committee, although the caucus may not have 
whispered "thou shalt not," refused to act until the caucus thundered 
"thou shalt." Neither the Conunittee on Rules nor any other com­
mittee is in any official way responsible to the caucus, but the game 
worked because the excuse was convenient and the people too far 
away to understand. 
Partyism is the parent evil in Congress. The caucus is the last 
and fullest expression of partyism. . . . . 
DISFRANCHISING MEMBERS 
In practical operation the caucus disfranchises every Congressman 
who does not participate in caucus legislation. That means all minor­
ity members, in the last Congress one-third of the membership of the 
House. As will be shown, many mare are indirectly disfranchised 
by being outvoted in the caucus. 
Members who participate in a caucus, either through ignorance 
of its straw-man strength or a desire to justify their position before 
the public, feel that they are bound to abide by the decisions of the 
caucus, and to carry out its decrees. Take away from a caucus 
that cardinal fiction and it is no longer a caucus. Without assuming 
the power to bind its members to a unanimity, a caucus becomes 
only a conference. Obviously, then, a majority of the caucus "con­
trols" its own minority, and, when it is a caucus of the predominant 
party, a majority of the caucus controls the w'hole membership of the 
House..... 
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DISADVANTAGES OF CONFERENCE COMMITTEE 
PROCEDURE 
(Ogg and Ray: "Introduction to American Government," pp. 397-398, The Century 
Company, New York.) 
. . . . In Congress, as in the state legislatures, the conference 
corn:mittee is an exceedingly useful device. It is more necessary 
than in European parliaments (although it is by no means unknown 
in them) because, in the first place, our national and state legisla­
tures are organized in accordance with a more extreme bicameral 
theory than are most foreign legislatures, and, in the second place, 
because, whereas in cabinet-governed countries the ministers, com­
prising in a sense a continuous conference committee of the two 
Houses, are able to coordinate the Houses' actions, our sys.tern of 
balanced government leaves the legislative Houses legally isolated 
and devoid of coordinating machinery except such as the Houses set 
up for their own convenience. The machinery employed is, of courRe, 
the conference committee. Some questionable features, however, 
appear. Almost without exception, conference committees work in 
secret. Doubtless it would be difficult for them to make headway 
otherwise. Yet, in view of the power which they wield, strong objec­
tion can be, and is, raised. For while the committee is supposed to 
deal only with actual differences between the Houses and to stay well 
within the bounds set by the extreme positions which the Houses 
have taken, it often works into the measure, as reported, many 
features of its own, even going so far as to rewrite whole sections 
with the sole purpose of incorporating the views which the majority 
members happen to hold. Conference committee reports are likely 
to reach the Houses near the close of a session, and, as has been said, 
are very likely to be adopted. There may be little time for critical 
scrutiny or debate; anything that the committee reports has a strong 
presumption in its favor; failure to act might entail embarrassment. 
In practice this often means the enactment of important provisions 
without consideration by either Hous&--in other words, legislation 
nominally by Congress but actually by conference committee. . . . . . 
NEGATIVE MATERIAL 
CRITICISMS OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 
(Luce's "Legislative Procedure," pp. 189-200, 1922, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., 
It will be seen that in weighing the comparative merits of the 
English and American systems, we are to determine whether it is 
better to have the preliminary investigation and the discussion of 
minute detail conducted by the whole House or a sizable fraction 
thereof, or by small groups to each of which is entrusted all measures 
relating to one field of governmental activity. 
FACILITIES FOR INTRIGUE 
In criticism of small groups, American committees, it is averred 
that, like all other small and secret bodies, they tend to intrigue; 
that they furnish facility for the exercise of underhanded or corrupt 
influences; that they are the easy prey of the lobbyist. It is charged 
that though semi-judicial in their nature, they rarely give both sides 
of a question equal opportunity for presentation; and that the ad­
vantage lies with the side supported by able counsel, skilled in argu­
ment and accustomed to the conditions of committee hearings. Fur­
thermore, it is argued that small groups are peculiarly exposed to 
the temptation to compromise matters of principle, as well as to sacri­
fice broad policies to personal feeling or selfish interest. These are 
charges that can be brought with more or less force against many 
kinds of small working groups, and the answer is that though the 
evils do exist, they are found relatively unimportant in the activities 
of boards of directors, trustees, commissioners, and the like, which 
for generations have been justified by their fruits, and have become 
customary organs of joint effort. 
DISSIPATION OF ABILITY 
More unusual are the conditions found in the make-up of legisla­
tive committees. Unlike working groups in other fields, fitness and 
capacity or not the predominating tests for their selection. Every 
member of a legislature or Congress must by custom have at lea:.'t 
one committee position; often he gets two or three positions, some­
times several, or, indeed, in the case of Senators, they might be called 
many. It is generally felt that on every committee there ought to 
be at least a few men of recognized capacity, for bills are to be 
assigned by classes of topics, making it impossible to concentrate all 
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the important questions, and in advance there is no certainty that 
any single committee in the whole list will have nothing but unim­
portant work. As the strong men in any legislative body make up 
only from one-fifth to one-tenth of its membership, in practice the 
result is that they are scattered through the committees, and the 
chances are that the majority of each comim.ittee will be made up of 
men without experience or without marked capacity. This is said to 
dissipate ability, where instead ability ought to be concentrated on 
the really important problems. 
This criticism is weighty. It can be met only by pointing out that 
it applies to all representative bodies gathered as a result of popular 
suffrage, and that the situation is saved by the familiar workings of 
leadership, whereunder the few of greater ability guide the many 
of lesser ability. Legislatures might or might not be more effective 
if they were composed only of the strong few. The American theory 
has been that democracy is safer, if not wiser, when it is guided 
by the many. 
RESTRICTION OF INTERESTS 
Another result of what may be called topical committees is that 
the interest and activity of each legislator is for the most part 
restricted ro the topics dealt with by the committees to which he is 
assigned. Only as a witness can he share in the work of any other 
committee. Assuredly this has its unfortunate side. On the other 
hand, there are few men so gifted that they can do many things well, 
and on the whole it may be advantageous to secure concentration 
of legislative study. The man who wants a finger in every pie 
is apt to be a rather useless sort of man, of the busybody variety. 
Now and then a legislator may well chafe because he cannot share 
activity in more matters than his committee assignments bring to 
him ; he may be justified in feeling that he could really help in the 
work of this or that other committee. Individual hardships no doubt 
follow. Yet there is usually work enough to go around, and the man 
willing to apply himself to whatever comes to his lot need rarely 
be idle. 
Undoubtedly the system throse much power into the hands of chair­
men, but where is the harm? Somebody must lead. If it is not the 
strong, it will be the weak. If it is not the experienced, it will be 
the inexperienced. Otherwise chaos. But, it is said, this is leader­
ship without responsibility. The objection is fanciful. It carries the 
demand for ~ponsibility to an absurd extreme. 
RULE OF LITTLE LEGISLATURES 
Next consider the allegation that most of the laws are really 
:made by committees--that we are ruled by "little legislatures'' This 
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is a phase of the subject to which much attention has been given by 
those writers who state a simple fact with a context implying that 
it is necessarily reprehensible. As an eample, take Francis E. 
Leupp's description of a familiar scene at Washington, the same sort 
of a scene that is to be observed on a smaller scale in every legisla­
ture of the land. "Perhaps the most cheerful pleasantry ever per­
petrated by Congress," he says, "is the bit of comedy enacted in the 
Senate nearly every day when the clerk's desk is heaped with bills 
for private pensions and relief. It may be that only one Senator 
is in his seat, and he reading or writing. One by one the bills are 
called by title, the presiding officer reciting the usual formula: 'The 
question is, Shall the bill pass? Those in favor will saye "Aye" ; 
those opposed, "No." The ayes have it and the bill is passed.' Not 
another voice is heard, and millions of the people's money is voted 
away at a sitting without the sound of an 'Aye' or a 'No'-the bills 
floating through on nothing but the silence which is assumed to give 
consent." 
This breathes the notion that the practice must be evil. The same 
impression can be produced by a statement of fact without any com­
ment at all. Thus Professor Reinsch says in a footnote : "On one 
day in January, 1905, 459 bills were passed in eighteen minutes. 
In 1899 the River and Harbor Bill carrying appropriations amounting 
to $30,000,000 was passed after a debate of ninety minutes." Here 
the very absence of explanation permits the reader to draw an un­
favorable conclusion because on their face the facts suggest nothing 
else. Even so candid a man as President Cleveland described the 
practice in a way to give the impression that there is but one side 
to the question. It was in a message vetoing the Elizabeth S. De­
Kraft pension bill, June 21, 1886, that be said: "In speaking of the 
promiscuous and ill-advised grants of pensions which have lately been 
presented to me for approval, I have spoken of their 'apparent con­
gressional sanction' in recognition of the fact that a large proportion 
of these bills have never been submitted to a majority of either 
branch of C'ongress, but are the results of nominal sessions held for 
the express purpose of their consideration and attended by a small 
minority of the respective Houses of the legislative branch of gov­
ernment." 
UNFAIR CRITCISM 
In the previous year Woodrow Wilson, who was destined to be a 
successor of Mr. Cleveland, had published his book on "Congressional 
Government," with strictures on the same point. Said he: "The 
House never accepts the proposals of the Committee on Ways and 
Means, or of the Committee on Appropriations, without due delibera­
tion; but it allows almost all of its other standing committees vir­
tually to legislate for it. In form, the committees only digest the 
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various matters introduced by individual members, and prepare it, 
with care, and after thorough investigation, for the final considera­
tion and action of the House; but, in reality, they dictate the course 
to be taken, prescribing the decisions of the House not only, but 
measuring out, according to their own wills, its opportunities for 
debate and deliberation as well. The House sits, not for serious dis­
cussion, but to sanction the conclusions of its committees as rapidly 
as possible. It legislates in its committee-rooms; not by the deter­
mination of majorities, but by the resolutions of specially-commis­
sioned minorities; so that it is not far from the truth to say that 
Congress in session is C'ongress on public exhibition, whilst Congress 
in its committee-rooms is Congress at work. 
In spite of criticisms from such eminent sources, I hazard tho 
belief that the practice is not bad, but, on the contrary, is positively 
good, and whether bad or good is at any rate absolutely necessary 
as long as our legislative bodies persists 'in concerning themselves 
with administrative detail. Not a word is to be said in defense of 
what is virtually the delegation of legislative power to committees 
in matters of public policy involving important governmental prin­
ciples. These, however, are numerically a very small part of the 
questions confronting every Congress and Legislature. The over­
whelming mass of the business is technical, administrative or quasi­
judicial. 
CHOICE BETWEEN EVILS 
How is it to be handled? Take, for eample, the much criticized 
river and harbor appropriations. Granted that a committee of Con­
gress is an unfit body to decide whether new harbor or old harbor 
or some other harbor should be dredged. But C'ongress itself, sit­
ting as a whole, is a vastly more unfit body to decide. Something 
:anyhow is gained by reducing the number of incompetents passing 
judgment. They are not incompetent for certain things, but what 
can the mass of Representatives be certain that they know about 
the needs of some little harbor of which most of them never befor~ 
heard? Or take the pension bills that brought applause to President 
Cleveland because of his vetoes. You say the pension committee 
did bad work. Very likely, but would not House or Senate have done 
far worse? The committee has at least the opportunity to hear and 
examine evidence as well as to deliberate. House or Senate cannot 
spare time to study the facts in these matters of administrative 
detail. It would take those bodies a century to go into each matter 
with the thoroughness of committee procedure. 
Undoubtedly we do not do the thing in the best way, but it is the 
only way if our lawmaking bodies are to make rules and regula­
tions as well as laws, if they are to dispense justice to claimants, 
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if they are to continue the pretense of being expert in administration. 
Only by having thirty, forty, or fifty "little legislatures" can even a 
sizable fraction of the work be done. That is the real reason why 
we legislate by small groups, subject to the revision of the full 
assembly. Perforce this revision is hasty and inadequate. It must 
be assumed that most of the committee work has been done right. 
The marvel is that under the conditions so much of that which is 
imperfect is detected and corrected. 
Of course there is complaint that the scrutiny is not close enough, 
that too much reliance is placed on the judgment of the committees, 
and that the tendency to follow them blindly permits them to prevail 
with much that ought not to be approved. For instance, Pro­
fessor Beard, in his "American Government and Politics," says, "it 
is by the committee that good measures are often smothered or 
riddled by amendments, and pernicious measures carried through the 
Legislature without adequate scrutiny." Had he served in such a 
Legislature as that of Massachusetts, he never would have given 
space to such an argument. He would have found that amendment 
in matters of detail is far more wisely made in committee than on 
the floor. The judgment of the committee in respect thereof is 
usually sound, and experience proves it more often correct than the 
judgment of the House as a whole. If the proposed change goes to 
the essence of the matter, previous study by a committee more often 
helps than hurts. 
COMMITTEES NOT INFALLIBLE 
Yet committees are not infallible and it would be unfortunate if 
in fact their use precluded amendment by House or Senate itself. 
That is not the case in Massachusetts; amendments are readily and 
freely made in the course of debate. It is not the case ih Iowa. The 
"Legislative Manual" of that state says committee amendments 
are considered first and often are amended before adoption. Then 
come amendments from the floor, and the Journals show a large 
number of these are offered. In a recent Senate more bills were 
amended that had no committee recommendations than those that 
had amendments proposed by committees; and a number of bills to 
which there were proposed committee amendments were rejected. 
Surely of these states it cannot be said that, because some committee 
has reported, "pernicious measures are carried through the Legisla­
ture without adequate scrutiny." No proof comes to my notice that 
elsewhere such a regrettable consequence generally follows. In the 
very nature of things it is improbable. Although the backing of a 
committee may have much influence, yet the measure that is perni­
cious almost always arouses too many enemies to let it run the· 
gauntlet of the House and Senate without criticism. 
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EXAMPLES OF FOREIGN GOVERMENTS 
Under the system of ministerial responsibility, which is usually 
favored by those who condemn American committees, it is significant 
that the forward-looking men urge committees for the very purpose 
of greater freedom of amendment. In the German Reichstag, where 
bills were not always referred to committees, Lowell said it was note­
worthy that the more advanced Liberals constantly urged such a 
reference in the case of Government bills, because the authoritative 
influence of the ministers was thereby diminished, and greater op­
portunity was given for criticism and amendment; while the more 
moderate parties, following the lead of the Government, often pre­
ferred an immediate discussion of important measures by the full 
House, without the intervention of any committee at all. 
Even in England, with the cabinet system so often held up for 
our admiration, it is urged that more questions should be handled 
after the American fashion. There is no small significance in the 
opinion of such a man as W. E. H. Lecky, who rarely saw the good 
in anything democratic. "The House of Commons," he said, "as a 
whole is becoming so unfit for the transaction of the details of busi­
ness that it will probably more and more delegate its functions to 
committees; and these committees submit great questions to a thor­
ough examination, bring together the most competent practical 
judges and the best available information, weaken the force of party, 
and infuse into legislation samething, at least, of a judidal spirit." 
Thus English thinkers urge imitation of the United States, while 
American reformers urge imitation of England. Distant hills are 
always greenest. 
COMMITTEE BARS INTRODUCER OF BILL 
Another of the objections raised to the American system is that 
the introducer of a bill gets no chance to protect his offspring, at 
least in its infancy, unless he happens to be a member of the com­
mittee to whose mercies it is entrusted. There is something in this 
argument, but it militates with equal force against the bicameral 
system, which precludes the parent of an idea from fighting for 
its life in the body of which he is not a member. Furthermore, if 
experience proved this to be a really serious objection, the logical 
deduction would be that no bills are likely to come of age except those 
born within the legislative chambers, which everybody knows is far 
from the case. It may be doubted whether often there is likely to be 
great value in a measure that has but one warm friend, its parent. 
No mor~ serious is the objection that the committee system creates 
unfortunate rivalries for the right of way. Nothing of the sort 
develops in Massachusetts or in other states where every petition 
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gets an answer, every bill that has been introduced gets a report, 
every report gets its place on the calendar, and the calendar is dis­
posed of before prorogation. In legislatures that do not finish their 
work, as also in the overburdened Congress, committee rivalries may 
do harm, but if there must be preferences, why are not committee 
rivalries as likely to meet the need as any other system? The blame, 
if blame there be, should fall on the situation and not on the methods 
it produces. 
MAKES LAW-MAKING UNATTRACTIVE? 
Even of less weight seems to me the criticism that the committee 
system, by shifting the center of gravity from the floor to the com­
mittee room and lessening the opportunity for debate in the open, 
disastrously reduces the attractiveness of legislative life for strong 
men. Yet as keen a man as E. L. Godkin declared this to be the 
most serious defect in the committee system, and the hardest to 
remedy. Said Mr. Godkin: "In recent days, legislatures in all the 
democratic countries have been made repulsive to men of mark by 
the pains taken 'to get business done' and to keep down the flood of 
speech. Everybody who enters a legislature now for the first time, 
especially if he is a man of talent and character, is bitterly disap­
pointed by finding that the rules take from him nearly every oppor­
tunity of distinction, and, in addition, condemn him to a great 
deal of obscure drudgery. It is only by the rarest chance that he 
finds an opening to speak, and his work on the committees never 
shows itself to the public. It consists largely in passing on the 
merits of the thousands of schemes concocted by inexperienced or 
ignorant men, and has really some resemblance to a college professor's 
reading of 'themes.' In fact, the committee room may be called the 
grave of honorable ambition. We find, accordingly, that only few 
men of real capacity, who have once gone to the Legislature or to 
Congress, are willing to return for a second term, simply because 
they find the work disagreeable and the reward inadequate." 
This so hopelessly confuses causes and results that one is at a loss 
to know where to begin refutation. It ignores the fact that some­
where, somehow, by somebody, the work now done in committees must 
be done. If it is not agreeable to men of real capacity, shall it be 
left to men without real capacity? Will it be less disagreeable if 
it is transferred to the floor? How will that increase the speaking 
opportunity for the man of talent and character? Is it the rules 
that deprive such a man of the opportunity for distinction, or the 
volume of business that compels the rules? And is it the case that 
any considerable number of men with or without capacity decline a 
second term in Legislature or Congress? True, it is that long terms 
of service either in Congress or the Legislatures are not the rule, 
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but that is from. causes having nothing whatever to do with the com­
mittee system. 
PUBLIC INTEREST IN LEGISLATION 
Akin to this particular criticism. is that which blames committees 
for the decadence of public interest in the proceedings of Congress 
and Legislatures. This strikes me as far-fetched, but Bryce includes 
it in his list of defects, and it should therefore get at least a word. 
It may be that lack of interest is in some measure due to the small 
proportion of debate that has any elements of the dramatic, the 
picturesque, or the vital, but evidence is wholly lacking to show 
that this proportion is smaller than of old. The colonial Journals 
indicate that in olden days too the bulk of the business was trivial. 
Men who served in the early Congresses were constantly complaining 
of the waste of time on inconsequential things. May it not be that 
the wonderful increase in the abundance and diversity of social inter­
ests in these later years has made it impossible for the petty phases 
of lawmaking to draw and hold public attention? 
Another complaint is that committees by working independently 
produce conflicting and bad results. In Mr. Wilson's epigrammatic 
phrase, "our legislation is conglomerate, not homogeneous." Else­
where he has described it as "haphazard, incoherent." Bryce 
thought the system lessens the cohesion and harmony of legislation. 
This type of criticism assumes that there ought to be cohesion, har­
mony, homogeneity. Why? The purpose of government is not 
single, save in the most abstract sense. The common welfare is to 
be advanced in a thousand directions that have no closer relation 
than the thousand fields of social activity with which they are con­
cerned. The comparison with a single industrial enterprise is wholly 
fallacious. The directors of a great corporation may well devise a 
unified program for the sole purpose of earning dividends from a 
group of closely allied activities. Nothing of the sort appears in 
government. Who but a dreamer can conceive any relation between 
the suppression of crime and the building of good roads? 
SCATTERING RESPONSIBILITY 
As if the two faults were related, lack of coordination and loss of 
responsibility were intermingled in a scathing criticism by Joseph 
H. Choate, Jr., in the North American Review for January, 1916. 
"The present pernicious committee system," he declared, "is the bane 
of all American legislative bodies. This system, by scattering re­
sponsibility among a score of separate committees, which act without 
reference to each other, and consist of men not known to the public 
in connection with their duties, makes the work of any Legislature 
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inharmonious and uncorrelated, and deprives the people of all real 
power of holding any one accountable for bad measures." Mr. Bryce 
and Mr. Wilson had each blamed committees for their impairment 
of responsibility. Surely it is audacious to question so eminent a 
trio. Yet one may gain courage from recalling that Madame Roland 
found crimes to have been committed in the name of Liberty, anrl 
from reflecting that likewise follies may be committed in the name of 
Responsibility. 
Responsibility is as hard to define as Liberty. Without trying to 
frame an adequate description of its purport, let us assume that the 
sting of its lies in punishment. A man is to suffer for an error that 
can be justly laid at his door, the theory being that certainty of 
punishment will make him cautious and virtuous. With the theory 
there can be no quarrel. Its application to government brings the 
rub. Government may be chiefly a matter of one man-the monarch 
where (if anywhere) autocracy survives, the Prime Minister of 
England, in time of war the President of the United States. Or 
there may be sharing of leadership-the National Assembly of 
France, the American Congress in time of peace, the State Legisla­
tures, each dividing power with Cabinet, President, Governor, or 
party Maders, as the case may be. The two methods, inexactly de­
scribed by the words "autocracy" and "democracy," shade into each 
other, but their outlines are distinct enough to give contrast. 
Democracy secures responsibility through the devices of political 
parties. It makes little attempt to punish individuals as such. It 
holds that in such a matter as the making of laws, wherein many 
men are asked to share, it would be unjust and impracticable to indi­
vidualize responsibility. The vast range of legislation goes far be­
yond the mental capacities of any one man or any small group of men. 
No single human being so nearly approaches omniscience that he 
can reasonably be expected to pass intelligent judgment on the 
wisdom of all the proposals coming to even a single session of a 
State Legislature, much less the thousands on thousands flooding 
Congress every two years. 
CRITICS TAKE PARTIAL VIEW 
What the critics really have in mind is that very small number 
of important and vital ~asures upon which there may usefully be 
party division. By reason of these they damn the whole committee 
system. Some day we may learn how to separate from the mass the 
few great questions of public policy. Meantime it is idle to de­
nounce by reason of irresponsibility an effective, practical, sensible 
way of handling the great mass of the business, in regard to which 
there would be gross injustice, marked lessening of efficiency, and "l•J 
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compensating advantage, were a system securing individual punish­
ment substituted. 
Even the critics of the committee system admit it has various 
advantages. Under it far more measures can be handled. Worth­
less bills can be easily and quickly killed. The chance of h.11Sty and 
ill-considered legislation is lessened. Work is more fairly divided. 
Every member gets an opportunity to have a share in lawmaking, 
where, with only debate on the proposals of a ministry, the great 
mass of members can do nothing but vote. In committees many men 
can apply facilities and capacities developed by their usual vocations, 
which the lack of ease in public speech keeps them from exercising 
on the floor of a House. Each committee acquaints a few men with 
some one field of governmental activity. They become specialists, 
with all the gains that modern development has proved to spring 
from specializing and the subdivision of labor. Some of the mem­
bers are almost sure to serve on the committee several years, thus 
carrying to the newcomers knowledge of the routine of business, 
together with other benefits of experience. Particularly useful may 
be their acquaintance with the capacities and failings, hobbies, and 
prejudices, resources and limitations, of the administrative officials 
whose recommendations are to be accepted or rejected in whole or 
in part. 
COMMITTEES HEAR BOTH SIDES 
Furthermore, committee hearings disclose in some degree the atti­
tude of public opinion and the extent of public demand. They give 
chance to hear both sides without the bias of partisanship and the 
prejudice of personality, better than is possible under the conditions 
of legislative debate. They permit the taking of testimony, the 
preservation of evidence in extenso. They facilitate the use of ex­
perts. They furnish an easy means of communication between the 
legislative and executive departments. 
Bryce noted as an advantage of committees their replacing of 
the system of interrogating ministers in the House that prevails 
in most European chambers. Curiously enough, where Bryce, an 
Englishman, saw gain in this particular, Woodrow Wilson, an 
American, saw loss. Said Mr. Wilson: "Resolutions which call 
upon officials to give testimony before a committee are a much 
clumsier and less efficient means of eliciting information than is a 
running fire of questions addressed to ministers who are always in 
their places in the House to reply publicly to all interrogations." 
It may be that to secure the attendance of officials by means of resolu­
tions is a clumsy method, but there is no need whatever for it and as a 
matter of fact it is rarely used. Customarily officials cheerfully pre­
9£:nt themselves in committee rooms whenever invited, and experience 
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does not suggest that this method of eliciting from them fact and 
opinion fails to produce all the desired results. 
Committees, too, furnish better means for the scrutiny of admin­
istrative departments, study of their efficiency, investigation of their 
defects. If this is to continue a province of the legislative depart­
ment, the functions of committees in connection therewith should be 
elaborated rather than replaced. 
SPENDING PUBLIC MONEY 
(Luce's " Congress, .. pp. 82-86, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. ) 
In each of the last three years the appropriations have 
been more than $10,000,000 below the budget figures. Contrast this 
with the statement made by the English Committee on National E:~­
penditure in 1918, that there had not been a single instance in the 
preceding twenty-five years when the House of Comm'Ons by its own 
direct action had reduced on financial grounds any estimate sub­
mitted. 
Yet Congress has a reputation for waste and extravagance that is 
notorious. Why this injustice, so wide of the facts? It is partly 
because in all times and in all countries where representative govern­
ment has prevailed, many of the people have taken a keen delight 
in abusing their representatives. It is partly an inheritance from 
days when the standards of public service were far below what 
they are today. For example, undoubtedly there was once a "pork­
barrel," a metaphorical barrel from which legislators pulled out 
"pork" to satisfy the ravenous appetites of greedy constituents. 
There is no longer any pork-barrel and there has been none for years. 
Yet the memory survives in what is now little else than sheer slander. 
The baneful fiction is attached chiefly to two classes of expendi­
ture--one for the improvement of rivers and harbors, the other for 
the erection of public buildings. The charge is that untold millions 
are wasted despite the protest of the few honest men in House and 
Senate, against the advice of the Government experts, and to the 
abhorrence of the whole administration. 
What are the facts? 
When a Congressman thinks that money should be spent on a 
river or harbor in his district, he must first persuade a committee 
to recommend and the House to agree that a survey shall be made. 
This must be repeated in the other branch. If that were the whole 
story, there might be just criticism, for so far attention to the project 
will have been largely perfunctory. The story, however, has only 
begun. Now comes the technician, assumed, and usually with right, 
to be expert, unprejudiced, disinterested, honorable. The chief of 
engineers of the War Department, through his staff, which is supposed 
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to be composed of very capable engineers, directs a preliminary 
examination to be made by a district officer. If this officer is con­
vinced by his examination that the project would be useful and 
probably ought to be undertaken, then a regular survey is authorized, 
followed by an estimate of cost. If the report is again favorable, 
it goes to the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, consisting 
of seven men, a briagdier general, colonels, and majors, all of prac­
tical experience in this field. They make careful examination. lf 
they in turn favor, their report must be approved by the Chief of 
Engineers before recommendation will be sent to Congress by the 
Secretary of War. 
The Budget Committee of 1919 was made up of some of the ablest 
noon in the House, men of long experience and the highest standing. 
They were agreed that not in their time had a single expenditure 
for improvement of river or harbor been advised by the Colill!Ilittce 
on Appropriations unless it had been recommended by the Army Engi­
neers and approved by the Secretary of War. 
No unprejudiced m.an can deny that in the last ten years the 
total of appropriations for rivers and harbors has been far below 
what the needs of commerce and the prosperity of the nation would 
have justified. 
In the matter of public buildings Congress has been still more 
shortsighted and miserly. It is grossly wasteful in the extent to 
which it persists in paying rentals rather than build. Much work 
is carried on under crowded conditions that are bad econom;y. Not 
since 1913 has there been a public building bill. One was attempted 
in the Sixty-eighth Congress (1923-1925), for the purpose of meeting 
the unbusinesslike, deplorable situation, but it failed of passage. 
The episode added to the reasons why, if Congress is to be blamed, 
it should be for parsimony and not for extravagance . 
Another misconception about Congress is that in the face of the 
recommendations of its committees and against their protests, it 
greatly increases the appropriations by amendments on the floor. 
Log-rolling is alleged to be a habit. Importunity and favor are 
supposed to waste millions. The fact, however, is that the House 
rules make it very difficult, indeed usually impossible, to add or 
enlarge by amendment. Senate rules are not so strict, and the 
Senate appears to be by nature more lieral than the House. In fact, 
m,ost Representatives would be likely to put it more uncharitably 
and say that the Senate is the less careful, cautious, and economical 
body. Anyhow, the man who thinks that the House has been stingy, 
tries to get a Senator to move to amend by inserting what the House 
has omitted, or increasing what it has voted. The result is that a 
good many increases or new items go from the Senate to the inevit­
able conference committee. In practice this institution long resulted 
in giving the Senate its way much more often than the House 
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relished; but of late that has been checked by a new House rule 
forbidding its conferees, unless specifically authorized by separate 
vote, to agree to any Senate amendments that would have violated 
the House rule had it been offered in the House. As the House rule 
thus controlling is very strict, the Senate is no longer able to force 
appropriations that do not commend themselves to the House. 
Records for many years show that the net increase of appropria­
tions on the floor, beyond the committee reports, has been less than 
one-tenth of 1 per cent. Most of this was undoubtedly for purposes 
about which honest and sincere men might well differ in judgment. 
The figures explain why, at least in Congress, no great importance 
attaches to one of the most mooted issues in the matter of budget 
reform, that of executive control. In Parliament no member may 
move to increase a single item of expenditure as proposed by the 
Government, that is to say, the ministry. Not a few friends of the 
budget reform have insisted that the same rule should be put in force 
here. Congress in enacting the system refused to abdicate its 
powers in this particular. It has seen no occasion to regret the 
decision. Its self-respect was worth saving. It is chosen to carry 
out the will of the people and ought not to shirk its responsibility. 
That in matter of thrift it one the whole meets this responsibility 
in praiseworthy degree, should be the verdict of every fair-minded 
observer.... 
FOUR YEARS OF CONGRESS 
(By James Miller Leake. in The American Political Science Review, May, 1917.) 
.... During the whole of President Wilson's first term of office 
at no time has he failed to lead his party, to shape its program, to 
dominate its policies. Concerning the wisdom of his course, the 
methods he has used, the legislation he has sponsored, his relations 
·with Congress, there is room for, and there is undoubtedyl, decided 
difference of opinion; but on one point all are agreed, friend and foe 
alike,-President Wilson's leadership in his party has been para­
mount. Two illustrations will suffice to show his influence during 
the Sixty-third Congress: first, his reestablishment of the custom, 
followed by Presidents Washington and John Adams, of reading his 
message to Congress; second, his conferences in the President's room 
of the Capitol with Senators and Representatives regarding important 
legislation or business before Congress. With the wisdom or ex­
pediency of these customs one may disagree; of their influence in 
securing favorable action from Congress on bills in which the admin­
istration is interested there can be no question. Throughout his ad­
ministration, Mr. Wilson has made the presidential message a potent 
influence in shaping the legislative program of the session and in 
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winning for the administration program congressional and popufar 
support. In the hands of the President the nature of the message 
has been changed entirely. Instead of the message being, as in 
former administrations, a long executive document droned through in 
a perfunctory manner to an inattentive Congress by a reading clerk, 
it has become a short dignified state paper appealing for needed 
legislation. It is delivered with a certain amount of dignity and 
ceremonial, is listened to attentively by Congress, and is read and 
understood by the public. In delivering his address in this manner 
the President focuses the attention of Congress on the administration 
program, and focuses the attention of the public on Congress. In 
this way public sentiment may be created or made audible in support 
of certain legislation. That President Wilson appreciated the sig­
nificance of the personally delivered address is evident from the 
manner in which he has made use of it. 
. . . . The second custom also seems to be a sensible one. Al­
though certain Senators and Representatives, who still believe in 
Montesquieu's doctrine of separation of powers, have shown some 
resentment at Mr. Wilson's presence in the Capitol when conferring 
on legislation before Congress,--one Senator even charging the Presi­
dent with lobbying,-there seems to be no valid reason why the 
President in his capacity as party leader and as head of the adminis­
tration should not use his influence with Congress in every legitimate 
way to secure the passage of his legislative program. It seems a 
trifle inconsistent that some of those who early in his administra­
tion attacked Mr. Wilson for trying to cooperate with Congress and 
for not seeking the counsel and advice of its leaders. . . . . 
Congress adjourned on October 24, 1914, after a continuous session 
of one year, six months, and seventeen days, the longest continuous 
session on record, during which it had transacted a vast amount of 
important business. The Democratic party had held its majority 
unbroken, had done much to redeem its platform pledges, and had 
established an enviable record for constructive legislation. . . . . 
THE LONG SESSION OF THE SIXTY-FOURTH CONGRESS 
.... An important bill passed largely through the active support 
given the measure by President Wilson is the Keating Child Labor 
Bill. Indeed, it is not too much to say that it was mainly due to 
the President that the matter was brought up for consideration in 
this session, and that without his insistent demand for its passage 
it could hardly have come to a vote. So selfish was the opposition 
of the interests that opposed the passage of the bill that most of 
the Senators who sympathized with the abolition of child labor, but 
voted against the bill on constitutional grounds, repudiated the meth­
ods of the business interests which fought its enactment. During 
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the Sixty-fourth Cor..gress there were introduced in the House of 
Representatives 21,104 bills, 393 joint resolutions, 79 concurrent 
resolutions, 387 resolutions and 1,141 reports. There were enacted 
by the Sixty-fourth Congress 384 public bills and 209 private 
acts..... 
PARTISANSHIP 
(.Luce's "Legislative Procedure," pp. 502-504, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,. 
Mass. ) 
The whips are the agents through whom party machinery is used 
for the conduct of the business of the House. They are the eyes 
and ears of their party chief. It is their business to try to discern 
the direction in which sections of opinion are mpving, to hear any 
mutterings of discontent, and to suggest methods for its mitigation 
or removal. 
The Government whips are paid officials, with official titles that 
do not indicate their real work. The chief of them is a Secretary 
of the Treasury, others are junior Lords of the Treasury, and one 
of them often holds a post in the King's household. They have an 
office in Downing Street beside their official rooms at the House 
of Commons, and perform important duties in connection with the 
arrangement of the business of the House. They sketch out a fore­
cast of the probable work of the session, or of a part of the session, 
estimating the time each item of work will occupy and how much 
time for it can be spared. The chief whip settles, under instructions 
from the Prime Minister, the program of Government business for 
each sitting of the House of Commons, anrl sees that the necessary 
notices are handed in at the table of the House. He ascertains, 
by communication with the whips of the other parties what kind of 
opposition the items of the program are likely to encounter, and 
how many and which of them have a reasonable chance of being 
reached and disposed of before the end of the sitting. He also ar­
ranges in the same way the days on which it would be :most convenient 
to take particular votes of i!!Upply, and how committees appointed by 
the House are to be constituted so as to give a fair representation 
to various sections and interests. These are the arrangements that 
are referred to when members of either of the two front benches talk 
of communications passing through the usual channels. It is by 
means of arrangements and understandings of this kind, carried on 
through the agency of the Government whips, that a great part of 
the business of the House is conducted, and the belief is that it 
could not be got through with in any other manner. 
The whips of the other parties do not enjoy the advantage of 
official posts or official salaries. 
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One of the whips told the Select Committee on Procedure in 1914 
that he thought, if it was found a member was constantly voting 
against his party on important questions, the fact ought to be 
brought to the attention of his constituents. Our inference from this 
may be that an English member who shows any independence exposes 
himself to discipline at the polls through the agency of the party 
servants in the House. 
Most American legislators would strongly resent any such control. 
In our National House of late we have had whips, but they would be 
promptly suppressed if they undertook to carry tales back home. All 
we want and ask of them is that they shall incite members to be 
·on hand at moments of party importance. Very likely they may 
yet develop functions of more consequence, but they will not match 
their English prototypes as long as the great bulk of our legislative 
work remains as it is today-non-partisan. This, be it remembered, 
is a particular in which there is fundamental difference between the 
lawmaking institutions of the United States and those of Europe. 
Under ministerial responsibility, any bill may endanger the Govern­
ment, may turn its members out of office. To oppose is the business, 
the prime purpose, of the opposition. So inevitably the first question 
asked about any proposal is, not whether it is in itself wise, but 
whether it will help to maintain or tend to subvert an administration. 
In the United States the political is usually the secondary considera­
tion if it is brought up at all. With us no party leaders will at once 
lose or gain places of power upon a vote adverse to the majority. 
Here no serious danger attaches to independence of thought and 
action. Personal responsibility is not eclipsed by party responsi­
bility. 
The result is that even in Congress the public welfare is for the 
most part the immediate rather than the ultimate consideration. In 
other words, the wise result is reached directly, and not through a 
partisan medium. Note the declaration of James W. Good, of 
Iowa, Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations of the 
Sixty-sixth Congress, after ten years of service on that committee, 
both when of the majority and when of the minority: "If I were 
to make a rough estimate of the appropriations that are actuated or 
controlled at all by political considerations, I would say that not 
1 per cent of them has any party consideration at all. I do not 
recall now a single instance during my work on the Committee on 
Appropriations when the party lines were drawn. I think the situa­
tion is just contrary to what the public has in mind with regard to 
political consideration." .... 
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INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT 
(Brown's "The Leadership of Congress," pp. 222-224, Bobbs-Merrill Company, 
Indianapolis, Ind. 1922) 
. . . . The successful conduct of party management in the House 
of Representatives is naturally dependent upon the extent and the 
reliability of the information possessed by the leaders as to the state 
of mind of the House. This was as true of the old system as it is 
of the new. Under the old regime the Speaker and his floor leaders, 
obtained their information through the "whip," a member, thus 
designated, whose duty it was to round up members as occasion re­
quired, to ascertain how they would vote, or to instruct them in that 
respect, and to see to it that the leaders were informed accurately 
as to those who could not be counted upon, for or against a measure, 
as the case might be. Under the new regime information is obtained 
in a more formal way, and in one which generally has proved more 
satisfactory to the membership of the House. 
Information is thus obtained sometimes by careful polls of delega­
tions by states, and sometimes through series of conferences which 
the floor leader calls. In this way the latter is able to ascertain 
whether the majority favors or opposes a given measure, and to take 
action appropriate to the situation. 
Under the new system the floor leader and the Steering Committee 
lack the power to compel a member to do a thing against his judg­
ment. The member cannot be removed from a committee except by 
action of the House. Hence, logic, persuasion and the party welfare 
are the compelling influences. Members of the House quickly learn 
that in such a body nothing can be accomJllished except by coopera­
tion. There must be a certain amount of give and take, an accom­
modation of interest, a yielding here for the sake of a gain there. 
The floor leader becomes the medium through which the friendliness 
and the understanding of the House are enabled to work their way. 
Under the system of Reed and Cannon the House did not know 
for any considerable period in advance what the program of the 
House would be. Such knowledge as the leaders had they kept to 
themselves for good and sufficient reasons. Advance information 
might enable opposition to become strong enough to overturn the 
most carefully laid plans. Such a condition was bad for the House 
in that it did not enable members to prepare in advance for the work 
on the floor they might be called upon to do. In the closing days 
of the Sixty-sixth Congress the floor leader began to give notice by 
word of mouth of what might be expected on the program for a few 
days in advance, and later for a number of days in advance. In the 
following Congress the floor leader inaugurated the policy of posting 
a tentative program for a week in advance, and not long after a copy 
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of the program for the following week was sent to each member on 
Friday or Saturday. It was not always possible to carry this pro­
gram out exactly, but members were given reasonably accurate in­
formation, and had time to prepare for the consideration on the floor 
of bills which might not have been considered by committees of 
which they were members, but in which their constituents were inter­
ested. This program is prepared by the floor leader after conferences 
with the Steering Committee, the Speaker, and chairmen of commit­
tees. The Speaker is kept informed of all plans, since he is presiding 
officer of the House as well as a member of the House, but under the 
new system the floor leader has become the general manager of his 
party in the House, the counselor of his colleagues, the harmonizer 
of their conflicting opinions, their servant, but not their master. 
The advantage of the new system lies in its greater flexibility 
and its friendlier democracy. The House is freer under the new 
regime than under the old. With democratization has come a cou­
sciousness of power and a greater intellectual integrity. 
WOMAN SUFFRAGE IN PARLIAMENT 
(By Evans Clark, In The American Political Science Review, May, 1917. ) 
. . . The question for us, then is: does the commons control the 
cabinet, as we are told by the constitutional theorists; or does the 
cabinet control the commons, and through it, reign supreme? 
A review of the votes for women movement in Parliament presents 
as strong a line of evidence in the case as could be garnered from any 
one source. It is claimed by suffrage supporters that there has 
been a clear majority of the members of the House of Commons 
in favor of womens' suffrage since 1886. There is no data at hand 
that will stand the test of non-partisan reliability to prove this con­
tention. But we have an astonishing story of persis.tent and con­
tinuing efforts to pass suffrage bills spread out on the records of 
the House of Commons from the year 1866 to the opening days of 
the great war-a story which goes far in that direction. That 
these efforts resulted, as early as 1897, in the conversion of at least 
one-third of the total membership of the House to suffrage is attested 
by the passage of an enfranchisement bill on its second reading in 
that year by a vote of 228 to 157. 
In 1906 a clear majority of the party in power, to whom the 
government of the day is supposed by the theory of parliamentary 
supremacy to be responsible, went on record in favor of suffrage. 
A suffrage bill was passed through two readings as far back as 
1870; and since that time no less than six m,ore bills have been 
similarly passed, some with overwhelming majorities. Yet no cabinet 
has agreed to make of one a government measure; there has never 
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been an opportunity even to register a vote on a final reading; and 
no bill has been made into the law of the land. 
In other words, there has been on the one side a rising tide of 
suffrage sentiment that has in thirty years swept with it what is 
perhaps a clear majority of the House, and at least a clear majority 
of the party in power, and on the other a cabinet which, unlike 
Canute of old, has rolled back the tidal wave. . . . . All the evidence 
in the case is now in. A review of the record will disclose first 
that individual members of the House of Commons, even though the~' 
include a large majority of the party in power as well as a voting 
majority on the opposition benches cannot make over their convictions 
into the law of the land in the face of cabinet opposition. There is 
some evidence to indicate that a majority of the entire membership 
of the House is equally powerless. The record also shows the con­
victions of a majority of voting members were blocked from effective 
expression no less than seven times. It further reveals twenty 
instances where what may have been a majority of the members 
were not allowed to register their convictions even on a second 
reading..... 
The pressure of business is now so great that the members of the 
House in their capacity of rubber stamps have sanctioned rules 
giving Government bills right of way to an extent which in their 
capacity as individuals they bitterly and openly resent. These rules 
have given power to the cabinet to plot out the course of legislative 
business at all sessions except a very few reserved for private mem­
bers measures. Their time is limited to Tuesdays and Wednesdays 
from 8 :15 to 11 P.M., and on Fridays from noon to 5 :30. After 
Easter, however, the Tuesday period is eliminated, and after Whit­
suntide only the third and fourth Fridays following are allowed to 
the private member. Even these days are not secure against Gov­
ernment aggression. The private members have less than 10 per cent 
of all the time of the House at their disposal,-and the individual 
member must ballot for any share in it at all,-and even that small 
fraction may be eaten into by Government business. The way this 
works out in practice and a suggestion of how it can be used as a 
club on offending legislation by the cabinet may be seen from the 
fate of the suffrage measures of 1874, 1881, 1884 (second bill), 1885, 
1887, 1895, 1896, 1899, 1900, 1901, and 1903..... 
It is practically impossible, as this page of parliamentary history 
bears eloquent testimony, for a private member's bill to dodge the 
fatal blows of the cabinet big stick, if they see fit to use it. Of 
course such private measures do pass. Some ten or fifteen usually 
find their way into the statute books each year. 
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THE POWER OF THE PURSE 
(By J. A. R. :Marriott, in the Nineteenth Centurv , August, 1917.) 
Among the functions at present imperfectly performed the control 
of public expenditure is unquestionably the most important. Where 
is the remedy to be sought? .... 
Plainly the first step to be taken is to insure a real and not merely 
a formal examination of the estimates. But a real examination is 
not possible at the hands of the whole House, nor indeed at the hands 
of any smaller body-such as a select committee-unless and until 
the national accounts themselves are presented in a simplified, 
coherent and complete form. This is a point on which Mr. T. Gibson 
Bowles, whose absence from the House at this juncture is nothing 
less than a public misfortune, repeatedly and rightly insisted. The 
national accounts, he wrote in 1904, are "unsystematic, unscientific, 
complicated and so presented as to conceal and even falsify the facts." 
With the latter charge I do not associate myself, with the former I 
emphatically do. The first thing, then, is that the accounts should be 
presented in form comprehensible by average intelligence. The 
second is that the estimates should be closely scrutinized by a com­
mittee or perhaps a series of committees---0ne for each class of 
votes-specially appointed for this purpose and charged to make a 
report to the House before the estimates are approved in committee 
of supply. An estimates committee was, I believe, set up for two nr 
three sessions before the war, but how it worked or what has become 
of it I have not been able to ascertain. Another reform greatly to be 
desired is the limitation of supplementary estimates. There has 
been of late (I speak of pre-war days) an increasing tendency to 
have recourse to this device, in itself an indication of slipshod methods 
of administration. To eliminate supplementary estimates altogether 
is obviously impossible, but there can be no comprehensive and critical 
review of public expenditure if an exceptional expedient is per­
mitted to become a part of the normal practice. 
Something more is needed, however, than reform of procedure. 
Clearly there must be such reform if the House of Commons is to 
keep a hold upon the purse-strings. But that is not enough. A 
distinguished public servant who has recently retired, after long and 
intimate experience of the Treasury, contributed to the May and 
June numbers of this Review two papers on "The Business of Gov­
ernment." His conclusion may be stated in a sentence: "If the 
House of Commons," he wrote, "really wishes to obtain control over 
expenditure it must concentrate itself not on estimates but on the 
financial side of legislation." I venture to italicise the last few 
words. They go to root of the matter. I have no desire to revive 
half-forgotten controversies, but it is notorious that in the years 
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immediately preceding the war Parliament passed a series of meas­
ures, some of them generally and ardently desired by the country, 
some of them long overdue, but involving nevertheless a vast in­
crease of expenditure, and passed them with a very imperfect appre­
hension of the financial responsibilities which they were likely to 
entail upon the taxpayers. We want, therefore, not only an estimates 
committee, but also a committee whose duty it shall be to examine 
the financial aspect of every bill which involves the expenditure 
of public money-a committee which shall have the power to examine 
ministers and permanent officials, and shall make a detailed report 
to the House before it goes into committee on the bill. It may be 
objected that such an innovation would involve a great expenditure 
of time and interpose a tiresome delay upon proposed legislation. 
Let it be frankly admitted that it would. But is the objection 
fatal? Is it not demonstrably true that much of the waste of public 
money which we are deploring today is due to over-haste in legisla­
tion? The process of legislation if the product is to be sound and to 
stand the test of experience must necessarily be slow ..... 
There is another feature of recent legislation which deserves in 
the present connection close attention. It used to be said of English­
men that they were distinguished from their continental neighbors 
by their "instinctive sqepticism about bureaucratic wisdom!" Con­
sequently they attempted to provide beforehand by statutory enact­
ment for every contingency which might reasonably be expected to 
arise. This naturally rendered the form of statistics elaborate and 
detailed. Owing to the increasing complexity of modern life, to the 
break-down of the economic principle of laissez faire, to the widen­
ing range of governmental guidance and bureaucratic control, this 
characteristic feature of English legislation has tended to disappear, 
and much more discretion is left, perhaps necessarily left, to the 
administrative departments. Parliamentary statutes are increas­
ingly content to lay down general rules and to leave it to the depart­
ments concerned to issue the detailed orders. . . . The regulations 
made under this delegated authority are of two kinds: provisional 
orders and statutory orders. The former, commonly made by local 
authorities or private companies, require statutory confirmation; 
the latter become operative after lying on the table for a given 
number of days. In both cases, therefore, Parliament does in form 
retain control; in neither case is the control in practice effective. 
Whether this delegation of the legislative functions of Parliament 
be right or wrong, expedient or the reverse, is not the point with 
which for the moment I am concerned. In any case, it is unques­
tionable that the practice makes against public economy and tends 
still further to loosen the control of Parliament over public expen­
diture. Each department is naturally disposed to magnify its own 
office, to extend to the utmost limits the powers conferred upon it hy 
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the supreme Legislature; nor is it immediately concerned by the rela­
tions between expenditure and administration. That is a matter for 
the superior authority by whom the powers were conferred. 
It all comes back, therefore, to the House of Commons, and to the 
necessity for insisting upon a vigilant exercise of the powers which 
that House unquestionably possesses. But it is one thing to possess 
powers, and another thing to know how they can be effectively exer­
cised. That the House is gravely perturbed by the growth of expen­
diture and not less perturbed by its own impotence to restrain it, 
was clearly demonstrated in the course of the debate to which refer­
ence has already been made. A proposal was then made by Major 
Godfrey Collins for the appointment of a committee, consisting of 
members of the House of Commons, with power to review all national 
expenditure, examine ministers, and officials and report to the 
House. The idea, as the proposer explained, is that the House should 
appoint a committee with a Treasury official as secretary; that 
the main committee should appoint several sub-committees to review 
expenditure in various departments. Mr. Montagu, in characteristic 
front-bench fashion, attempted to side-track this direct and simple 
motion by proposing instead the appointment of a departmental 
committee to consider and report what changes are necessary in 
the forms in which estimates and accounts are laid before the House, 
and further to appoint a select committee on parliamentary procedure. 
The general sense of the House proved, however, to be strongly 
opposed to Mr. Montagu's amendment and unmistakably in favor of 
the more direct method suggested by Major Collins and his sup­
porters. So unmistakably indeed that the Government so far yielded 
an to propose the appointment of a select committee, for two 
purposes: firstly, to consider whether the House can, in permanence, 
secure more adequate control over expenditure, and by what specific 
means it can exercise it; and, secondly, to go into the spending 
departments, examine their methods of expenditure, accountancy and 
so forth and make recommendations either to the House of Commons 
or to the several departments or to both. This proposal, made by 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was favorably received by the 
House, and there, for the time being, the matter rests. 
P. S. (By the author) : Since this article went to press the 
Government has settled the terms of reference to the select commit­
tee which is to be set up immediately. 

